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ABSTRACT
This study grew out of an interest in environmental justice and the unique problems faced by
neighborhoods located near petrochemical facilities. It also focuses on negotiation theory and
how it can be applied under an increasingly diverse array of circumstances. I sketch the roots of
the concept of integrative bargaining and how it emerged as a powerful yet limited tool for
meeting the interests of stakeholders in multi-party contexts. Specifically, I demonstrate how
research into the structure of conflict, with origins in contract and game theory, encouraged a new
profession that focuses much of its time, paradoxically, on matters of agency, such as the strategic
elements widely viewed as conducive to a Pareto efficient outcome. In an effort to encourage a
renewed focus on structure, I show how in a highly institutionalized setting, which for my
dissertation included the causes and immediate consequences of an accidental toxic emission by a
chemical processing facility, much of the integrative potential of the negotiations that follow is
removed from potential discussion or even discovery before mediators and the parties involved
begin to address root causes. New roles for mediators, and why it is as important to focus on
limiting the narrowing effects of structuration as it is to try and expand the initial offer space, are
discussed. Data for my dissertation include semi-structured interviews with over 90 agency and
industry representatives, residents and community organizers, and the lawyers and mediators who
were also a part of the conflicts that followed accidents such as the Unocal Catacarb spill. I also
collected primary documents, including environmental data, deposition transcripts analyzed to
determine the organizational roots of the accidents, plant management and government agency
records, media accounts, and drafts of community-corporate agreements.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In 1973, there was an explosion on my street. A family, and one of my ex-students was burned by
an explosion that was caused by a young man whom I taught. He was cutting grass in his yard and
his lawnmower hit one of the pipelines, ethylene pipelines that somehow, some way connected
with Shell Chemical that's directly in front of my house... it ignited, and there were two lives that
were lost, and it was the lady who was in the house sleeping, the house caught afire, and the young
boy who was on fire as he cut the grass. (Interview with member, Concerned Citizens of Norco,
Diamond, Louisiana, February 28, 2001)
The literal extension of a Shell Chemical facility into the yards of nearby single
family homes, described above by a long-time resident of a small town along the
Mississippi River, would undoubtedly be dismissed by many as an exaggeration,
misunderstanding, or at worst, an anomaly. Perhaps there are isolated instances where
the boundaries between some of the 278,000 chemical plants and transport, treatment,
storage, and disposal facilities in the United States and residential areas are blurred to an
uncomfortable degree.' Maybe some jurisdictions lack the sophistication or desire to
address these facilities, which were grandfathered into their current location and size
through loopholes in state and federal environmental statutes.2 Indeed, interviews with
planners along the very industrial corridor in which Shell Chemical exists, a heavy
concentration of petrochemical facilities that stretches from Baton Rouge to New Orleans,
Louisiana ("known as "Cancer Alley"), 3 revealed that planners did not see a role for land
use regulations or comprehensive planning in the protection of residents from
environmental pollution. For many of us, it would be all too easy to dismiss "Cancer
Alley" and other such places as vestiges of another time, unfortunate but unusual
examples of pockets of the country holding on to a bygone industrial era begun in the
1890's.
Yet a more purposeful investigation of the lives, stories, and claims of people in
Norco and similar environs elsewhere reveals that the commingling of residential and
industrial zones and its effects on poor minority populations was far from the exception
in our nation's history: it was standard practice and in many places, it was the law. In
March 1927, Texas called for all municipalities to delineate separate residential districts
based on race.4 Winston-Salem, North Carolina, Oklahoma City, and Apopka, Florida,
followed suit in adopting racial zoning ordinances in 1930, 1933, and 1937, respectively.5
Racial segregation through the use of zoning policy has also been documented in such
cities as Richmond, Norfolk, Roanoke, and Portsmouth, Virginia; Birmingham, Alabama;
Atlanta, Georgia; Louisville, Kentucky; St. Louis, Missouri, Indianapolis, Indiana; New
Orleans, Louisiana; and Dallas, Texas.6 In addition, the first zoning ordinances to be
enacted in San Francisco and New York City were designed to maintain segregated
neighborhoods (San Francisco prohibited the operation of laundries in residential areas in
order to keep Chinese people from living in white communities).7 Manufacturing was
often introduced to or encouraged in the resulting sections of cities that housed minority
populations. Minority districts were used as buffer zones between industrial land uses
and white residential areas. Planners developed interesting guidelines such as the notion
that multifamily (disproportionately low-income and minority) housing was appropriate
to site near manufacturing complexes.8 Much of our nation's public housing
developments have been built on comparatively cheap land near petroleum refineries,
landfills, and other undesirable land uses. And in many cases, industrial zones were
overlaid on racial districts.9
For one who has never been to places such as Norco, Louisiana (which includes
the former plantation communities of Diamond and New Sarpy, both settled before the
arrival of the New Orleans Refining Company from which Norco gets its name), the first
moments spent in these neighborhoods can be an exercise in sensory overload. In Norco,
symbols of risks to human health abound: odors, repetitive noises, loudspeakers, flaring,
"blazing" (high flares), and imposing physical structures such as storage tanks are ever-
present. In addition to these and other "mundane stressors" to which residents attempt to
habituate, families living in these communities are regularly subjected to industrial
accidents that result from the operation of such massive, complex facilities. Speaking
with local parish officials, one would never know the frequency of these accidents or the
level of concern they generate among the general population:
For the most part if there is an industrial accident in a facility of the nature we have here, usually
they are all self-contained, usually their internal systems, their safety and fire systems have always
managed to handle it (Interview with St. Charles Parish official, April 15, 2001)
While such a level of trust in a mature industry such as petroleum refining is common,
chemical, refinery, and storage tank accidents "are plentiful, and serious enough in terms
of catastrophic potential." 0 Indeed, accident rates in Saint Charles Parish are high. For
instance, between January 1998 and June 1999, the Shell Norco complex averaged over
3.5 accidents per month that resulted in a chemical release." The Orion refinery
experienced 40 accidents between May 1 and November 12, 2000.12 In addition, the
Norco and New Sarpy facilities are prone to vast quantities of fugitive emissions, which
stem from thousands of pumps, valves, and other elements of a chemical facility that
degrade or malfunction.' 3 Shell Chemical alone has more than 200,000 emissions points.
Failure to adequately check these points at the Shell Norco complex has been extensively
documented. 14
When an accident occurs in a community such as Norco, a series of routine
responses are set in motion. The politics of risk management and communication in
Norco proceed according to distinct ritualistic acts by government and industry officials.
Information available to the public is limited. The Parish did not release a disaster plan
detailing worst case scenarios for its facilities until January, 1999 (submittal of these
plans by June 1999 was required by the EPA in June 1996). "5 By 1997, Saint Charles
Parish had established three ambient air monitoring sites to collect measurements of air
pollutant concentrations.16 However, these facilities are located far away from such
facilities as the Shell Norco manufacturing complex (in Destrehan, Hahnville, and
Luling), and measure a severely limited range of pollutants (PMio"/TSP", Ozone, and
PMio/TSP, respectively). None of the toxic pollutants that are produced by
petrochemical plants or that would be of concern to the residents of Norco or New Sarpy
during an accidental release are monitored by state or federal agencies. Nor are there any
existing requirements under the Clean Air Act for the monitoring of toxic air pollutants.'9
To the present, the Parish does not play a role in environmental enforcement and
compliance and is reliant on the state Department of Environmental Quality for such
20
actions. Citizen complaints are forwarded to an Emergency Operations Center, which
sends information to the state police who in turn work with appropriate state and federal
agencies.
So what happens during a release, or "episode" as it is referred to by the state?
Below are contrasting accounts of a recent accident to occur in Norco, Louisiana:
Shell's account:
0800 - over-pressure of a small vessel occurred at the resins unit at Shell Chemical
0815 - event declared unusual and on-site emergency response team activated
0827 - event upgraded to an alert level, which tells the DEQ and parish officials to assemble their
personnel
0827-0850 - nearby schools told to shelter in place due to the potential for flying debris from a
rupture. State police notified. DEQ director called for a rerouting of busses to a high school
outside the potentially impacted area. DEQ informs schools next to plant to shelter in place.
0935 - state police arrive at plant
0945 - a message is sent over an automatic phone line to Norco residents.
1005 - DEQ officials arrive to take air samples and are informed that there was no release. DEQ
officials decide not to take air samples.
1052 - event is downgraded to an unusual event.
1140 - an all clear is declared.
1500 - fliers are distributed throughout the community2'
Norco resident's account:
8:30 a.m. - a cloudy mist descends upon residents of Washington Street in Norco, LA.
9:35 a.m. - a representative from Shell travels into the community warning residents to keep their
doors and windows closed and to stay inside.
3:30 p.m. - another representative passes out fliers announcing that the emergency was over and
there were no chemical releases to the community22
There are subtle differences in the descriptions of an uncontrolled reaction in a batch
resins unit at Shell Chemical by company officials and a local resident. The militaristic
set of responses in the first account is used by Shell officials to suggest that emergency
response plans in place with the Parish and State worked as planned. It included steps
taken to change the designation of the accident, escalating and de-escalating from
"unusual" to "emergency" to "under control" and finally "all clear." A series of
notification steps were taken to comply with regulations governing the facility's use of
hazardous materials. DEQ officials responded to one of these calls, and declined to take
canister air samples based solely on Shell claims. While procedures were undertaken and
documented by the relevant authorities, residents experienced roughly six hours of
uncertainty, fear, and silence. What role were residents given during this time? As is
standard practice under such circumstances, they simply responded to instructions given
to them one hour after a "black cloud" was seen "walking" across lawns of the homes on
Washington Street at 8:30 in the morning.23 "Shelter in place," they were told: seek the
nearest building, seal off potential sources of air, shut your windows and doors, turn off
your air conditioner (if you have one), and wait. " The "duck and cover"-like qualities of
this approach to emergency planning are striking. In a low-income community consisting
of aging, dilapidated, wooden-framed homes, residents are given the impossible task of
sealing themselves inside, and the disempowering task of remaining completely reliant on
the assurances of industry (and occasionally state) officials, whose common refrain is to
give an "all-clear" announcement or siren several hours after the start of an accident.
Often the potential for toxic releases is ruled out as a possibility when an accident occurs.
If penalties are administered for an accident release, they are minimal and fail to provide
incentives to even temporarily reduce production rates (penalties resulting from Notices
of Violation average less than $1,000 in some states).
Not surprisingly, residents of isolated, low-income, minority communities have
begun to take matters into their own hands in response to industrial accidents. They have
begun to recognize that the state is not nearly as omniscient as imagined when it comes to
answering the simple questions that arise in the event of an incident at a neighboring
facility: What chemicals have been released? Are they dangerous? Will they combine
to form unanticipated compounds either in the facility or in the open air? In what
concentrations will they accumulate on residential streets, and how long will they persist
in the air, water, and soil? Are there risks of domino effects at the facility caused by the
close proximity of other units? Are there appropriately trained, staffed, and notified
emergency response teams and services in the area? How can all who share a stake in the
outcome of such regular incidents learn from this accident and improve public safety and
quality of life? Lacking answers to such questions, local residents have reasserted their
collective security needs and right-to-know as spelled out in the Emergency Planning and
Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA),26 while developing innovative right-to-inspect
and other citizen participation mechanisms that they have tried to implement through
community-corporate negotiations with targeted facilities. Residents have organized
around industrial accidents, forming scores of community-based organizations that have
moved into areas that were previously the sole purview of regulatory agencies, such as
environmental monitoring and development planning. They have established new
initiatives for collaborative environmental assessment, including efforts to monitor
environmental conditions through use of "bucket brigades," "spill teams," "flare cams,"
"reactant bags," and other low-tech strategies,2 8 to deliberate over desired pollution levels
and other concerns through "good neighbor agreements," 29 and to engage government
agencies through sophisticated uses of Toxics Release Inventory data.30 These attempts
to supplement or even rethink traditional command-and-control environmental regulation,
spearheaded by members of environmentally overburdened communities, are a direct
indictment of existing responses to accidents and attempts to rationalize the continued
operations of facilities that by today's standards would not be allowed to cast such long
shadows over homes, schools, and playgrounds.
Indirectly, such actions also constitute a scathing critique of scholarship and
theory-building in the area of environmental justice research. Social scientists, armed
with statistical analysis software and gigabytes worth of spatial and census data, have
seemingly exhausted the possibilities presented them. We have demonstrated substantial
effects of environmental pollutants on human health, estimating some 60,000 annual air
pollution deaths in the United States and linking cancer mortality with the location of
chemical industries. We have isolated minority and income variables and shown that
race is a strong predictor of the location of hazardous waste facilities in certain cities,34
the Southeast,3 5 and across the contiguous 48 states. 36 And we have more recently
explored the power of racial variables to predict health effects and environmental quality
for such wide-ranging matters of concern as air quality,3 7 childhood asthma,38 elevated
blood lead levels, 39 effluent from the hog industry,4 0 and even indoor cockroach allergen
levels.4 1 These and dozens of other studies have shed light on distributive inequities and
their role in explaining disparities in health outcomes among minority populations. 42 But
while this brand of scholarship was at first necessitated by resistance to the notion of
environmental racism and has been useful in shifting attention, policy, and resources, 4 3
some question its utility in getting to the heart of the matter: the multiple, overlapping,
and sometimes hidden forces that lead to disproportionate exposure to environmental
harms, and more importantly, appropriate responses. Pulido summarized the
shortcomings of this research:
The first "racial pitfall" in most work on environmental racism is the assumption that racism is a
specific thing whose effects can be neatly isolated. This assumption exists across disciplines and
has left the strongest imprint on urban poverty debates. Within environmental racism research this
belief is evidenced, for example, by regression analysis, which seeks to determine which variable
is most strongly correlated with particular outcomes.. .While it may be possible statistically to
separate and analyze "racial" and income groups, such a procedure does not necessarily help us
understand the racialized nature of our economy, including the process of class formation, the
division of labor, and poverty... It suggests that racism can be eliminated on its own because it is
readily extricable from everything else"
Academics continue to try to prove (and disprove 45) the extent and forms of
environmental burdens borne by low-income, minority populations. At the same time,
community organizing and the gathering and deployment of new forms of environmental
data by local residents have lead to a surge in opportunities to meet face-to-face with the
perpetrators of industrial accidents, either in a court of law, along picket lines, or across
the table from industry and agency representatives in board rooms, church basements,
and other meeting spaces. My dissertation considers negotiations that occur when the
perpetrators of industrial accidents are bound by permitting authorities to deliberate with
residents, forced to consider settlement options when their probability of success on the
merits is limited during litigation, and encouraged to remove attention focused on their
operations by sophisticated data employment and media strategies.
Why Focus on Industrial Accidents?
The experience of Norco residents during accidental releases is mirrored in many
regions of the country and is far from infrequent: from 1988 to 1992, there were more
than 20 chemical accidents per day, totaling over 34,500 accidents resulting in the release
of a reportable quantity of one or more toxic chemicals.46 In 1991 alone, the National
Response Center received over 16,300 calls reporting the release or potential release of a
hazardous material.47 Such numbers are misleading, as not all hazardous chemicals or
facilities that handle them are regulated. While there are a number of data sources for
"chemical incidents," no uniform definition exists across agencies of the federal
government for the term. In addition, the data that are available suffer from gaps,
duplications, and inaccuracies. Finally, there is no legal requirement for the reporting of
all chemical incidents, which may be reportable to state agencies or in some cases remain
undocumented. But the potential for accidents is staggering. In addition to the thousands
of fixed sites and storage facilities that operate in the United States, more than 250,000
shipments of hazardous materials enter the transportation system each day.48 Figure 1
gives an overview of chemical accidents in the United States over the last ten years. Of
particular interest to environmental justice communities are the following incident types:
"fixed" (release of material from non-mobile machinery, refineries, manufacturing plants,
and other point sources), "continuous" (release above the Federal limits due to normal
operations of a facility), "railroad" (including derailments of freight and commercial
trains and other releases from rail), and "storage tank" (releases from containers that store
hazardous materials).49
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The importance of industrial accidents derives from more than the mere frequency
with which such events are experienced in our nation's industrial zones. Industrial
accidents set the stage for many of the conflicts that occur in environmental justice
communities. They offer rare glimpses into the standard operating procedures that allow
facilities to function in close proximity to residential neighborhoods, conform to permit
and other regulatory requirements, promote a perception that the risks they present are
within acceptable limits, and avoid state- or citizen-sponsored threats to the legitimacy of
their operations. Much of the behavior that occurs in manufacturing and regulatory
organizations has become so habitual (where workers and managers exhibit similar
patterns of behavior when faced with a given stimulus without explicitly selecting it over
other responses) that it is ungovernable by rational deliberation.5 0 The questioning and
changing of habitual routines can only occur under a relatively limited set of
circumstances, many of which are set in motion during an industrial accident:
Encountering a novel state ofaffairs: When a situation is relatively unique, uncertainty over its
meaning can lead to a reconsideration of available responses, although the degree to which the
situation must be different from what workers are accustomed to can vary.51
Experiencing afailure: Sudden failure to achieve certain objectives (such as production runs or
safe operating conditions), and the re-evaluation of goals that it can encourage, leads to
uncertainty and the need to reconsider the appropriateness of routines. However, some groups that
experience failure will simply execute their existing responses more vigorously. In addition, some
organizational groups will close down rather than open up when under stress.s2 Thus it is possible
that certain levels of failure will lead to an "escalating commitment" to existing routines rather
than a reconsideration of their appropriateness. Social facilitation theory also suggests that
heightened arousal during times of crisis will encourage the enactment of dominant responses.53
Reaching a milestone: Studies of group behavior suggest that motivating goals, breakpoints, and
the discretion to make changes can led to the review and reconfiguration of routines. 54 Various
milestones (including anniversaries, deadlines, disruption of trends) can give organizations the
stimulus to break free of old patterns and start new ones.
Receiving an intervention that calls attention to group norms: Interventions from both inside
(management) and outside (regulators, industry groups) an organization can encourage review of
habitual behavior. The intervener must be able to alter the focus of groups from carrying out their
routines to examining their appropriateness.5 5
Coping with changes to the structure of a group: Changes to the composition of groups, the
design of their tasks, and the amount of authority they have to manage their work can lead to
questioning of previously accepted routines. 56
Accidents present an opportunity for community members to focus attention on the
routines at work within chemical facilities that lead to, magnify, and limit learning from
accidents, and the habitual responses evidenced by state and federal agencies that fail to
adequately inform or protect residents or give them a role in environmental decision-
making.
Irrational Outcomes of Community-Corporate Negotiation
For the negotiation theorist, accidents that occur in environmental justice
communities provide a novel situation in which various dispute resolution techniques are
being applied for the first time. The central puzzle that is presented when one considers
these negotiations concerns the "doubly irrational" outcomes that they can generate.5 7
Despite the strong tendency of settlements to fall through when it is perceived that one
side benefits more than the other, and contrary to the fairness norms such as equity and
equality that one would expect to factor heavily in the results of negotiations with
environmental justice communities, agreements were reached in every case that I
considered. In addition, parties to the negotiations evidenced many of the behaviors and
strategies called for in the negotiation literature for the production of agreements that
satisfy the underlying concerns of all parties. At the same time, the agreements were
suboptimal from the standpoint of all parties: industry representatives operating in the
aftermath of industrial accidents and under the shadow of the law and the regulatory state
offered expensive concessions that were not linked to residents' primary interests, while
they rejected low-cost proposals from their host communities for improving residents'
most pressing concerns. Resident concerns focused on symptoms of poor emergency
response planning, environmental monitoring, notification, and citizen involvement that
were revealed during the accidental releases which galvanized each community. It is
striking to learn how these organizing themes were dismissed, tabled, or bargained away
over the course of each negotiation. And it suggests that the existing literature on dispute
resolution is unable to disentangle the complexities of community-corporate negotiation
in a way that elucidates (a) interests, issues, and offers that may remain tacitly understood
or off-limits after an industrial accident, (b) forces at work that can narrow the set of
interests represented in such a negotiation, despite the use of elements of integrative
bargaining known to contribute to the expression and expansion of interests addressed,
and (c) the proper role of neutral interveners (mediators, facilitators) in bringing these to
the fore and making parties understand what can or cannot be accomplished within a
certain window of opportunity after an accident.
It is imperative that environmentally overburdened communities come to terms
with these questions, because of the context in which they are asked: cases where the
disenfranchised have successfully organized, secured technical and legal assistance,
opened lines of communication with heretofore monolithic industrial complexes, and
achieved substantial leverage over their operations. By viewing the limits to integrative
bargaining in this context, we can isolate the areas of greatest resistance to change
following accidents, and the potential for mutual gains that exists should these problems
be translated into new agenda items for future negotiations. It may also be possible to
link the current use of administrative and adjudicative processes to some of the narrowing
of interests that occurs, and suggest how the "solution space," or set of available
proposals and agreement provisions for a negotiation, can be protected even during these
traditional forms of conflict resolution.
Toward a Theory of Narrowing
Negotiation theory focuses on efforts to expand the set of options, resources, and
actions available to parties who have a stake in the outcome of a dispute (see Chapter 2
for an overview). There are numerous ways in which this can be done, including
techniques employed by a neutral mediator, various means of compensation and cost-
cutting, and contractual strategies. Efforts to encourage what is known as "integrative
bargaining" can begin long before parties sit across the table from one another, through
attempts to ensure proper representation of interests, sufficient discretion to commit
among the individuals selected, and an appropriate set of procedural norms to encourage
the generation of new ideas under conditions of minimal pressure to commit to any given
proposal. This body of knowledge, culled from economists, administrative theorists, and
social and cognitive psychologists, is constantly being introduced to new arenas of
conflict in the public sector, including labor-management and environmental disputes. I
argue that in the context of environmental justice disputes, the theory has limited
explanatory power. While it can offer rigorous treatments of what is possible during a
given negotiation and prescriptive advice regarding how to engage in integrative
problem-solving, it is silent when faced with barriers that lie beyond the procedural give-
and-take of a small group and a mediator, or the individual or group decision-making
biases that can pervade such a situation.
Given this limited repertoire for assessing or influencing conflict, it is not
surprising that negotiated agreements that fail to meet the interests of certain parties are
explained under the broad banners of "rational actor" behavior or "power imbalances."
The former perspective seeks to identify important features of a negotiator's strategic
context that impose constraints on self-interested behavior. 58 For example, a rational
choice scholar may point to a classic prisoner's dilemma, where changing rules of
interaction will lead to different choices of behavior (i.e., to defect, cooperate). In the
cases that follow, we will certainly see examples where industry or citizen representatives
adjust their strategies to match certain constraints imposed on them during negotiations.
The notion of power imbalances describes a situation where a party's interests cannot be
met because its "backstop" or alternative to a negotiated agreement is weak, the party's
dependence on an opponent limits his ability to defect, or one side holds a monopoly over
certain forms of information, expertise, or other resources. Again, power imbalances
undoubtedly occur between informal community-based organizations and multi-billion
dollar corporations operating complex facilities. The subtext for either explanation is
simple: stakeholders' preferences are assumed, and the manner (rational choice) and
extent (power imbalances) to which they are pursued are subject to change and limitation.
The negotiation theorist in turn can get to work adjusting procedures and addressing
stakeholder asymmetries in order to induce a more balanced probability that each party's
interests will be expressed and lodged in any settlement. We will see how either
perspective is "too thin," leading to only a partial view of the potentials and pitfalls of
negotiation in the context of industrial accidents. The rational actor model allows for too
much agency among parties to a negotiation in terms of their ability to adjust their
behavior to more optimally pursue their preferences, which are taken as exogenous. The
notion of power imbalances grants too much agency to those who would intervene during
a conflict, such as mediators, arbitrators, and ombudsmen. It suggests that impediments
to agency can be adjusted, or "brought into balance" through various forms of assistance
by a neutral third party.
I will show how in a highly regulated, institutionalized context (such as the
response of agencies and environmental managers to disruptions at a petrochemical plant),
a "thicker" account of the structural limitations to meeting stakeholder interests is
required. We must account for how the unique "collection of institutions, rules of
behavior, norms, roles, physical arrangements, buildings, and archives that are relatively
resilient to the idiosyncratic preferences and expectations of individuals" 59 in such
situations can alter and restrict stakeholder preferences and goals as well as strategies
that are the focus of rational choice scholars. By leaving problematic how negotiating
groups define their self-interest, we can identify the forces that work to shape them and
encourage agreements that deviate from objectives that led to stakeholders' initial
participation in dispute resolution processes. Throughout this dissertation, I will examine
cases where the narrowing of interests, proposals, offers and counteroffers, and other
actions occurs beyond the scope of existing negotiation theory. I will explore four
dynamics that can act alone or in concert to sufficiently foreclose an affected
population's primary interests from rational deliberation or displace initial preferences.
The key factors that will be considered include:
1. The manner in which an accident unfolds, is reported, and is responded to
prior to a negotiation;
2. Efforts, if any, taken by plant-level workers and managers to limit changes to
the status quo, including existing role structures, standard operating
procedures, production rates, and production processes;
3. The effects of parallel adjudicative or administrative actions taken on behalf
of the affected community on resident objectives, agenda-setting, data
collection, and the timing and scope of available agreements; and
4. Limits imposed by the nature of the facilities involved and the technologies
employed for source reduction, pollution monitoring, and risk regulation,
including ways in which these technologies alter resident goals and available
paths for meeting them.
Through a close examination of three cases of industrial accidents which led to
community-corporate negotiation, I will be able to outline a theory of how these forces
work in various combinations, and how standard protocols and tactics introduced in the
negotiation literature fail to account for their effects. The broader objective of this
research is to show how such limits to the representation of affected communities'
interests operate, whether they become more than the sum of their parts when they occur
in tandem, and how they can shed light on the most stubborn elements of resistance to
change in environmentally overburdened communities. By expanding our understanding
of conflict resolution in this area of practice, we become increasingly aware of the next
generation of struggles facing the environmental justice movement, now that it has
reached a critical mass of community organizing, networking, and legal and technical
expertise and often commands sufficient leverage to neutralize many of the power
imbalances that historically shaped the landscape of overburdened communities.
Of the six cases that I considered (three of which are discussed in-depth in this
dissertation), five yielded negotiated agreements that failed to address the primary
interests expressed by residents affected by accidents (and in certain instances the
responsible parties as well):
Swansea, CO - Conoco mediation: A series of non-permitted emissions prompts
residents, a statewide public interest organization, and state and federal agencies to seek
enforcement of various statutes at a Conoco petroleum refinery. Facility management
agrees to negotiate a settlement to residents' citizen suit. Resident proposals rejected by
Conoco include joint exploration of potential odor sources, on-site monitoring, the hiring
of a community technical consultant to review options for equipment upgrades, a
notification system to warn residents during heavy flaring, the pursuit of monitoring
technologies for advanced warning of residents during releases, and a review of sources
of potential releases at the facility. Litigation settlement addresses sulfur dioxide
emissions to the exclusion of other concerns, including benzene emissions to
groundwater that were the cause of state and federal agency intervention. Compensation
to the affected community is unrelated to residents' primary concerns, including security
(residents demanded assurances of reduced flaring and toxic emissions as well as a
notification system), sense of control (through joint coordination of data gathering and an
understanding of risks associated with chemicals released by the refinery), and
empowerment (the ability to educate residents about the risks posed by the facility).
Kennedy Heights, TX - Chevron mediation: The discovery of hydrocarbons under a
subdivision in southeast Houston leads residents to try to establish links between
abandoned crude oil storage pits and high levels of cancer and lupus in the area. During
mediated settlement of mass tort litigation, numerous proposals are raised by residents,
including the movement, replacement, and repair of water lines constructed through the
oil pits, soil remediation in clearly defined areas, set-asides for potential cleanup should
the EPA find new evidence of contamination at a later date, water filtration systems in
homes defined as particularly at-risk by a fate and transport model, medical treatment for
both acute and chronic conditions prevalent in the subdivision, and the buyout of homes
over two of the three pits. Settlement includes the allocation of an average of $4,000 to
over 3,000 plaintiffs according to time lived in the subdivision, distance from pit centers,
and a small personal injury award for high-profile diseases. The settlement does not
address residents' primary interests of security (assurances of no further risks from
contaminated soil or water due to pipe breakage, medical care and monitoring, clean-up
of areas agreed to during site sampling to have significant quantities of hydrocarbons,
efforts to fix, move, or otherwise mitigate waterlines) and economic well-being
(sufficient funds to enable certain families to relocate, including transaction costs, efforts
to address structural damage to the community's home foundations, yards, and
sidewalks).
Manchester, TX - Rhone Poulenc permit renewal negotiation: A sulfur dioxide
release increases resident scrutiny of a permit modification for a nearby incinerator.
Unassisted negotiations include the facility's rejection of such proposals as joint
monitoring of Rhone Poulenc-contracted truck traffic, increased monitoring of
groundwater and air emissions, sharing of monitoring data, a citizen's health survey,
efforts to canvass the neighborhood to determine symptoms of disease and their
distribution throughout Manchester, residents' ability to notify the facility of certain
conditions, citizen audits and influence over the facility's response to recommendations,
and emissions reduction pledges. A settlement which leads to permit approval
incorporates facility commitments already made or projected for the near future.
Provisions include the sharing of data with a newly-formed community advisory
committee (already required by state agencies), sharing of existing monitoring data and
modeling on a one-time basis (already required by the Texas Natural Resources
Conservation Committee), an independent environmental audit (already required by
permit), and $4,000 for a health survey that followed certain protocols accepted by Rhone
Poulenc (never implemented). Residents' interests in security and sense of control over
environmental conditions are not addressed (no pollution reduction offers or proposals
for resident involvement in emergency notification are accepted).
North Richmond, CA - Chevron permit negotiation: During an environmental impact
assessment process for construction at the Chevron Richmond Refinery, there is a
sulfuric acid release at a facility co-located on refinery grounds that is operated by
General Chemical. The accident sends 24,000 to area hospitals and clinics. Various
efforts by organized community groups and regional environmental organizations to
negotiate project mitigations are made, before the City Planning Commission, City
Council, and the Air Quality Management District. Face-to-face negotiations include
Chevron's rejection of numerous proposals and issues of concern, such as community
right-to-inspect, nitrogen oxide emissions reductions, Chevron control over General
Chemical facility emergency management, water emissions (mercury and selenium),
residents' heavy reliance on the Richmond Marina for subsistence fishing, mitigation
funds for school and home improvement to address the inadequacy of shelter-in-place
programs, and efforts to address 90% asthma rates in nearby elementary schools. A
Memorandum of Understanding is signed, offering reaffirmations of existing efforts and
large financial commitments to the broader community that are unrelated to their primary
interests of security (a proposed fenceline monitoring project yields contradictory results
and is never implemented, air and water emissions increases continue unabated, and
certain constituencies such as fishermen and elementary school children are excluded
from the MOU) and control over environmental conditions (the MOU includes no
changes in the direction, quality, or means of post-agreement community-corporate
relationships).
Rodeo/Crockett, CA - Unocal permit negotiation: An environmental assessment
process is disrupted by a 16-day release of Catacarb, a refinery catalyst known to cause
neurological damage, skin disease, birth defects, and other health problems. The County
Board of Supervisors requests that Unocal participate in negotiations with a broad
coalition of residents from several small, unincorporated towns and a public housing
development before granting construction permits for the refinery's reformulated fuels
project. Committees of residents develop innovative, cost-effective proposals, such as
community-wide neighborhood environmental watch, replacement of flaring with
ground-style facilities, on-site professional monitors of the communities' choice on a 24-
hour basis, community odor and spill patrol teams, surveillance cameras at major refinery
units, flares, and fencelines, citizen monitors inside the property to participate in the
activation of public notification and warning systems, fenceline monitors wired to fire
departments and residences to ensure early detection and control of release sources,
computerized databases with information on the effects of known hazardous materials
and recommended treatments, and soil lead testing in the Bayo Vista housing
development along with Catacarb sampling. All such proposals are rejected early in the
negotiation process. Settlement includes a 15 million dollar commitment, with less than
1% devoted to residents' primary interests: security (there is no noticeable improvement
to notification, response, agency procedures, or community involvement to reduce the
frequency and effects of refinery accidents) and sense of control (low-cost proposals for
citizen monitoring or involvement are rejected). Millions of dollars are spent on remote
sensing technologies that have yet to be used in improving emergency response during an
accident.
The conventional wisdom regarding steps that should be taken to engage in "effective
negotiation" is described in greater detail in the next chapter. Then, three cases will be
considered in-depth. First, the response to crude oil contamination of drinking water
through pre-litigation site and risk assessment and its effects on a mediated settlement
will be discussed in Chapter 3. Next, the historical development of the "Unocal Good
Neighbor Agreement" is presented in detail in Chapter 4, allowing us to consider further
structural limitations to integrative bargaining. Chapter 5 presents the Conoco mediation
as a function of parallel administrative actions. The lessons that emerge from these case
studies will be applied to the other examples of industrial accidents leading to
community-corporate negotiation in Chapter 6. A theory of narrowing will be sketched
and used to suggest a balancing of agency and structure in negotiation theory that will
lead to greater explanatory power and more useful prescriptive advice to agency, industry,
and community representatives.
Chapter 2
Effective Negotiation: The Conventional Wisdom
Introduction
A rapid increase in the use of formal negotiation techniques in environmentally
overburdened communities 60 follows the development and intersection of the
environmental justice movement and the field of environmental dispute resolution.61 A
recent drive to institutionalize dispute resolution practice in areas of policy that are prone
to claims of environmental inequity is rooted in the promise of "integrative bargaining,"
or efforts to allow each party in a dispute to move to a more favorable position on their
relevant utility curve. The ideal outcome of integrative bargaining is commonly known
as an "efficient" or "Pareto optimal" agreement. Because efficient solutions to conflicts
are often not known or obvious to parties, the field of environmental dispute resolution
has sought to better understand the conditions necessary for encouraging exploration of
the efficient frontier. Negotiation theory suggests that the extent to which these
conditions are met in a given dispute will determine how close the outcome reached is to
the frontier. The notion of Pareto efficiency has led to troubling assertions regarding the
logic of facility siting and waste disposal in low-income communities of color. Yet
integrative bargaining remains at the core of our theoretical understanding of how
negotiation can meet the interests of disadvantaged groups. Here I consider the meaning
of integrative bargaining from the standpoint of an environmentally overburdened
community, and introduce the tactical/procedural, social-psychological, and group
decision-making variables that have been described in the literature as necessary for
achieving integrative potential. From this literature I will distill the most important
elements of integrative bargaining, and offer a criticism of the theory's silence with
regards to the manner in which institutions (i.e., agencies, rules, routines, technologies)
can structure political situations and leave their imprint on outcomes, including
negotiated agreements. I call for a greater balance between elements in negotiation
theory that speak to exploration of the efficiency frontier and those that constrain the set
of expressed interests, goals, and strategies.
The Theoretical Emergence of Integrative Bargaining
Much of the appeal of negotiation and collaborative approaches to resolving
environmental disputes lies in the logic of "integrative bargaining." This term represents
a distinction that has long been drawn in public administration between compromise and
integration in joint decision-making.62 Compromise occurs when a dispute centers on
issues that involve a fixed total objective value which can be allocated between the
parties in various shares or proportions. Integration occurs when the focus of a dispute is
on problems, where agenda items contain possibilities for greater or lesser amounts of
value which can be made available to the parties. In theory, the potential for an
integrative negotiation increases as the number of parties and issues for discussion
increase, and the manner in which areas subject to negotiation are valued becomes more
diverse. Under these circumstances, parties can search for ways of structuring a deal that
will benefit each party more than the simple division of one or more assets. Even if
parties all want the same things, it is still possible to reach an integrative solution, as long
as each side places different values on each.
Much of the history of negotiation theory was rooted in "distributive bargaining,"
which was first considered in Von Neumann and Morgenstern's Theory of Games and
Economic Behavior (1944). This work characterized the optimal solution to zero-sum
games (involving two players where one wins if and only if the other loses).63 The
authors also introduced a version of game theory"6 to address cooperative situations. The
latter, which has spurred the development of a variety of n-person interactions and has
even encouraged "fair share" treatments of coalition-building within multilateral disputes,
has not received significant attention and is almost absent from modem texts of game
theory.65 The reason lies in the complexity of situations in which cooperation can occur,
namely multiparty disputes. Even three-person, zero-sum games have a large number of
solutions, and it has proven difficult to characterize the solutions to every game.66 I
their place, simple concepts applied to two-person situations, such as the prisoner's
dilemma,67 have proliferated and informed negotiation theory and policy design as well. 68
Bargaining theory was significantly advanced through its formalization by Nash,
who proved that an equilibrium position will always exist when there are a finite number
of agents and a finite number of strategies in a dispute. 69 In a game with two bargainers,
for instance, A and B parties seek to split a value v. This can only be achieved if they
agree on a division. If no agreement is reached, A will get a and B will get b. These are
called backstop payoffs, which have become known as BATNAs (Best Alternative to a
Negotiated Agreement) in the negotiation literature.70 The Nash cooperative solution
applies a rule which states that each player is to be given their backstop plus a share of
the surplus obtained from reaching agreement. These "Nash formulas" for each party can
be represented in slope-intercept form where an intersection of the two lines is the Nash
solution. This theory led to the integrative approach to negotiations, which states that no
available mutual gain should go unexploited. 7 ' The analytic convenience of the Nash
bargaining solution, 72 clear limits to the predictive capabilities of cooperative theory, and
doubts about the solvability of some n-person games73 encouraged the dominance of
negotiation prescriptions rooted in Pareto efficiency. Pareto efficiency is a notion similar
to Edgeworth's (1881) "economic calculus" for drawing up a contract between two
parties exchanging commodities. 74 Edgeworth showed that when the indifference curves
of two individuals are superimposed, each curve for party A is tangent to a unique
indifference curve for party B. This is due to the qualities of parties' indifference curves,
which are subject to the law of decreasing utility and the law of increasing labor. The
curve consisting of these points of tangency is called the contract curve. A point not on
the contract curve corresponds to a contract that could be improved for one party without
worsening it for the other. The pursuit of contracts that correspond to a point on the
contract curve mirrors the pursuit of Pareto efficiency, the notion of which is nearly
ubiquitous in negotiation texts in use today.





Indifference curves LO-L3 correspond to the employee's utility, subject to the law of increasing labor (LO represents initial position).
Indifference curves MO-M3 correspond to the manager's utility, subject to the law of decreasing utility (MO represents initial position).
The pursuit of a formal logical structure of conflicts, begun by Edgeworth, is
directed at the conditions that will ensure their optimal resolution.7 5 A second line of
scholarship has arisen to tackle the sequential programming of interactions of parties
involved in a conflict. This field, known as negotiation analysis, is also deeply rooted in
notions of Pareto efficiency. 76 Here, the contract curve is called an "efficiency
frontier,"77 and integrative bargaining is evoked as a means of reaching agreements that
approach this limit. A number of analytical tools have been developed that can be used
to plot potential contracts between parties, according to how they are ranked, either on a
cardinal or ordinal scale. From a plot of all contracts can be inferred a set of efficient
contracts, or those that jointly dominate the rankings of other contracts. These embody
the "efficient frontier" in a bargaining situation, which when coupled with parties'
reservation values (the lowest utility that either side would accept from an agreement)
define a "zone of possible agreement." It is argued that the purpose of integrative
bargaining is to explore means of reaching an agreement that is as close to the efficient
frontier as possible.
Figure 3. Integrative Bargaining Defined as Reaching an Efficiency Frontier.
From the standpoint of a neighborhood faced with the siting of an undesirable land use,
the notion of Pareto efficiency can appear disturbing. After all, the efficiency frontier
does not discriminate between contracts near the edge of one of the parties' reservation
levels and those toward the middle of the frontier. The utilitarian argument for ensuring
"good policy" when the former occurs is to propose a hypothetical compensation test for
the agreement: If "winners" gain enough to compensate losers fully and if they still come
out ahead, then the agreement is considered a "policy improvement." 78 Clearly, this test
ignores the differences in the value of money to people of different socioeconomic
backgrounds, or whether issues of concern to low-income minority communities can be
quantified and converted to a monetary metric in the first place.79 Some environmental
justice advocates would further argue that negotiated settlements, even when they include
full compensation to a community, are still inherently unfair, as the cost of compensation
would still be lower than what a wealthier neighborhood would demand. And there is no
denying that the logic of Pareto efficiency, when used to address environmental burdens,
has appeared offensive when leaked to the general public, exemplified by Lawrence
Summers' World Bank memo ("The economic logic of dumping a load of toxic waste in
the lowest wage country is impeccable and we should face up to that")."
Nevertheless, integrative bargaining, and efforts to encourage it, cannot be
dismissed out of hand. Compared with available legal remedies and legislative initiatives,
integrative bargaining, when carried out through a variety of alternative dispute
resolution8 ' practices, promises greater flexibility, scope of salient issues, control over
outcomes, and potential to meet unique interests. Rather than objecting to the use of
negotiation in such a context, it is important to investigate whether the inherent logic of
integrative bargaining holds true in overburdened communities. If there are real limits to
its use, then the lawyers, organizers, and residents involved in determining a course of
action in a given community should understand them before a bargaining situation is
entered into. If certain conditions known in the negotiation literature for encouraging
integrative bargaining are not present, this, too, should be shared with professional
mediators, facilitators, special masters, and stakeholder representatives so that sufficient
resources and attention can be redirected.
In addition, Kersten's (2001) characterization of negotiations allows us to
consider integrative bargaining as more than a simple movement toward an efficient
frontier (or the search for dominating offers within a given set) with the possible
necessity of side payments or compensation should a result prove efficient yet
inequitable.8 2 Indeed, a negotiation that produces a strictly "efficient" offer suggests that
other offers, should they produce further gains for one party, will produce losses for the
other. To avoid this paradoxically distributive end result of integrative bargaining as
reaching Pareto efficiency, we must think of IB as a process which creates the potential
for value creation through the changing of the initial offer space. This can be done
through the following activities:
1. Modifications of one or more constraints defining the initial set of feasible
offers
2. Addition of new offers which expand the set
3. Changes in the dimensionality of the set (i.e., a new attribute is discovered
that is indicative of parties' joint interests)
These truly integrative activities introduce a qualitative difference to the negotiation
process, as opposed to simple quantitative differences that are the focus of much of the
literature that views IB as efforts to reach an efficient frontier. Figure 4 illustrates the
differences between two forms of distributive and two forms of integrative bargaining.
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Arrows in each drawing represent a sequence of alternating offers. In the positional
bargaining example, parties make initial offers that yield comparably high utility values
for them. Each subsequent offer corresponds to a small concession. Under certain
conditions, a compromise is reached that may or may not be near the efficient frontier.
One technique of reaching as close to the frontier as possible under these circumstances is
for one party to propose several offers that yield the same utility for them, and the other
party selects one of them. The single text negotiation in the upper right was developed
by Fisher and Ury.83 Here, an initial offer is made that yields low utility for both sides.
Parties either work together or with a mediator to point out the flaws in the design and
create changes to the offer. The process continues until either an efficient offer that
cannot be further improved is made, or until external pressures, decision-making biases,
or information processing challenges bring the talks to a premature close. The
requirement for each stepwise movement toward the frontier is that each subsequent offer
must dominate the previous one, an essentially distributive exercise. Truly integrative
bargaining is depicted in the lower left and right corners of Figure 3. The utility curve to
the lower left of these drawings is equal to the curve (UI) in each distributive bargaining
example. In the lower left, parties know the available sets of offers. In the lower right,
parties expand the offer set without defining the expanded sets. The key difference
between the IB and DB examples is that in DB, parties do not modify the set of offers
and merely strive for efficient solutions within an existing set, whereas IB involves the
creation of value or new alternatives through restructuring of the problems at hand. If we
view integrative bargaining in such a way, then its underlying logic can be turned from
the efficiency of clusters of noxious facilities to the adequacy of existing efforts to
improve the lives of those who dwell in such places.
Meeting Integrative Potential: The Received Wisdom
Integrative bargaining sets a high standard for itself by evoking its ability to
produce agreements that are more stable than compromises (which encourage issues to
resurface at a later time), its tendency to strengthen the relationship between parties by
encouraging problem-solving, and its potential to contribute to the welfare of a broader
community in which multiple parties are members.8 4 The literature suggests that parties
should focus on several factors which are supposed to lead to conditions conducive to IB
and an increase in the joint benefit available to industry, agency, and community
representatives. Pruitt (1981, 1983) was one of the first to espouse strategies by which
parties' initially opposing demands in a negotiation could be transformed into alternatives
to reconcile their interests and yield integrative solutions. 85 These include:
1. Increasing available resources: This is a useful approach when parties reject
certain demands because of opportunity costs. If a rejected proposal reflects
its inherent costs to another party, then increasing available resources may not
encourage agreement. Parties are encouraged to consider whether the conflict
hinges on resource shortages, and whether critical resources can be expanded
through joint action. This tactic has come to be known as "increasing the pie"
or "avoiding the fixed-sum error."8 6
2. Nonspecific compensation: Through the gathering of information regarding
what each party values and what they are sacrificing through the concessions
that they make, adequate compensation for these concessions can be
determined.
3. Logrolling: Sometimes, negotiation agendas can be developed that consider
several issues where parties have different priorities among them.87 Here, all
parties, rather than one or a small subset (as in #2), are compensated for
making concessions desired by others. It is necessary to understand each
party's priority orderings in order to move systematically through a series of
possible packages8 8 or single-text agreements (tentative negotiation proposals
that are examined, criticized, and improved by all parties).
4. Cost-cutting: Integrative bargaining can occur when one or more parties
achieve their objectives while others' costs are reduced or eliminated. This
tactic focuses on the costs incurred by certain stakeholders because of their
acceptance of a proposal, rather than on providing an unrelated repayment.
5. Bridging: Similar to logrolling, parties work to satisfy the most important
interests underlying their demands. This tactic is derived from Simon's (1957)
notion of a search model of administrative decision-making.8 9 If initial efforts
do not yield a mutually acceptable proposal, then each party will discard some
of their lower-priority interests and recommence the search for a new option.
The tactic of looking past superficial demands was popularized by Fisher and
Ury.90
Other tactics for achieving IB have emerged, focused on the contractual problems
associated with bargaining. These include solving problems of adverse selection and
moral hazard,91 and the construction of post-settlement settlements (which allow further
movement toward the efficient frontier). 92 Taken together, these are the basic tactics that
embody the kind of creative problem solving that can lead to integrative agreements.
They can be used in isolation or together to either expand the zone of possible agreement,
move toward the efficient frontier, or remedy some of the inequitable consequences of an
agreement. They overlap somewhat with Lax and Sebenius' (1986) catalogue of
opportunities (stemming in large part from parties' attitudes and perceptions) for
integrative bargaining, which focuses on exploiting differences between parties in terms
of their (1) interests and how they are valued, (2) view of possible future events, (3) level
of risk-aversion, (4) time preferences, (5) attitudes toward precedent and principle, (6)
constituencies, (7) criteria for success, and (8) capabilities. 93 Lax and Sebenius were the
first to give form and precision to these means of using common differences to create
value.
Wetlaufer (1996), by outlining the contexts in which these opportunities can lead
to integrative bargaining, showed how the general conditions underlying a dispute must
be coupled with certain of Pruitt's tactics for value creation in order to yield truly
integrative solutions.94 For example, increasing available resources ("expanding the pie")
through a focus on parties' differing probabilistic assessments of the likelihood of a
future event (number 4 above) can only happen if parties (a) are willing to speculate and
bet on their projections, (b) avoid risk-bearing combinations that decrease the probability
of agreement, (c) construct appropriate contingent agreements that account for their
differing time preferences, and (d) take action within a small window of opportunity
before the increased resources become unstable or return to their original position. Of
course, each of these activities requires that parties engage in joint problem solving
characterized by a certain level of cooperation, information-sharing, trust, and honesty. 95
Pressures to engage in distributive bargaining or value claiming behavior inherent in all
IB situations will limit these behaviors. Wetlaufer suggested that opportunities other than
those provided in Lax and Sebenius' conditions number (1), (2), and (4) above will not
result in integrative bargaining unless they are combined with one or more of the other
conditions and tactics.
As integrative bargaining was increasingly applied to labor-management disputes
(under the rubric of "mutual gains" negotiation) 96 and then environmental conflicts,97
several developments have sought to provide additional nuance to our understanding of
how integrative bargaining works. First, renewed focus on cognitive aspects of
negotiation gave scholars an opportunity to criticize traditional behavioral 98 and game
theoretic 99 approaches to bargaining, which as we have seen focused on parties' expected
utility. Psychological research showed that parties will often violate the rules of utility
theory upon which integrative bargaining theory was first constructed. 100 The dominant
bias in environmental disputes was found to be the assumption that a negotiator's
interests will directly oppose other parties' interests (the "mythical fixed pie
problem").101 A primary example of this bias in action occurs during CERCLA litigation,
when parties attempt to shift cleanup liability rather than agree to a prelitigation
settlement that cuts down on transaction costs. Those who carry the fixed-pie assumption
through a negotiation will also exhibit information processing errors, either
misunderstanding or ignoring certain data as it becomes available or reactively devaluing
concessions made by their adversaries. 102 It also limits parties' chances of achieving log-
rolling gains or finding outcome preferences over which parties agree. Other cognitive
biases that can limit the integrative potential of a negotiation include sacredness (viewing
certain issues as unavailable for trade or compromise),103 the endowment effect (prior
ownership of a good or experience of a positive state will increase its perceived value and
make it more difficult to trade) 0 4 overconfidence (individuals overestimate the
probability of their accuracy),105 positive illusions (belief that one does more harm or
good than reality suggests and attribution of desirable behaviors to in-group members),106
egocentrism (justification of one's assessment of fairness by changing the importance of
attributes affecting what is fair,107 and framing (consistent with prospect theory,
negotiations will have different outcomes when they are described as bargaining over
losses or gains).108 These biases can have a substantial impact on stakeholder perceptions
and behaviors, and therefore their ability to reach the integrative potential of a
negotiation.109
A second area of development concerns group behavior and decision-making
barriers to integrative bargaining. Three primary areas of research concern group
dynamics, coalition-building, and representation. Group relations studies 10 suggest a
variety of social influence effects on rational efforts to reach agreement, behavioral
norms and roles, and preferences. Social influence theory began with studies of task
performance in the presence of others and grew into several research programs aimed at
teasing out more systemic effects of group membership on conformity to norms and
positions. The importance of social influence lies in its effects on the acceptability of
solutions or agreements, through the establishment of "groupthink," "valence," and
"risky shifts.""' Through such mechanisms, groups can problematize individuals'
preferences or even lead to reversals. Even absent social influence, group negotiations
require that proposals are kept incomplete, meaning the plethora of possible endpoints
available to a group blurs the interpretation of a party's expressed demands. Individuals
must spend significantly more time either advocating norms of conduct or looking to the
group for clues as to how to proceed (i.e., how should a "fair" agreement be identified?
As equitable, equal, maxi-min, etc.?). Information processing demands increase, as do
the complexities of interpersonal processes. At the same time, feedback to group
members declines as the number of people involved increases, and patterns of interaction
become unbalanced. 1 2 Members of groups prone to social influence and information
processing problems have to address a series of issues before anything approaching a
search for integrative solutions and their distribution can begin: they must agree to social
combination rules (do we operate by consensus, majority rule, super-majority,
deliberation, force?), distribute and adopt new roles and norms of behavior, and ensure
that the negotiation holds open chances for group members to share new ideas and
alternatives by keeping moves toward false consensus in check.
The increased complexities associated with group interaction create incentives to
form coalitions and unique opportunities to cooperate. Coalitions lie between informal
expectations of where cooperative energies should be directed and formal, codified rights
and duties of parties to a collective. They tend to be short-term and are used to either
ensure enactment of a set of decisions or the blockage of consensus. As with social
influence mechanisms, it is an agent's perception of whose participation in a decision-
making process requires her own and vice versa that determine the stability of
coalitions. 1 3 Raiffa's experience with coalition games suggests that prescriptive advice
for parties seeking to join them is difficult to obtain." 4 A better understanding of the
calculus of entry into coalitions and the tendency for different configurations to alter
group decision-making should be required of parties and intervenors. For example,
coalitions may encourage more efficient issue management, through the creation of
unique, coalition-specific languages or frames of interpretation. Or, coalitions can be
used to delay or disrupt consensus. Mediators who understand the degree to which
coalitions within a group are nested, disjoint, or overlapping will be better able to spot
where agents who can bridge or block group activities are located. There must also be an
awareness of how a shifting network of coalitions can lead to role differentiation or
confusion about how active each party should be in carrying out different tasks.
While self-interest and competitive strategies are responsible for the initial
formation of coalitions, responses to the complexity of group interaction can also proceed
in the spirit of cooperation. The support of multiple parties for emerging norms and
incremental actions and promises can in and of itself encourage cooperation. Axelrod
(1997) identified norms (or expectations for behavior) as the primary factor explaining
cooperative behavior.1 5 Norms can substitute for costly monitoring schemes which
Olsen (1965) argued will override the benefits to cooperation." 6 Thus, it is important to
isolate the mechanisms responsible for the emergence of norms in multilateral contexts.
For example, mediators who are aware of parties' perceptions of similar negotiation
settings will be able to anticipate how they will fall back on behaviors that were
perceived as optimal in those other contexts. Helping parties define a negotiation setting
in similar ways will facilitate interaction and the use of similar scripts, encouraging the
cooperation necessary for joint problem solving and integrative bargaining.
The presence of non-monolithic parties, or stakeholders composed of multiple
entities, results in a final challenge for groups seeking to engage in integrative bargaining.
Each member of a group serves as an agent for x principals, who may or may not be
agents for other parties. This added element results in the spreading out of negotiations
from simply taking place "across the table" to occurring simultaneously within each non-
monolithic party. One solution to this additional layer of complexity might be to tailor
principle-agent models to real-world negotiation settings and use them to suggest the
proper incentives necessary to ensure that a principal's interests are represented.
However, principals may not hold a monopoly on legitimate interests. It is quite probable
that through the development of simultaneous principal-agent and across-the-table
negotiations, agents will develop legitimate concerns that differ markedly from those of
their principals." 7 Parties and neutrals are left with the task of synchronizing these
parallel negotiations and avoiding the adoption of norms or decision heuristics for group
decision-making that will limit the effectiveness of principal-agent negotiations.
Limits to Negotiation Theory
Many of the conditions described as necessary for achieving integrative potential
are evident in conflicts involving environmentally overburdened communities: parties
have different interests (e.g., security, certainty, recognition, economic gain), as well as
interests that they value differently. As an example of the latter, residents want steps
taken that will increase their security from accidental releases while facility managers
desire security in the form of continuous production. Residents want stability in the form
of steadily reduced emissions, fewer episodes, and more predictable facility operations.
Managers of industrial facilities value stable relations with agency monitors and rule
enforcers and a stable internal culture and division of responsibilities across various
employee roles. They may have different conceptions of time, influenced by the urgency
of needed environmental improvements, deadlines, or levels of risk aversion. Residents
may give greater weight to costs imposed on future generations than their private
counterparts. Each side may assign different odds to anticipated outcomes of a
negotiation. For example, if a facility believes that certain raw material costs will
increase while a community group anticipates lower costs, they might both agree to tie
financial contributions to the plant's future profit margins, with each side able to live
with the anticipated outcome. In addition, parties may have access to different kinds of
information, skills, or capabilities that can be combined to form the basis of an agreement.
The possibilities for reaching an integrative settlement among multiple parties are fairly
unbounded in theory.
While strong gains have been made in explicating the tactical prerequisites,
social-psychological inhibitors, and group decision-making challenges to integrative
bargaining, focus on external, structural constraints on IB have been less productively
verified and translated into useful prescriptions. Game theory has provided some useful
models of creative problem-solving, including the combined effects of external
constraints (such as deadlines, the cost of inspection of clause offers, and the fact that
individual costs and benefits of negotiating are not synchronized) with internal, party-
specific constraints (such as the potential value associated with a finite number of issues,
the sincerity of proposals, the propensity to reject proposals, and the inefficient limits
placed on searches for creative solutions when side payments are not allowed)." 8 To
date, however, little has been done to empirically evaluate models which vary structural
variables or to compare the broader integrative and distributive models that have risen to
prominence in the field.'9 This is the case even though structural limitations, such as
predetermined roles of parties that are defined by legal and political structures, have been
given as a primary reason behind IB's limited initial acceptance by labor and
management. Incomplete understanding of how structural variables constrain IB or the
available set of feasible offers for a given negotiation leads to prescriptive advice
centered on procedural tactics and efforts to ensure productive group behavior and
decision-making. While such endeavors are certainly useful, they can also lead to a false
sense of security if they fail to explain to parties the possible limits to IB hidden within
the structure of relationships between stakeholders and the broader economic, political,
and technological context within which a dispute unfolds. Proponents of effective
negotiation might therefore encourage representatives of environmental justice
communities to engage in a certain level of cooperation, trust, and information exchange
necessary to achieve integrative bargaining without a full disclosure of its inherent limits
within this unique setting.
The attempt by victims of industrial accidents to negotiate with owners and
regulators of petrochemical facilities gives us a setting within which to better synchronize
agency and structure within negotiation theory. I will do this by demonstrating the
tendency of such negotiations to narrow the preferences, goals, and strategies of relevant
parties and the means through which these are discussed, translated into proposals, agreed
to, and implemented. This approach bypasses the primary shortcoming of rational choice
theory, which brackets the issue of preference formation or assumes an a priori definition
of self-interest. The influence of rational choice theory over the conventional wisdom of
"effective" negotiation can be seen in how this assumption of preferences leads to
admonishments to "identify stakeholders," "categorize and order group interests," and
"ensure that primary interests are represented, expressed, and traded" through a dispute
resolution process, as if such elements are clearly defined and waiting to be applied in a
way that maximizes joint utility. Because preferences are fixed in this approach,
suboptimal agreements are blamed on procedural mistakes, most common of which
include incomplete representation, expression of existing interests in a group setting,
tradeoffs, compensatory measures, and allowances for individual and group limits to
these activities. My analysis proceeds from the assumption that people don't simply ask
"how can I maximize my self interest?" when faced with a given choice set; instead, they
will follow situationally defined rules to guide their behavior, even when so doing may
not meet their primary interests or concerns. We will see how in the case of an
environmental justice community, leaving problematical how parties define their self-
interest opens up the analysis to new factors that can constrain the full expression of
interests, and the movement of a dispute resolution process from an industrial accident to
the broader symptoms of disproportionate environmental burdens and neglect that persist
in such a place.
We will proceed by taking an in-depth look at three cases. Rather than focus on
the rational actor (agency) variables that are known to encourage movement toward an
efficient agreement, I will treat each stage of the case (accident, response, negotiation,
agreement implementation) as an occasion for changes to the initial offer space, through
either (a) preference formation or change or (b) structural limits to their expression. It
makes little sense to focus on reaching an "efficient" solution in such a context,
particularly when studies have shown that multiparty negotiating games such as those
that occur following an industrial accident have more than one efficient solution and a
nearly inexhaustible set of inefficient or unfair outcomes. 2 1 It is the rethinking,
displacement, and constraint of interests relating to the pursuit of relief from
environmental burdens that parties and neutrals alike must be able to identify and guard
against, lest we allow a dispute resolution process to devolve into a temporary exercise in
conflict avoidance. A complete typology of the forces that can "narrow" the full
expression of an overburdened community's interests will include the institutions, roles,
and responsibilities present during each stage of conflict formation and resolution that
can shape actors' preferences, goals, and strategies, mediate their relations of conflict and
cooperation, and structure situations in ways that leave their imprint on outcomes. These
factors will then be compared across six examples of post-accident negotiation in order to
add nuance to how they can be expressed. At this point I will able to provide a refined
theory of narrowing that offers a more balanced approach to negotiation theory: through
a clearer understanding of how qualitative changes to an initial offer space can be
influenced by elements of agency (which predominate existing theory) and structure, we
can seek to improve not only how overburdened communities approach the limits to
integrative bargaining but also how negotiation analysts in general should consider
conflict assessment, group facilitation, and process mediation.
Chapter 3
The Narrowing Effects of Pre-Litigation Site Assessment:
Kennedy Heights Mass Torts Claims
Introduction
As compared with the good neighbor negotiations discussed in the next chapter, a
two-year mediation process regarding toxic exposure in Houston, Texas was entirely
shaped prior to the first meeting between residents and a court-appointed special master.
Residents' interests remained off-limits throughout the process to such a degree that there
is little sense today that their primary concerns, reflected in low-cost proposals and
organizing themes prior to the mediation, were even considered. The narrowing effects
on what resident interests were represented during mediation were generated by the
manner in which the slow-moving, gradual contamination of a subdivision was responded
to prior to negotiation. Through the use of site characterization and risk assessment, the
scope of the accident was defined by a government agency (the Railroad Commission)
and a private entity (Chevron Corporation, who owned the site prior to residential
development) in such a way that did not reflect resident experiences with and stories of
contamination, or their ideas for how to ensure an environmentally safe place in which to
live.
The residents of Kennedy Heights in southwest Houston, Texas wrestle with a
complex set of questions about their neighborhood. At base is their concern that
something dangerous, potentially even poisonous, exists beneath the soil under their
single family homes. To get answers, residents called upon the appropriate state and
federal regulatory agencies in the early 1990's, specifically the Railroad Commission of
Texas and the Environmental Protection Agency, to investigate what earlier contractors
hired by the city suspected was residual contamination from crude oil storage. The
resulting investigations took ten years, and encompassed two of four elements of the
scientifically accepted practice of risk assessment: exposure assessment 2 2 and risk
characterization. Residents of the subdivision also sought redress in the courts, by
filing toxic tort claims against the former owners of the site.' 24 The two processes, risk
assessment by the state and EPA and toxic tort litigation, are driven to varying degrees by
questions of causation, which are answered by the same group of people: experts.
Before residents can be told whether the air they breathe or the water they drink is
causing them harm or threatening them, a series of "experts," mostly contractors hired by
an agency or potentially liable party, will first look at the totality of the evidence and
make a series ofjudgment calls.'2 5
The final product, a risk assessment conducted by contractors for Chevron and
accepted by the Railroad Commission and later the EPA, reflected merely a stylized
account of a negotiated process between a regulated entity and agencies that lacked the
wherewithal to participate in the give-and-take that was involved. While the conclusions
were clearly stated, the assumptions underlying the findings and the process which led to
the collection of data points were obscured or left out. The narrowing effects of pre-
litigation site and risk assessment on resident interests that occurred in Kennedy Heights
is important to demonstrate because, despite its shortcomings, the "weight of the
evidence" 126 approach to risk assessment is accepted practice among regulatory agencies.
More generally, it comports with the received view of science first sketched by Karl
Popper. Popper noted that, far from universal knowledge derived from formal logic,
science is an imperfect process involving intuition, conjecture, inference, professional
judgment, and repeated testing. This sort of "deductive falsification" guides most of
the progress of science today. However, a relatively recent development in the courts
offers a competing view of science, one that is more closely aligned with the logician's
search for universal knowledge derived from formal logic.1 28 The ascendancy of this new
standard of scientific validity in the courts presents residents of contaminated
communities with a conundrum: the methods upon which they must rely to demonstrate
that their properties pose a risk and should be cleaned up call for improvement and
greater transparency, while at the same time a new judicial interpretation of scientific
evidence threatens to limit the interests of effected populations that are addressed and
even render some of them off-limits after an industrial accident.
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Daubert v. Merrill Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,129 federal trial judges are charged with the task of determining the
admissibility of scientific evidence, including the results of site and risk assessments used
in toxic tort cases. Because causation claims in toxic torts rest on expert testimony, this
"gatekeeper" role for district judges is critical: if experts are not allowed to speak to their
findings, the vast bulk of toxic tort cases will be dismissed on summary judgment. How
are district judges supposed to evaluate evidence that purports to be scientific? Daubert
requires a trial court, under Rule 104(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE),13 0 to
determine whether an expert is testifying from scientific knowledge13 1 and whether their
reasoning or the methodology underlying their fmdings is scientifically valid. 3 2 In dicta,
the Court added several criteria for whether information testified to by an expert witness
could be considered valid, in addition to the test of "general acceptance" formerly used in
Frye v. United States13 3 : whether the methodology employed to generate the information
can be proven wrong, whether the method has undergone publication or peer review, the
existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique's operation, and the
method's known or potential rate of error. 3 4 Many courts have read these and
requirements suggested in subsequent decisionsm to mean that the evidence presented by
a scientific expert should be without flaws, logical leaps, or inferences that have not been
proven fully. Such a high standard of validity is evidenced in the "corpuscular approach"
used by most courts: a proponent of scientific evidence must establish the reliability and
relevance of every individual study from which they drew their findings (in addition to
the same test for the expert's broader conclusions).136 Absent this finding, summary
judgment will be granted.
An example of the use of the corpuscular approach is General Electric Co. v.
Joiner, the reasoning of which (along with Daubert) has been enshrined in a recent
amendment of Rule 702 of the FRE.13 7 In Joiner, the plaintiffs' experts concluded - and
offered to testify - that plaintiffs had developed lung cancer because of their exposure to
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCB's). Five studies were offered to support this finding:
one animal bioassay and four epidemiological studies. The Supreme Court ruled that the
trial judge was entitled to find that each of the studies lacked the necessary validity for
drawing a reliable scientific inference regarding PCB's and whether they caused cancer.
One of the studies lacked statistical significance (although the Court did not provide a
gauge of the p values necessary for declaring a significant finding, leaving that
determination for the authors of the study.139 Another found a statistically significant
relationship between PCB exposure and lung cancer death, but because the Japanese
factory workers in that study had been exposed to other potentially carcinogenic
substances (such as rice oil), the study was invalid (again, there is no discussion of
whether statistical measures for accounting for confounding variables used in the study
were adequate, or how one would evaluate such a procedure).140 Plaintiffs' experts were
not allowed to testify as to their findings.
Indeed, challenges to expert testimony were more successful following the
Daubert decision. One report found that rate of exclusion for "evidence based on
physical science in a product liability case jumped from 53% during the two years before
Daubert to 70% between mid-1995 and mid-1996."' 4 ' A fifty-case sample of civil
actions spanning three months found that 90% of the experts challenged were excluded
by district judges.142 The post-Daubert environment, characterized by a conception of
science that is more precise and exacting that the scientific method itself, posed a
challenge to the residents of Kennedy Heights, whose legal counsel decided to enter
mediation rather than face a Daubert hearing on their soil and water contamination
evidence.14 3
More importantly for our purposes, the methods used in Kennedy Heights for
more than ten years in an effort to find a scientifically valid answer to resident concerns
fed into the limiting dynamics at play during post-accident community-corporate
negotiations. The results of site assessment in Kennedy Heights, where "scientific"
methods were applied in a form of negotiation between a regulated entity (Chevron) and
a resource-strapped and arguably inept agency (the Railroad Commission), suggest that
the manner in which an accident is responded to (including a growing disconnect
between resident experiences and sampling frame choices, interaction and negotiation of
the process between an agency and regulated entity, and interpretation of disparate
findings through techniques such as risk assessment) and corresponding administrative
actions can render resident interests inaccessible during subsequent negotiations.
This chapter sets out the story of Kennedy Heights. Rather than focus on the case
that ultimately was settled by a court-appointed special master, it delves into the parallel
process of investigating potential site contamination, which set the agenda and to large
extent the outcome of subsequent mediation. The process is recounted here following
extensive document review, including internal and external Railroad Commission
correspondence, fieldnotes, and data, site and risk assessment documents prepared by all
relevant parties, historical primary documents regarding the site's history, and interviews
with a handful of "experts" charged with managing the process (from the Railroad
Commission, Exploration Technologies, Inc., the Texas Natural Resources Conservation
Commission, and Chevron attorneys, who spoke on behalf of the contractors who
prepared the site's only comprehensive risk assessment report).
Given the standards of admissibility for scientific evidence in mass torts cases
shaped by the holding in Daubert, the Kennedy Heights experience should give us pause
before we accept the assumption, exhibited even by the final judge to preside over Adams
v. Chevron, that such evidence must be "sufficiently established" and constitute
"scientific" proof of a certain proposition.144 Primary documents outlining the various
efforts toward site characterization and risk assessment suggest that these processes were
shaped in different ways, utilized divergent assumptions, and ultimately yielded findings
that more closely resembled arguments than results. The rich history left behind by the
Kennedy Heights story gives us a chance to see the tasks of site characterization and risk
assessment for what they are: inherently negotiated exercises, riddled with limitations,
and bounded in terms of what they can tell the expert or the layman. Such an
understanding has implications for post-accident negotiations that extend far beyond the
boundaries of this single subdivision in Houston, Texas.
The Site: Kennedy Heights, Texas
Preliminary Note. Each of the following three chapters offers a case study of a
different form of post-accident community-corporate negotiation. This chapter presents
the results of a case study of site and risk assessment in Kennedy Heights. There are
three primary rationales for conducting a single case study.145 Occasionally, there will be
a clearly specified theory with a set of propositions that can be tested by a single case,
because the case meets each of the conditions for testing the theory. Graham Allison's
Essence ofDecision fits this description.146 Allison's single case described the standoff
between the Soviet Union and the United States over the siting of intermediate-range
missiles in Cuba. Three competing theories were offered and compared in order to
generate the best explanation for the type of crisis embodied in the conflict. Gross et al.
focused on a single school in their work, Implementing Organizational Innovations.14 7
The conventional wisdom had been that innovations failed because of certain barriers to
innovation. Gross et al. demonstrated that, in one school, implementation processes
explained the outcomes rather than barriers. The work was considered a defining
moment in innovation theory. Another occasion for presenting a single case is when it
represents an extreme example. This is true when a phenomenon is so rare that social
scientists are unable to find common patterns, such as occurs in clinical psychology when
a rare syndrome is identified. A final rationale concerns the revelatory case as single case.
A revelatory case is recommended when "an investigator has an opportunity to observe
and analyze a phenomenon previously inaccessible to scientific investigation."148 In
1967, the phenomenon of living in a poor neighborhood as a black male, and the coping
behaviors that were needed to deal with unemployment other challenges, was not
understood. Elliot Liebow's Tally's Corner was one of the first examples of a social
scientist gaining access to such a circle of individuals.149 By doing so, he demonstrated
through thick descriptions of the problems of unemployment how further research could
be carried out. The seminal example of a combination of the theory testing and
revelatory case study is The Challenger Launch Decision, by Diane Vaughan. 50 In 575
pages, Vaughan shows the inaccuracy of conventional theories for why the Shuttle
Challenger was allowed to launch in January 1986. Through meticulous historical
reconstruction based in part on over 122,000 pages of documents collected by a
Presidential Commission and in part on copies of NASA original documents relevant to
the incident that were stored at a warehouse at the Johnson Space Center, Vaughan
showed that production pressures and managerial wrongdoing were not to blame.'5'
Rather, NASA experienced an "incremental descent into poor judgment," where signs of
potential danger were normalized in engineering risk assessments.' 5 2 Vaughan noted:
"The cause of disaster was a mistake embedded in the banality of organizational life... as
this book revises historically accepted interpretations, it embraces broader themes. It
describes how deviance in organizations is transformed into acceptable behavior." 5 3 The
Challenger Launch Decision has encouraged an entire sub-discipline in historical
sociology of disaster studies.
The story of Kennedy Heights represents a modest attempt to capture the same
two rationales for a case study: by reconstructing a ten-year negotiated process which led
to the results of site and risk assessment, I seek to offer an interpretation of their effects
on a negotiation process. At the same time, the Kennedy Heights story is revelatory, on
two levels. First, no one has told this particular story before, except when I was asked by
the Environmental Protection Agency to discuss the settlement process. Second, the
phenomenon of an inept agency negotiating the findings of a contaminated site
investigation has been in large part inaccessible to legal scholars and social scientists. I
came about the primary sources for this case study through a series of fortuitous events.
While researching the settlement process that ended toxic tort litigation in this case, I was
invited by a prominent law firm in the case to travel to a nearby warehouse where the
entirety of their discovery and trial preparation materials had been catalogued and stored.
I spent the better part of one week in the warehouse, and generated copies of the
pleadings, expert reports, correspondence, exhibits, depositions, and historical documents.
I supplemented these documents with more recent public records requests to the Railroad
Commission and the Environmental Protection Agency, which had jurisdiction over the
site. The length of the following case study is intended to offer sufficient evidence for
the negotiated process that I discovered, and also to enable the researcher to consider new
and heretofore unarticulated explanations for why, after ten years and millions of dollars
spent on everything but site cleanup, the residents of Kennedy Heights were asked to
accept the status quo and move on with their lives. I offer only a detailed reconstruction
of an agency-industry negotiation, for which the former was woefully unprepared. The
reasons for why the process proved asymmetric, or why the residents were and continue
to feel short-changed, are too many and varied to be sifted through and settled in one case.
Still, the story is one worth telling, and in some detail. In addition to its alternative
interpretation of a negotiated process and its foundation in materials that are not normally
available to scholars, it represents an effort to bring what happened in Kennedy Heights
to a broader audience of social scientists and concerned citizens. The residents with
whom I spoke at the subdivision wanted me to share their experiences with this audience,
and my extra efforts to preserve the chain of events as they occurred will be evident to
the reader.
The narrative begins with a history of the site, including its transformation from
crude oil storage pits to single family residential properties. The racial underpinnings of
decisions to develop the property in certain ways suggest one explanation for why the
residents of this subdivision, who are black, approached this process with such mistrust.
Whether the racial makeup of the neighborhood contributed to the lack of action by the
City of Houston for twenty years after problems began to arise is a question that cannot
be answered with the materials that I encountered. How the presence of crude oil under
the property was discovered is told in the next section. Then, the assessment process is
reconstructed. First, the parties and their findings are listed. Early developments are
described, which focused mostly on one street, Murr Way. The next section depicts the
entry of the Railroad Commission and its joint efforts with Chevron, which had
purchased the site from Gulf Oil and faced liability exposure for the continued presence
of crude oil. Soil sampling and analysis processes, which proceeded in two stages, are
then discussed. The account of site investigations conducted by multiple agencies,
jurisdictions, and consulting firms will show how resource constraints and the kinds of
pragmatic considerations that they require can subsume objective analysis in the practice
of site and risk assessment. Results of the first two phases of investigation varied greatly
depending on the party involved, a finding that I explain by considering the sampling
frame choices that were made and employed. Other dynamics at work as the site
assessment process unfolded included a growing disconnect between resident concerns
and the sampling designs used, interaction and negotiation of the process between the
Railroad Commission and Chevron, and the interpretation of disparate findings through
risk assessment methodologies developed by a consulting firm hired by Chevron. Each
of these forces is described in detail.
History - The Racial Underpinnings of Site Redevelopment. The Pierce Junction
oil well yielded as much as a quarter of a million barrels of oil every two months during
the 1920's." Discovered in 1921, the well was connected by pipeline to a series of pits,
including three unlined, earthen storage tanks southeast of Houston, known as the
Mykawa Tank Farm. Each with the capacity to hold 300,000 barrels of crude oil, the pits
were located to the south of Selinsky Road and to the east of what is now Cullen
Boulevard (then Chocolate Bayou Road) in the Kennedy Heights subdivision.'5 5 The
northeast (NE) and northwest (NW) pits were operational and covered with lumber
roofing while the southeast (SE) pit simply filled with brine. 5 6 The storage pits were
partially destroyed by a hurricane that broke apart the wooden roofs covering the pits in
1927. Because of the damage as well as marginal production at the Pierce Junction field,
owners Gulf Production Company (Gulf Oil) ceased operations at the tank farm.
While actual use of the property after the pits were abandoned is uncertain, it is
clear that the site accommodated other land uses over the course of the next four
decades. 5 7 The pits remained visible in aerial photographs taken in 1935, 1945, 1955,
and 1969.158 During much of this time, Gulf Oil failed to "secure the site from the public
and, as a consequence, municipal waste, junk, debris, rubbish, and hazardous substances
were deposited at the site."15 9 In the mid-1960's, Gulf had the site appraised and began
to take steps to dispose of the property.
The appraisal documents refer to the land near the tank farm, located near
Chocolate Bayou, as a "typical Negro area."16 0
Should this land be developed for low- to medium-priced housing with FHA or VA financing, it
would have to be a bi-racial development according to present regulations. It is felt that
eventually this would be the highest and best use of this property because it would then serve as a
buffer between the white residential area in Crestmont Park and the heavily colored developments
to the north and west.''
We feel by being surrounded by negro subdivisions this property is committed to a use, either for
subdivision purposes or other, by this element. Eventual industrial use may be foreseeable;
although, this seems unlikely with the nearest trackage available two miles away.162
Such references to the social demographics of the area are striking. Yet they mask a
more important distinction that was made in appraisal documents for the tank farm. Prior
to sale of the property, developers began to figure out the appropriate cost of the land
purchased with the storage tanks filled, after their contents ("sludge," or the remnants of
stored crude oil16 3 ) were removed.
The present worth of subject property is its market value less the cost of draining, filling, and
leveling the three large open tanks. Mr. R. Salmon, a dirt moving contractor, estimates it will take
3 months or longer to do this work, at a cost of $2,500 per tank. Mr. Neville of Humble figures
his cost at $1,500 per acre of tank on some tanks in Humble that have as much as six feet of B.S.
& W. These tanks are approximately 400 feet square, and it is felt that $5,000 per tank is a safer
estimate of cost, as it is not known how much experience Mr. Salmon has actually had in this type
of work. Like Mr. Neville, Mr. Salmon would spread out the sludge on the land to dry. It is felt
that land east of Chocolate Bayou Road will not sell as high as land adjoining a present residential
development, especially where this land will have to be developed as a buffer zone between
colored and white areas. For the above reason it is felt that the price being asked for the 29 acres
fairly well represents the price at which a residential developer would buy subject property, if it
were in its original condition and free and clear of tanks. "
Highest and best use: The most profitable use for this land appears to be for medium priced
houses for white occupancy, with a 200-foot-wide commercial strip fronting on Chocolate Bayou
Road as a buffer strip against the all colored Cloverland Subdivision on the west side of Chocolate
Bayou Road.165
This area is both colored and white, with Chocolate Bayou Road serving as the dividing line.
Because of colored settlements across the road to the west the highest and best use for this land
appears for low cost homes for white occupancy. The three large open earthen pits on the land
will have to be filled before subdivision work can proceed on all the land. This may cost from
$2,500 to as much as $5,000 per tank.' 66
For six years, Gulf Oil "unsuccessfully attempted to dispose of this acreage."16 7
The company then began negotiating with John Lester, President of Log Development
Company, who was interested in "acquiring the site for a Negro residential and
commercial development." 6 1 In 1968, Gulf Oil conveyed the site to Log
Development.169 The transaction involved a tax-free exchange of the Pierce Junction
Tank Farm (valued at $274,107) for the northwest corner of Richmond and Montrose
Streets, in Houston. 7 0 Log Development did not remove any tank bottoms in the area of
the earthen tanks utilized by Gulf, a practice that had been suggested for the property
when it was assumed that it would become a white subdivision.' 7' Lester simply had the
berms along the sides of the pits pushed inward, filling the pits. 7 2 The Kennedy Heights
subdivision physically replaced the Mykawa Tank Farm in the late 1960's.
Residents Discover the Problem. The name of the subdivision, its location, the
way it was marketed, and documents obtained from Log Development suggest that in the
end, the homes built were targeted at below-middle-income African-American buyers.
The subdivision was quickly filled by new homeowners. However, several aspects of the
subdivision seemed "off' to the new residents. Sidewalks and backyards began to buckle
and sink. Residents noticed putrid smells and strange colorations in their tap and
bathwater. Some even experienced diseases that were not in their family histories,
including multiple forms of cancer as well as lupus. One resident had to cope with four
different forms of cancer nearly simultaneously.
Well, what I remember though, when I was a kid, we used to crawfish in the ditch behind the
house, and I remember the soil had like four or five different levels. It was like orange, purple,
blue, and I guess reddish, plus the dirt on top. But as a kid, I didn't know what it was. 7 3
I've been in Kennedy Heights for 30 years. I waited for my house to be built over there, so that's
how long I've been here. And as having young kids there, the water has always been bad. We
tried putting water filters, everything on the water. And really I wish I would have kept the filters.
Because the filters that we would take out, it was filled with oil and green gook and everything
else. So finally it got so bad to where we were afraid to drink the water even with filters. We
changed filters 2-3 times a month and it still was bad, so we had to start buying water to drink.
And we've always had dogs in the backyard. And every dog we've had, anytime they would dig,
they would die. At first we thought somebody was poisoning them. But after we looked at it,
anytime they would dig deep in the yard, they would die. So every dog we had in the back, that's
what happened to them. And we had a pear tree in the back and it was like one side of it would
bear pears and one side wouldn't. So the side that didn't bear pears, that's where the dogs would
dig all of the time and evidently there was something there. 7 4
There's too many deaths for the amount of people. And that's what got somebody's attention.
That too many people were getting sick and dying. And there were too many abnormalities and
birth defects in people. I mean, you know, even whole households, everybody was sick. You
know, not just one.175
Like on my side, it was like every other house, somebody had died of cancer. You don't tell me
that's normal. That's not normal. [The special master] was trying to tell us that that was normal
in a neighborhood. It's not. This was just on one side, within a block. I'm not talking about the
other side, or down the street. Just one side. You're talking about 12 houses and every other
house, somebody has died with cancer.'7 6
An additional concern focused on the water lines under subdivision properties, which
would continuously rupture. One resident, a school teacher, recorded important events
on the inside cover of her husband's Bible:
Lord help us. We are your children. God, seems like the water is making Albert sick. Lord help him.
September 12, 1971. The water has broken again.
October 4, 1971, water break.
October 22, 1971, water break. The water smells real bad today. It's yellow-looking. What are we going to do?
April 5, 1972, water break.
April 26, 1972. The pipes are rusty, the workers said to let the water run a long time.
July 1973, the water has broken again. Albert is sick. Lord, I have called the city. They won't fix the water.
April 1975, water breaks.
June 1975, water breaks.
December 1975 water break.
May 1976, water breaks.
November 12, 1976, water breaks.
January 1, 1977. New Year's Day. The water breaks. I can't cook.
January 20, 1977, water breaks again.
May 10, 1977, water breaks.
May 8, 1978. City put in a blue plastic pipe. Hope it will hold.
This is May 3, 1981. The pipes burst.
Oh, God. The pipes are bursting.
Feb. 4, 1982. Pipe burst.
June 19, 1983. Pipe burst. I can't cook. Lord, what's next?m
Residents registered complaints about the water main breaks for twenty years, yet
Houston's Capital Projects Department did not begin major work on pipe excavation and
replacement until the early 1990's.178 A contractor, Pas-Key Construction Services, was
sent by the city to excavate a site on Murr Way in order to replace some of the waterlines.
On September 18, 1991, the contractor shut down the site when a worker collapsed
during site excavation. Other employees remarked that there was a creosote odor in the
area and complained of eye irritation. 179 The workers left a sizable hole in the ground
and "ceased all construction operations until further notice from the City of Houston
Health Department."' Residents began to wonder why the work had ceased. Perhaps
the pipe replacements were part of a broader effort to increase the number of units
available within the subdivision, as word spread that a low-income housing development
was in the planning stages.'8 1
The Assessment Process: Ten Years and Few Answers
Unbeknownst to the residents, the City of Houston hired a contractor to
investigate potential petroleum contamination at the site. Thus began a disjointed process
convened by regulators and private industry, lasting more than ten years, to assess
whether Kennedy Heights residents were exposed to dangerous levels of a variety of
toxicants, including Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons (PAHs) (some of which are
known carcinogens).' 8 2 Efforts to characterize the risks faced by local residents included:
* A contractor hired by the city carried out soil borings drawn along the water main replacement
route at 0-10 feet, finding contamination at a depth of 2-7 feet, including petroleum hydrocarbons;
* The city of Houston analyzed samples taken from two water mains near Murr Way, and found "no
contamination of the potable water supply system";
e A Texas Water Commission official arrived to conduct a site inspection, but because the
excavated site had been filled in, he was not able to take samples;
* Pas-Key, the consultant hired to replace some of the waterlines hired a consultant who found
"creosote mixed with crude oil which will cause skin rash, dermatitis, and breathing difficulties";
e John Hanby, a consultant hired by the Kennedy Heights Civic Association, found "extremely high
levels of petroleum-related chemicals" in the soil, with concentrations "several times higher than
the city's highest reading";
e American Home Dream Corporation requested an investigation of potential contamination at the
site of a proposed additional 53 units within Kennedy Heights;
e The Railroad Commission assessed the neighborhood in 1994, by reviewing results of the city
Health Department's earlier tests for contamination and above-ground visual survey. Based on the
city's data, the RRC concluded that there was no basis for the initiation of cleanup activities;
* In 1995, the Railroad Commission and Chevron met to discuss the site in response to resident
complaints and threatened litigation. Chevron proposed a Methane Investigation plan in
September;
* In 1996, Chevron proposed a Comprehensive Work Plan for Kennedy Heights;
e Methane testing ended with samples showing a maximum of 23,000 ppm methane at 5 feet, taken
in an area where plaintiffs also encountered high levels. Railroad Commission personnel reported
that surrounding tests indicated that such high concentrations were localized;
e By the close of the investigation, led and in many respects managed by Chevron, concentrations of
hydrocarbons as high as 29,000 ppm were found;
* Exploration Technologies, a consulting firm hired by the resident-plaintiffs, found levels of
hydrocarbons as high as 32,060 ppm, in addition to "liquid product" (crude oil) at several
locations;
* In March 1996, the Railroad Commission met with Chevron to discuss the second phase of the
investigation, the goal of which was to conduct a detailed toxicological risk assessment to address
the presence and distribution of contaminants, any exposure risk to residents, and surface or
subsurface water pollution. Again, the process was managed by Chevron and subject to severe
budgetary constraints by the Commission; and
" An informal survey taken by John Simmons, president of the Civic Association, showed that there
were 113 cases of cancer, brain tumors, lupus, and birth defects in the subdivision's 325 homes.
The prevalence of systemic lupus erythematosus in Kennedy Heights was calculated by an
epidemiologist from Boston University, who found it to be between 4.9 and 8.2 times the upper
end of the SLE prevalence range in the U.S. population.
Some of the data gathered were used years into the process by residents' legal
counsel to piece together a narrative for use in litigation against Chevron, which had
acquired the property from Gulf Oil prior to its conversion to residential property. 8 3 The
residents' narrative proceeded as follows: during periods of depressurization, caused
when breaks in the pipes under Kennedy Heights occurred, contaminants entered the
water pipes, located at a depth below the surface where some of the highest levels of
contaminants were found. Water main breaks occurred within Kennedy Heights at a rate
of 20-30 breaks per mile per year.'84 The contaminants included several known animal
carcinogens, including a number of aromatic hydrocarbon compounds. One of the areas
of the body affected by exposure to polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons is the immune
system. Lupus, a disease in which the immune system loses its ability to tell the
difference between foreign substances and its own cells and tissues, was prevalent in
Kennedy Heights at a rate several times the national prevalence rate.' 8 6 Other diseases
linked to some of the known or suspected carcinogens in the soil were also prevalent in
the subdivision.
Despite years of sampling and assessment and a trial that advanced through thirty-
one days of testimony (ending in a special master-driven settlement), to date no work has
been carried out to replace the pipes under their subdivision or remove any remnants of
the Mykawa Tank Farm. Some residents continue to believe that the City is reluctant to
act, because "if they dig, they'll find something else." The final official word on the
subject of contamination at Kennedy Heights was offered by the Environmental
Protection Agency, which in response to continued resident complaints performed an
Expanded Site Inspection in August 1998 and concluded its work in 2001, declaring that
the site did not meet criteria for listing on the National Priorities List. 8 7
It is no surprise that the level of uncertainty over even the existence of
contamination remained high throughout much of the ten year struggle, given the range
of estimates derived from the various efforts listed above. Yet these highly technical
procedures, coordinated by state and federal agencies in cooperation with Chevron,
consumed most of the resources devoted to investigating residents' claims, and
determined which of their interests would be folded into the mediation process that
followed.
The Site Characterization Process Described
The Early Focus on Murr Way. Site characterization began in September 1991,
when the city of Houston hired a contractor (Lockwood, Andrews, and Newnam, Inc.
[LAN]) to investigate potential petroleum contamination in the subdivision. This
occurred after personnel sent to the site by the city noted a "creosote like odor in the air"
and found trihalomethanes (a volatile organic compound) and evidence of the possible
occurrence of trichloroethylene.188 Soil borings drawn along the water main replacement
route at 0-10 feet found contamination at a depth of 2-7 feet, including petroleum
hydrocarbons "not normally indigenous to surface soils."' 89 While the city's analysis of
samples taken from the two water mains near Murr Way (where Pas-Key work had
ceased) suggested "no contamination of the potable water supply system," LAN, Inc.
found concentrations of total petroleum hydrocarbons (TPH) above levels recommended
by the Texas Water Commission (TWC) for soil contamination. 190 The city's Director of
Health and Human Services also argued that replacement of water lines should continue,
to allow for "higher water pressure" that would "decrease the probability of groundwater
infiltration."19'
The full results of the city's testing efforts were not shared with residents or the
contractor.192 The Texas Water Commission (TWC), Texas Railroad Commission (RRC),
and regional office of the Environmental Protection Agency, on the other hand, were
contacted. A TWC official arrived to conduct a site inspection, but because the
excavated site had been filled in, he was not able to take samples (according to what are
now TNRCC guidelines).193 Residents, who had begun to meet as part of the Kennedy
Heights Civic Association, formed a Contamination Committee and collected money to
pay for their own environmental consultant. Pas-Key also hired a consultant to
investigate the site. By January 1992, the contractors hired by Pas-Key found that "the
contaminant is creosote mixed with crude oil which will cause skin rash, dermatitis, and
breathing difficulties."1 94 Four streets were listed as affected by the city's sampling
activity, although until this point contractors had focused predominantly on the
excavation area.195 A contractor hired by the residents found even higher levels of
polyaromated hydrocarbons in the soil.196 At around the same time, the TWC changed its
policy for analyzing hydrocarbons, eliminating a former method for analyzing total
petroleum hydrocarbon in water, land, and waste.' 97
The pace of activity picked up in 1994-95, when American Home Dream
Corporation requested an investigation of potential contamination at the site of a
proposed additional 53 units within Kennedy Heights.198 The contractor, RRC, and
Chevron met to discuss the results, starting a trend where environmental scientists,
regulators, and the regulated would meet regarding the site, at times without the input of
the affected community. Meanwhile, John Simmons, who headed the Kennedy Heights
Civic Association at the time, began an investigation of his own, finding enormously high
rates of cancer and lupus through an informal survey of the subdivision's 325 homes.199
Chevron-Railroad Commission Joint Efforts. The Texas Railroad Commission
(RRC), which held jurisdiction over petroleum spills and deposits in Texas, initially
investigated the Kennedy Heights neighborhood in 1994, by reviewing results of the city
Health Department's earlier tests for contamination and above-ground visual survey.200
Based on the city's data, the RRC concluded that there was no basis for the initiation of
cleanup activities.
To encourage regulatory action, residents began a letter writing campaign in
August 1995, sending letters to the TNRCC and the RRC which urged them to
investigate the reported contamination under their homes.20' An attorney representing
John Simmons and other families (approximately 2,000 individuals at the time) also
presented a letter to the Chairman of RRC containing 68 pages of signatures and citing
findings of "explosive levels" of methane gas under certain homes. RRC involvement
began in earnest on August 23, 1995, when Commission and Chevron representatives met
to discuss the site. As much of the emphasis of residents (which led to a motion for
temporary injunction against the new contractor) focused on the threat of explosive levels
of methane, Chevron proposed the installation of several gas monitoring wells in areas
where high levels of subsurface methane had been previously identified.202 According to
Chevron, the testing would "assist in identifying the source of the gas" and to inform the
applicability of surveying homes in the subdivision for gas concentrations within the
residences.
Chevron presented its initial Methane Investigation Proposal to the RRC in
September 1995. The proposal called for three gas monitoring wells that would use push
tools in areas of "highest reported gas concentrations" (as found by residents'
contractors203) to take samples at two-foot intervals (vertical). 204 The sample with the
highest TPH reading for each well would undergo additional testing for PAH's, metals,
volatiles, semi-volatiles, and hazardous characteristics. In addition, 12-15 soil borings
were to be taken to a depth of 4 feet to test for lower explosive limits of methane, C02,
and 02. This was the first of several attempts by Chevron to measure the extent of
contamination in Kennedy Heights. They were based on a series of assumptions that
were contested by local residents. Tables I and 2 provide the primary concerns raised by
RRC staff and residents during testing at the subdivision.
Table 1. RRC Concerns Regarding Chevron Sampling Proposals for Kennedy Heights.






















* Vapor phase hydrocarbons are from 2-11 feet with random, thin,
and discontinuous distribution
* Pockets of liquid and residual hydrocarbons are at 5-26 feet;
sampling is too shallow at 4-10 feet
* Three wells is inadequate
e Need in-situ and discrete samples with depth instead of 5 foot
screens, to avoid dilution of samples
* Samples will vent; will not be able to measure concentration,
generation, or flux
e Should test for a greater variety of PAH's
* Vertical averaging will depress values
* Fractures in clay can intersect methane pockets, allow gas to
migrate to homes with cracked slabs
e Methane will be generated until food source (hydrocarbons) is
-1-207
Residents' representatives and RRC staff were able to comment on several
iterations of Chevron proposals, although this process was at times disjointed. RRC
records indicate that meetings to discuss sampling efforts were held exclusively among
Chevron and RRC representatives.20 As sampling began, RRC and resident
representatives were present to observe and record (by video tape) Chevron's efforts and
to split samples for their own analysis when desired. 21' The RRC adopted a statistical
sampling frame for split samples, in addition to the splitting of samples with visible
contamination.
On December 7, 1995, an RRC staff member was told that he had the authority to
contract for equipment and materials that would be needed to analyze the soil samples for
methane gas and other contaminants that RRC planned to split with Chevron. The
official was also told, "It is understood that the cost of this operation shall not exceed
$2,5500."212 At the same time, an attorney for the plaintiffs requested that the RRC
observe certain sampling efforts on behalf of the residents.2 13 Some of the final
preparations made by RRC included coordinating plans for responding to media interest.
Interoffice correspondence regarding sampling activities would often include a
characterization of media interest and any RRC response. Before testing started,
Chevron's public affairs representative was told by an RRC official that his plan was to
"respond to media inquiries about RRC monitoring roles but to refer questions about the
testing, sampling, analysis, timetable, etc. to him."214 By December 15, Chevron's
methane investigation was ongoing with what had become four gas wells installed.m
Testing continued at predetermined intervals from mid-December 1995 to
February 15, 1996. Preliminary data yielded 4,000-5,000 parts per million methane
recovered from the monitor wells over the pits. This was far below the level that RRC
considered "explosive" (50,000 ppm) but it was believed to be "a greater concentration
than Chevron anticipated measuring."216 Data also showed 2 of 25 samples in excess of
1% TPH. As Chevron periodically repeated its sampling procedures, a ritual ensued
where RRC Site Remediation personnel would unlock the wells, monitor sampling
activities along with plaintiffs' representatives, and request split samples when visual
contamination was noted. Occasionally, problems were reported. For example,
instrument problems at the laboratory used by RRC meant that certain samples had to be
shipped to a Corpus Christi lab for analysis. 218 These samples were shipped to Corpus
Christi, then to Louisiana, and then back to Corpus Christi.2 19 RRC officials questioned
the integrity of such samples, and were told that there would be no charge for them.
On another occasion, Chevron told the other parties that a sample was insufficient and
wanted to re-sample. RRC representatives noticed visible contamination in the sample
"and insisted and received split samples with residents."22 Another problem concerned
the effects of the wells themselves on samples and readings for methane. In mid-January
1996, field reports indicated that 3 of the 4 monitoring wells had partially filled with
water. RRC officials indicated that they would ask Chevron about "what effect the water
is having on the integrity of the testing."222
Methane testing ended with samples showing a maximum of 23,000 ppm methane
at 5 feet, taken in an area where plaintiffs also encountered high levels. RRC personnel
reported that surrounding tests indicated that such comparatively high concentrations
were localized. Elevated TPH was found at levels up to 5,990 parts per million (recall
that preliminary data in two samples showed 10,000 ppm, or 1% TPH).2 By the close
of the investigation, the highest concentrations of TPH found by Chevron and RRC were
29,000 ppm and 24,000 ppm, respectively. Exploration Technologies, Inc. (a consulting
firm hired by the plaintiffs) found levels as high as 32,060 ppm, in addition to "liquid
product" (crude oil) at several locations.m It is difficult to draw conclusions directly
from these numbers, particularly since the finding of liquid product was never officially
verified by the RRC. For instance, a 1993 RRC rule provided for cleanup of "non-
sensitive" areas when TPH levels exceeded 10,000 ppm.226 Kennedy Heights was a
sensitive area, implying that a lower threshold should be applied, albeit with adherence to
specific risk-based decision making rules and procedures.m This was suggested by RRC
District Manager Guy Grossman.22 8 However, the rule (Statewide Rule 91) did not apply
to spills that took place before November 1, 1993. For spills that did qualify for cleanup
under the rule, RRC provided the following advice:
Statewide Rule 91 distinguishes two categories of spills: (a) crude oil spills into non-sensitive
areas; and (b) (i) hydrocarbon condensate spills and (ii) crude oil spills in sensitive areas. Rule 91
establishes clear goals for cleanup of crude oil spills in non-sensitive areas: immediate removal of
all free oil, immediate vertical and horizontal delineation; specifying the "area of contamination"
that must be delineated and disposed of or remediated, and specification of a final cleanup level of
"1% by weight TPH." Rule 91 is less clear about the second category of spills. It stands to reason
that hydrocarbon condensate spills and crude oil spills in sensitive areas, which pose greater risks,
should at least follow standards established for the equally important but less threatening spills. 22 9
Yet the same residential and industrial limits are given for TPH and BETX, a group of
particularly toxic compounds associated with the processing of crude oil (benzene,
ethylbenzene, toluene, and xylene).
In March 1996, RRC met with Chevron to discuss the second phase of the
investigation. Chevron's plan included an evaluation of all three former pits with ten
shallow groundwater monitoring wells, 33 hollow stem auger soil samples, and 24 cone
penetration tests. The overall goal of this phase of the investigation was to "conduct a
detailed toxicological risk assessment that will address the presence and distribution of
contaminants, any exposure risk to residents, and surface or subsurface water
pollution."230 Sixty days of fieldwork were planned to gather data that would allow for a
more comprehensive investigation of site contamination. RRC and Chevron worked out
field operations so that representatives would be present for surveying, probing, and
sampling. Again, RRC officials describe budgetary constraints that "will limit us to five
samples."23' The parties started with the northwest pit for one week, and then moved into
the neighborhood.
Phase II of the RRC-Chevron Investigation Commences. In response to concerns
about drinking water, Chevron's Comprehensive Work Plan was drafted to include a
proposal to collect samples from the outside hose bibs of 13 selected homes "as soon as
reasonably possible, but no later than 24 hours after a water line break has been repaired
in the Kennedy Heights subdivision."232 The company also offered free drinking water
testing to residents whose homes were located in the general area of the northeast pit.
Plaintiffs were opposed to the sampling program, claiming that it was "unlikely to detect
contamination at any home not affected by a specific pipeline break."2 3 3 More
importantly, it would have "limited utility in determining how much contaminated water
has entered homes in Kennedy Heights during the last twenty-five years."23 4 The
Houston District Office of RRC was forwarded approximately 80 letters from residents,
originally mailed to the TNRCC, requesting cleanup of contamination at Kennedy
Heights.2 3 5 Fifty residents attended a technical meeting regarding Chevron's Work Plan,
again questioning the risk assessment and its ability to appropriately characterize
sporadic contamination entering residential lines after water main breaks.236 At a pre-
hearing conference in Houston, residents' attorneys claimed that the hearing process
lacked clear ground rules, standards, or a clear burden of proof.23 The residents
withdrew from the hearing, but implored RRC to continue its efforts, citing "ample
technical data available to support enforceable remediation measures." 238
Comparison ofResults by Party. Upon conclusion of sampling over each pit by
the various consultants, RRC prepared summaries of contamination found. Tables 3-5
provide an overview of the highest concentration of several compounds of interest, as
summarized by RRC.
Table 3. Highest Concentration Found as Proportion of TNRCC Regulatory Limit, NE
Pit (ppm).
n RE PSI
TPH at 1,453 800 7,797 590
Surface






TPH = Total Petroleum Hydrocarbons
VOC = Volatile Organic Compound
S-VOC = Total Volatile Organic Compounds
SPLP = Synthetic Precipitate Leaching Procedure, a method to determine the mobility of compounds in soil
DW = Drinking Water
-=no hit or test for this compound
* = above TNRCC regulatory limits (number below / represents limit); numbers for TPH with a * are above
RRC guidelines for non-sensitive areas; at the time, sensitive areas were assessed on a case-by-case basis
Table 4. Highest Concentration Found as Proportion of TNRCC Regulatory Limit, NW
Pit (ppm).
TPH at 3,674 1,100 636
Surface
186300* 32,060*
VOC 36.63*/10 7 (Methylene--
Total Metal 2.5*/.366 (Arsenic)
.0068*/.006 (Bis 2-
ethy1hexyl phthalate)
TPH = Total Petroleum Hydrocarbons
VOC = Volatile Organic Compound
S-VOC = Total Volatile Organic Compounds
SPLP = Synthetic Precipitate Leaching Procedure, a method to determine the mobility of compounds in soil
TCLP = Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure, an analytic method to determine metal mobility
-= no hits or test for this compound from samples taken
* = above TNRCC regulatory limits (number below / represents limit); numbers for TPH with a * are above
RRC guidelines for non-sensitive areas; at the time, sensitive areas were assessed on a case-by-case basis
Table 5. Highest Concentration Found as Proportion of TNRCC Regulatory Limit, SE
Pit (ppm).




Total Metal 12.1*/.366 (arsenic)
SPLP S- .01 H98*/.006 (Bis 2-
VOC ethylhexyl phthalate)
TPH = Total Petroleum Hydrocarbons
VOC = Volatile Organic Compound
S-VOC = Total Volatile Organic Compounds
SPLP = Synthetic Precipitate Leaching Procedure, a method to determine the mobility of compounds in soil
TCLP = Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure, an analytic method to determine metal mobility
- no hits or test for this compound from samples taken
* = above TNRCC regulatory limits (number below / represents limit)
While compounds were found at levels exceeding regulatory standards for both
declared and suspected human carcinogens, the RRC determined, through analysis of a
risk assessment performed by Chevron, that the levels of contamination did not pose a
sufficient threat to human health to warrant remedial action. Prior to completion of
Chevron's Work Plan, the RRC responded to concerns expressed by State Senator
Rodney Ellis regarding the anticipated risk assessment. The Assistant Director of the
Environmental Section of the RRC characterized risk assessment as follows:
No single risk assessment model will account for site-specific variables in all cases, including
those at Kennedy Heights. However, risk assessment techniques are designed to be adjusted to
accommodate site-specific variables. Commission staff has experience evaluating site-specific
risk assessments, including assessments of risk to nearby residents from surface and subsurface
contaminants. If a thorough risk assessment of the residual contamination at Kennedy Heights
indicates that the residents are or may be exposed to constituents of concern at unacceptable levels,
appropriate remedial measures will be required. 239
RRC's evaluation of Chevron's risk assessment led them to conclude that residents were
not exposed to unacceptable levels of hydrocarbons, a finding echoed years later in the
EPA's risk assessment. Residents were left to seek relief through the courts.
The Limiting Effects of Site Characterization and Risk Assessment in Kennedy Heights
The above account of the site investigations conducted by multiple agencies,
jurisdictions, and consulting firms represents only one of many sides of the Kennedy
Heights story.24 The value in piecing together this particular sequence of events lies in
its demonstration of how pragmatic considerations as well as uncertainty can overshadow
objective analysis as parties move to investigate a contaminated site. In addition, the
assessment dynamics at play can be shown to remove from consideration resident
understandings of the problems they face, making it difficult to assert their ideas during a
dispute resolution process. The primary dynamics at work as the site assessment process
unfolded in Kennedy Heights included (a) a growing disconnect between resident
concerns and sampling frame choices made by contractors, (b) RRC/Chevron interaction
and negotiation, and (c) the interpretation of findings from the first two phases of the
investigation through risk assessment methodologies developed by consulting firms for
Chevron.
The Importance of Sampling Frame Choice. Much of the variance in results
gathered by parties conducting soil sampling in Kennedy Heights can be attributed to the
choice of sampling frame24 1 by each consulting firm. Recall the difference of opinion
among RRC, residents, and Chevron as the parties set up the Methane Investigation
Proposal and Comprehensive Work Plan. Prior to the start of the Methane Proposal,
RRC expressed doubt over the time frame, volumes to be collected per tube, approximate
location of the soil borings (which Chevron did not specify), Chevron's rationale for
limiting its samples to four feet (when initial findings were at least in the 2-7 foot range),
its decision to sample at intervals of between one and two months, and the absence of any
plan to determine the origin of the gas. Residents shared some of these concerns,
particularly because of their findings of vapor phase hydrocarbons at 2-11 feet "with
random, thin, and discontinuous distribution" as well as pockets of liquid hydrocarbons at
5-26 feet. There was clear concern over the possible dilution of samples, which led
residents to propose an in-situ as opposed to a 5 foot screen approach and to predict that
the wells would vent, fill with rainwater, and necessitate vertical averaging that would
further depress values. Chevron only set up four gas wells for use over 13 months, three
of which filled with water. The RRC's only recorded response to this was to note that
they would ask Chevron about its effects on sample integrity.
Residents reiterated their concerns post-sampling as well. First was the fact that
that Chevron did not use a grid approach commonly applied by the industry. Consultants
for the residents employed this approach, which was described by a scientist at
Exploration Technologies, Inc.
We began with a, it might have been a 50 foot sampling grid, and what we did was map the
various components, the methane, ethane, propane, butanes, and what we call C5+, the pentanes
through xylene plus hydrocarbons, and of course the methane turned out to be the best indicator,
again, the anaerobic degradation product of the crude oil, and what it indicated to us, and the
purpose of doing the soil gas survey was to determine or delineate the aerial extent of the
contamination in the subsurface.. .we do this first, because we do not want to go out and install
borings and/or install monitoring wells at random.2 4 2
There were also problems with sampling decisions made during the 13 month
period. Residents protested the fact that Chevron recorded abandoned sampling efforts as
"no vapor" instead of "no sample" and based their entire sampling frame on methane
generation assumptions that were not shared by residents or the RRC. Perhaps most
troubling to residents was Chevron's neglect of methane accumulations under housing
foundations. Questions such as where to locate soil borings, what depths of the soil they
should reach, and how often they should be collected are closely tied to the narrative of
contamination that one is trying to construct. The narrative for soil gas location was
articulated by representatives of the community as follows:
We did a 50 foot grid, but those little insets indicate that the contamination was so, I don't want to
use the term random, but unpredictable, because what happened was they had these pits dug, and
what they dug out they put as a berm around the pits. They filled the pits to well beyond the pit
itself so that actually the crude oil was up into the berms. When they were ready to close those
pits, they just bulldozed everything back into the pits. So if you can imagine, the best analogy I
can give you is a vanilla and chocolate marble cake. So when they bulldozed all the berms back
into the pit, now what you have is your chocolate is your product, or your crude oil saturated soils,
that are now mixed in with your vanilla, which is less contaminated or possibly uncontaminated
soils, so it's very difficult to predict where these pockets of product exist.. .we did some drilling,
bore hold drilling after we finished our soil gas survey and we did it based upon our soil gas
anomalies and I personally was present and collected samples on three particular bore holes which
were drilled four feet apart. One on the, off the sidewalk but on someone's lawn, then moved over
four feet to the west, and both were contaminated, the cores were dripping crude oil, moved over
four feet again, and got nothing. That's how quickly you could go from contaminated soil to
relatively clean soil.m
The possibility that soil gas locations could be randomly dispersed across the subdivision
led scientists hired by the residents to express concern over the likelihood of methane
pockets. When reaching a level indicative of explosive potential, methane pockets would
be extremely dangerous if located under single family homes. Yet the Chevron Methane
Investigation Proposal and the Comprehensive Work Plan did not outline a plan to test
housing foundations. Nor did they account for possible exposure to vapors from
degrading crude oil (in the form of ambient air sampling inside the homes located over
the pits), the transport of hydrocarbons from the soil to residents' drinking water through
water main breaks (by providing a random drinking water testing throughout portions of
the subdivision following a line break), or the discontinuous location of hydrocarbons
and other soil gases (that could only be characterized through grid sampling).
Collectively, these early choices by Chevron, questioned by the RRC but ultimately
accepted, meant that resident understandings of their subdivision and fears regarding
possible exposure pathways (drinking water/showers following pipe ruptures, inhalation
from sub-foundation soil entering homes) and dangers (explosive levels of methane in
housing foundations) were effectively excluded from consideration. This narrowing of
potential findings occurred before the remainder of RRC's decisions, made almost
exclusively with Chevron representatives, further limited the ability of the RRC to
appropriately characterize sporadic contamination entering resident lines after water main
breaks.
By the time sampling efforts commenced, it was too late for residents to introduce
protocols to investigate the validity of the above narratives. For example, the residents'
consultants produced a map of their 50 foot grid, with bore hole locations over the NE pit
(bisected by Murr Way and Lockgate Lane, the side of the bulk of the lupus cases). The
map indicates that "liquid product," or crude oil, was found at 11302 Murr Way (at 8-10
feet), 11303 Murr Way (24 feet), 11315 Murr Way (10 and 26 feet), 11323 Murr Way (6-
9 feet), 11322 Murr Way (5-8 feet), and 11323 Lockgate Lane (8-10 feet).244 During
joint testing by RRC and Chevron, ETI workers asked a RRC official for permission to
demonstrate where the liquid product was located, and were told that they lacked a work
plan and had not submitted one in the requisite number of hours preceding their sampling
activities on site. 245 On December 13, 1995, RRC notes discuss this encounter:
"[Residents] want to spl (core soils) w/in and adj. to Chevron monitoring well @ 11323
MW. We have mtg. - Chevron say core rig disturb their well. I say we are implement
Chevron plan and want to maintain interpret of Chevron data - but the next round of
assessment we may address this." 246 Such an effort was not made, although RRC and
later EPA agreed that "visible hydrocarbons" were present in some of the samples.
Site and Risk Assessment as a Negotiated Process between RRC and Chevron.
The Assistant Director of Site Remediation for the RRC described a typical day of
sampling at the subdivision as follows:
Early in the morning, various parties, RRC, Chevron, Chevron's contractors, residents'
representatives, and the residents' contractors would meet for a safety meeting and go over the
daily activities that would go on there. RRC would have at least one, sometimes 2 or 3
representatives on site to witness the activities and keep records and then the sampling plans
would proceed.. .our role was primarily monitoring. Of course, there's media attention and things
like that. Occasionally we would have to answer questions like that.
This image of parity in sampling and coordination across parties is not found throughout
fifteen months of RRC correspondence documents, which focus primarily on media
attention, RRC questions regarding cost and method, and, most importantly, the ongoing
negotiation between Chevron and RRC over sampling protocol.
Media Attention. Most field notes taken on-site include the indication "no media
attention" or "no media on-site." Occasionally, media interest is noted, such as in a
December 12, 1995 entry: "Chevron has staked locations for about 2/3 of the locations
for soil samples and monitoring wells. High media interest. So far questions directed at
Chevron and plaintiffs, not us."248 In addition, there are entries that describe situations
that could potentially spark media interest:
August 4, 1996: As of 8 a.m. this morning, everything is running smooth at KH. Patty reported
that the picket signs that were used last week have now been placed on the curbs of the residential
area. Between yesterday and this morning wells on the NW pit have been evacuated.249
The event most likely to encourage media involvement would be a finding of "explosive
levels" of methane at Kennedy Heights. Most entries into RRC fieldnotes contain a
notation that "no explosive levels" were found to date, usually on the same line as "no
media attention." RRC internal correspondence also outlines meetings with Chevron
representatives and other discussions regarding what RRC planned to say to certain
parties (including the media) should they be asked about the process:
December 8, 1995: Talked with Mickey Driver, Chevron public affairs rep in Houston this
morning. They are putting out a media advisory today outlining what's going to happen. Told
Driver that my plan was to respond to media inquiries about RRC monitoring roles but to refer
questions about the testing, sampling, analysis, etc. to him. He said that was fine... Driver is
highlighting the methane aspect and sticking to the Chevron party lines that there's no evidence
anything else is there that poses a health risk.2 so
December 6, 1995: Kennedy Heights Technical Meeting notes. Noon on Monday. Any violence
leave. Safety #1. Any questions about Chevron's plan will be referred to Chevron. What to say:
on top of situation, we are monitoring the situation, long as it takes, Chevron foot the bill not the
taxpayers. Sample splitting priority: 1. Chevron, 2. Plaintiff, 3. RRC. Soil gas permeability we
will not be involved in... Pick the worst looking samples for analysis. 25 '
August 25, 1995: Contacted by John Cambell, adjacent landowner, requesting information on the
meeting with Chevron. I will provide the following information: Commission staff met with
Chevron reps this Wednesday. The outcome of the meeting is that commission expects Chevron
to submit a plan shortly within weeks or days which will include additional assessment activities
as well as address safety concerns. If pressed for additional information I'll take the stance that it
would be premature to speculate until the proposed plan is received, if pressed further I will refer
the caller to Office of Information Services. 25 2
RRC Questions. As the RRC sought to manage perception of its involvement and
determine what information it would share with various parties, it also tried to make
sense of its role vis-i-vis Chevron and its contractors. There is never an entry in the RRC
correspondence files regarding a request for information made by Chevron to RRC staff.
On the other hand, RRC readily inquired into the feasibility or relative merits of methods
and approaches throughout the site characterization process. RRC also struggled with
severe resource constraints and sampling and analysis problems that arose with some
frequency:
November 20, 1995: I finished reviewing the Chevron proposal on sample testing. The problem
is I won't know anything about our lab capabilities till Carl Nelson gets back.m
November 29, 1995: Spoke with Carl Nelson and he said he was not equipped to handle any of
the sample testing that Chevron is proposing to do. I am waiting on two companies to fax me their
cost estimates. Core Lab is the only one to fax their cost estimate. Their cost is for just one
sample for each of the individual tests - $1,260.
December 7, 1995: Authority to contract for equipment and materials necessary to analyze soil
samples for methane gas and other contaminants from an unknown source associated with former
crude oil storage pits. It is understood that the cost of this operation shall not exceed $2,500.2ss
December 28, 1995: RRC soils, obtained two weeks ago when samples were split between
Chevron, the plaintiffs, and the RRC, are being independently analyzed by Core Lab. Core Lab
reported insufficient sample to run al tests on three of the four samples. 25 6
January 17, 1996: Core Lab is experiencing problems and will ship the extract to the lab in
Corpus. Samples affected are #13 and 14 - RRC tag 20946, 20947. 2-4 and 4-6 inch soil core
sample. Analysis needed to complete work are TPH, semi-volatiles...Following questions will be
addressed on the letter we will receive from Core Lab. The validity of the sample analysis.
Integrity of sample being shipped back to Corpus Christi. Why were samples shipped to CC, then
to Louisiana, and now back to CC?25 7
January 24, 1996: Ray will speak with Lloyd Deuel [at Chevron] and get his response on what
effect the water is having on the integrity of the testing. Petty spoke with Chevron to make sure
that the sample procedure that was changed (instead of pulling 6-5cc of volume with the syringe
sample they are pulling 6-4cc of volume) is documented.2 ss
February 20, 1996: I'd like to go over these KH test results [Chevron's methane investigation
report]. I need to see the hotspots and understand what the report means.25 9
March 21, 1996: What is our next step at KH? Do we approve [Chevron's] plan, wait on
[residents'] comments? Their recent letter still leaves open ended when RRC will receive
additional information. Let's request a status update in 60 days.260
March 22, 1996: As of 10:00 a.m. we have received three bids. The low bidder is a hub -
Chemsolve from Austin. Bid is for $481 for either fluid or soil samples. The amount we are
authorized will limit us to 5 samples. Bids have been signed and amounts double checked for
accuracy. Any suggestions on what criteria we can document to award it as lowest and best
bidder?261
April 5, 1996: A review of analyses from various test samples indicates concentrations of organic
compounds that may be due to laboratory contamination or the addition of the compound as
internal standards. 1,2 Dichloroethane, Methylene chloride. Should take samples from same
locations by equipment that has not been contamined.
May 9, 1996: Do you have a copy of the KH samples we sent out with the wrong address several
months ago? I can't find mine. Please check with Carl Nelson on status of when current samples
will be completed. I'm getting media and Commissioner requests for information. 263
Lack of Balance in the RRC/Chevron Relationship. Resource and knowledge
constraints within the RRC left the RRC at a disadvantage as it tried to negotiate the
scope of Chevron's investigation. Chevron's initial Comprehensive Work Plan proposal
contained several glaring omissions, according to RRC staff:
Why no evaluation of migratory pathways to residents and/or surface and subsurface waters? No
toxiologic or risk assessment review of data. Need to evaluate presence and level of contaminants
and risk to residents/environment. Work plan does not address high TPH soils, free crude oil in
subsurface, crude oil contaminated groundwater, BTEX [benzene, toluene, ethylene, and xylene],
PAH's, or other contaminants as required by RRC letter of November 13, 1995. Report calls for
only one water sampling event in monitor wells, what about seasonal fluctuations and time? No
permeability or hydraulic conductivity testing of samples, cores, pit bottoms. Why are Hollow
Stem Auger pit samples shallow and only 8-10 feet, with no deep tests?264
Further meetings (exclusively with Chevron) led to an understanding that some of the
above gaps in the site assessment process would simply be addressed at a later date:
"This is viewed as preliminary to help [Chevron] plan for a more detailed assessment
activity which will culminate in a final report that will include a detailed risk
assessment."26s But not all concerns were addressed, as evidenced by RRC's questions
that remained following completion of the methane investigation:
April 8, 1996: Chevron still needs to explain several parts of the methane investigation, including
origin of methane, why no methane maps submitted, if soils have low perm to gas, how does it
diffuse through the soils, why so many "no vapor" tests and are they representative of a sampling
technique problem, would a different sampling technique allow for higher concentrations, further
evaluation of high levels of gas where Chevron reported them ... Further explanation of soil
moisture affecting permeability and gas, is there seasonal variation, does that tie-in with "no
vapor" reports? 26
April 8, 1996: Chevron claimed in one of our early meetings that since the [residents] had already
sampled extensively, Chevron wouldn't recreate those tests but would hit the high concentrations.
However, [residents] are reporting additional sampling events with ever-higher concentrations in
areas Chevron hasn't tested. Methane concentration distribution appears highly variable. Because
of this, I think we need to be able to say all residences were evaluated. The only way to do this is
a sample grid with a focus adjacent to homes.267
Sample grids were never employed at the Kennedy Heights site. This did not stop the
RRC from claiming that findings of elevated PAH levels were "localized," despite the
comparatively sporadic placement of soil borings that Chevron used.
Most of the other questions raised by the RRC were shared only with Chevron at
frequent technical meetings. Residents and their representatives only commented on a
handful of occasions, usually immediately after the submission of a draft sampling plan.
There is no evidence in the record of the kind of extensive interaction that RRC and
Chevron shared in 1995 and 1996, when most of the physical sampling took place. Thus,
not only were resident narratives regarding possible exposure pathways excluded from
consideration by the broader sampling plans, but the minutia of daily site-based decision-
making proceeded parallel but apart from resident involvement (with the exception of
resident presence at the actual sampling locations). Far from serving as the lead
stakeholder in a site investigation concerning matters within its jurisdiction, the RRC
focused on taking a limited number of its own samples, managing media relations, and
asking questions of Chevron contractors. Judging from RRC concerns that remained
outstanding following the close of the methane investigation, some of these questions,
such as whether to account for seasonal variations or the scattered location of soil gas
pockets, were not even raised until near the close of the exercise. More importantly,
residents were not made aware of the ad hoc choices made by RRC staff, such as
equipment for use in sampling and their relative merits, where to send samples, what
analytical methods should be used, how to split samples (visually, randomly, or by some
other means), how Chevron would avoid violating the integrity of the samples, what the
parties should do with diluted or questionable samples, and how RRC could serve its
chosen role as monitor most effectively on a budget of $2,500.
Residents Compare Ad Hoc Decisions to RRC Actions Elsewhere. The ad hoc
nature of RRC's choices led residents to question the agency's involvement with the
subdivision compared to its previous site interventions. On at least two occasions, RRC
officials were asked to assemble data regarding site investigations at other former storage
pits in Texas. These included Memorial Glenn, which was adjacent to a residential
subdivision ("Texaco had crude oil storage pits dating from the 1920's with liquid crude
exposed to the surface. No residents were involved. Remediation was a stabilization
program where the pit contents were solidified on site"); Wilson Court, in Humble a few
miles south of Memorial Glenn ("Numerous large crude oil storage pits dating from the
1920's were partially backfilled on the 104 acre site. Liquid hydrocarbons were seeping
to the ground surface. Current pilot program is a bioremediation/landfarm effort on 19 of
the 104 acres"); and the Sun site ("four large and several smaller crude oil storage pits at
the site again dating from the 1920's.. .The pits were open and exposed to the surface. A
bioremediation project is currently being conducted for closure."). 268 Information was
gathered in response to requests from the media as well as State Senator Rodney Ellis'
office. Ellis' Chief of Staff was most concerned about the "Texaco Humble Pits" and
whether they were similar to the Kennedy Heights Site, as well as the length of time
between discovery and sit closure. In reply, RRC maintained that
The age and use of the Humble pits are similar to KH, however many of the Humble pits were
open at the surface and had not been backfilled. Residences were adjacent, not within, the pit
boundaries. Elevated methane concentrations were not reported. Similar investigation activities
were required, which included the installation of water monitor wells and extensive soil
sampling.269
Comparisons of Kennedy Heights with other contaminated properties prepared by RRC
do not provide more than a cursory sketch of the site differences. Some indicators that
would suggest the need for swifter action at Kennedy Heights (e.g., pit adjacency rather
than collocation with a subdivision leading to a stabilization program) are presented
along with others that perhaps differed from the case at hand (e.g., hydrocarbons seeping
to ground surface), although residents' contractors would argue that similar conditions
persisted at Kennedy Heights. RRC's failure to adequately explain how it could engage
in varying degrees of remediation at nonresidential sites of former crude oil storage pits
contributed to a souring of relations among the parties. Residents picketed some of the
testing activities, claiming that RRC was responding at a slower pace to their concerns
than to those at Memorial Glen. The narrowing of options as site assessment progressed,
coupled with RRC's ad hoc decisionmaking and risk communications problems during
sampling, encouraged residents to seek relief in the federal courts under the belief that
they "will move faster than RRC."27 0
Risk Assessment - The Final Stage in a Negotiated Process. A final narrowing of
resident options occurred through analysis of the disparate findings noted in Tables 3-5.
By 1997, the only analytic work carried out with the sampling data was done by
Compliance Solutions, Inc. (CSI) and transferred to the RRC through attorneys for
Chevron.2 7' The risk assessment concluded that "while weathered crude oil is present in
some portions of the Subdivision, it does not present a significant risk to the health of the
residents."m The risk assessment process did not consider the primary health outcome
of concern to Kennedy Heights residents.
Risk assessment incorporates the best technical judgment of EPA scientists as to what toxic effect
(cancer or non-cancer) occurs at the lowest dose for each chemical, since protecting against this
most sensitive effect will afford protection against those toxic effects that are seen only at higher
levels of exposure. In this regard, [the RRC] asked whether lupus erythematosus (an autoimmune
disease) is considered as part of the Risk Assessment Report. Compliance Solutions has reviewed
the published literature which indicates that lupus is not etiologically related to any of the
chemicals of relevance to Kennedy Heights.m
Nor did CSI analyze samples of groundwater collected from soil borings as part of its
formal risk assessment, "because of the lack of appropriate background and regulatory
criteria."274
In addition, CSI made a number of assumptions in generating its risk calculations.
First, "the quality of the analytical and field information was often unverified or the
required information was not provided to us for this risk analysis,"275 leading CSI to take
existing reports and generate estimates of such variables as Method Detection Limits (the
lowest levels of prevision above which a laboratory can detect the presence of a
substance in a soil or water sample). For this calculation, CSI assumed that the ratio of
MDL's to quantitation limits (the lowest level at which a substance can be reliably
measured by a given method performed by a laboratory) was constant for each toxicant,
obtaining the latter from a Quality Control Study from Arthur D. Little and applied the
numbers to Chevron data only (Phase 3 analytical results for select volatile organic
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compounds). CSI also assumed that all reported data were valid, "unless it was clear
from available records that the technical problems associated with a specific sample made
its inclusion impossible."277 It assumed that the subdivision represented an urban rather
than non-disturbed background, based on data collected by Fluor-Daniel-GTI for
Chevron, and developed estimates of background for various chemicals accordingly. 278
CSI then estimated 95% Upper Tolerance Limits for each chemical observed in
background samples, but noted that "variations in the calculated 95% UTL's were noted,
and are believed attributable to small sample numbers and the relatively few locations
sampled at depth." 279 Chevron's statistician "considered 16 to be the minimum number
[sic] samples necessary to develop background statistics," but in order to achieve this
number, CSI had to use Chevron's "no vapor" samples (which residents noted were
abandoned samples rather than true "non-detects") to calculate its 95% UTL's 2 80
CSI then determined how the data were distributed using the Kruskal-Wallis
statistical test. The test compares the medians of samples from two or more groups, and
answers whether all samples were taken from the same population. While the test does
not require a normal distribution in order to test its hypothesis, it does assume that
measurements come from a continuous distribution.2 8' We have seen that by all accounts,
the distribution of soil vapors and certainly the sampling protocol at Kennedy Heights
were discontinuous. In addition, the test, being nonparametric, does not allow for the
calculation of confidence intervals, nor can it indicate by how much various
measurements differ. 282 CSI dealt with the finding that background concentrations
"showed marked skewness to the right" by taking the natural logarithm of each reported
concentration, and generating the mean and standard deviation of the transformed data to
calculate UTL's for the site. 283
The primary task of CSI was to compare data from samples that had been
collected to their 95% UTL's to "identify Potential Chemicals of Concern" (COC's). As
part of this comparison, CSI only labeled a chemical a COC if its geographic distribution
was consistent with a potential source of contamination. On the basis of one or both of
these criteria (numerical comparison and distribution), CSI did not identify any COC's
among the volatile organic compounds or semi-volatile organic compounds found at
Kennedy Heights. This process can be compared with the TNRCC's draft Ecological
Risk Assessment guidance document, issued in November, 1996:
To evaluate the need for undertaking a response action, measured COC concentrations are
compared to the lower of the human health Protective Concentration Level (PCL) or ecological
PCL for each COC (the lower of the two is called the critical PCL). If measured COC
concentrations exceed the critical PCL for any COC, the person may either refine the PCL's by
going to the next tier in the risk analysis or implement a remedy pursuant to the Texas Risk
Reduction Program requirements. Response actions must conform to one of two options for
performance standards, termed Remedy Standard A or Remedy Standard B. Under Remedy
Standard A, affected media must be removed or decontaminated to permanently reduce COC
concentrations below critical PCL's. Under Remedy Standard B, removal, decontamination, or
control measures may be applied to prevent exposure media exceeding critical PCL's.284
Chapter 350 of the Texas Administrative Code states that PCL's must be established for
each COC in an environmental medium at a potential cleanup site unless a number of
criteria are met.2s None of the listed criteria apply to the Kennedy Heights property,
meaning under regulations available in draft form in 1996, the lowest of three values
(three different kinds of Protective Concentration Levels) for each chemical should be
selected and compared with background levels to determine whether to proceed with soil
assessment.286 Present regulations deviate from the kind of site-specific determination of
background that Chevron conducted, and instead call for risk-based standards that are not
based on the attainment of background (unless background is greater than the risk-based
PCL or the chemical is listed as a Texas-specific soil background concentration).287 In
any event, CSI did not compare its statistically-generated background levels to PCL's for
each chemical, but rather to soil sample data offered by the parties, primarily from
Chevron.
Following completion of the Baseline Risk Assessment, the only analytic
application of the sampling data was carried out by the Environmental Protection Agency,
which completed its work in May 2001. The report noted "there were Quality
Assurance/Quality Control issues with previously collected data and therefore the EPA
would collect its own data to be used in [its] investigation." This included mostly soil
samples (62), as well as a few soil gas (13) and groundwater (9) samples, the latter
utilizing Chevron's former monitoring wells. All samples were taken at 0-2 and 4-6 feet
below the surface. The Inspection did not include drinking water samples, as a "review
of City and State records indicate[d] that the drinking water supply in the Kennedy
Heights neighborhood meets all drinking water standards." 288 Traces of volatile organic
compounds were found in soil samples, as were traces in groundwater samples. In
addition, a "thin oily layer of non-aqueous phase liquid was encountered while taking
water level measurements at groundwater monitoring well NE-30.")289 EPA contractors
documented hydrocarbon odors at several sampling locations when opening soil core
barrels. Visible hydrocarbons were present in a monitoring well and in one of the soil
samples. Still, EPA engaged in risk calculations only for soil as a possible exposure
pathway.
The fact that almost all of the TPH occurs in soils at depths greater than 2 feet below ground
indicates that direct exposure to soil at depth is not a complete pathway and the risk is reduced.
The EPA also assumed a "worst case scenario" in which the highest concentration of TPH
detected under Texas Methods 1005/1006 (1580mg.kg), was excavated and spread on the ground
surface. A child playing in the dirt and coming in direct contact with the soil containing the TPH
through the oral, dermal, and inhalation routes of exposure would yield a hazard quotient less than
one.290
The Agency concluded that "the soils do not present a risk to the residents from exposure
to TPH by direct contact with soil."291
The Limits Revisited and Applied to the Mediation Process
The above description of the Baseline Risk Assessment and Expanded Site
Inspection only begins to delve into the assumptions driving the analysis, which
effectively ended at the comparison of background to sample values. Still, it provides
substantial documentation of the decisions made by Chevron and EPA contractors,
relying to a considerable degree on best guesses and the use of proxy data. The process
was sufficiently removed from those who would be affected by its results that residents
chose to seek relief in the courts. Residents' data gathering and analysis, designed to
directly test resident narratives of contamination, were challenged by Chevron attorneys
under the Daubert principles. For example, doubt was cast on the plaintiffs' witnesses
charged with generating a computer model and theorizing how toxicants were moved
from waterlines to residents' sinks and bathtubs.292 Chevron questioned many of the
assumptions underlying the model itself as well as plaintiffs' choice of inputs into the
model.293 Chevron claimed that the model was not "scientifically valid" because (a) it
was not initially designed to model oil contamination but was created for the modeling of
soluble substances such as chlorine, (b) was not calibrated in response to field
measurements, (c) eliminated portions of the water distribution system to increase
amounts of the contamination to certain homes, (d) was run twice and then totaled, and (e)
resulted in more PAHs at certain homes than had been entered under the assumed water
line break. 294 Defendants argued that much of the evidence regarding drinking water
contamination was inadmissible under the doctrine set forth in Daubert. Before the
federal district judge could rule on the admissibility of drinking water and other evidence,
the case settle out of court, in part because plaintiffs wanted to avoid the possibility of a
ruling on summary judgment.29s
The kinds of limiting dynamics that grew out of the relationship between the RRC
and Chevron as they carried out site and risk assessment set the stage for the mediation
process that followed. As with the negotiated settlements described in Chapters 4 and 5,
there were ample opportunities to create value and attend to some of the organizing
themes that residents had translated into low-cost proposals (such as the replacement of
pipes, water quality monitoring, and sampling approaches that accounted for resident
stories of contamination). For example, under the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act (RCRA), plaintiffs claimed a right to require defendants to remediate the site, a
process which their lead environmental engineering expert estimated at between 30 and
42 million dollars. Chevron ultimately offered 12 million dollars to settle the case, a sum
which represented their calculation of the expected value of their liability exposure
should the case progress in court. For a fraction of these figures, resident interests could
have been considered and addressed. Yet because the mediation process was based
exclusively on data collected prior to when the court ordered the case to mediation,2 96 the
site and risk assessment processes that were long underway by 1997 set both agenda and
outcome of the process.
Mediation was ordered on September 22, 1997. Further, it was ordered that
approximately 1,000 plaintiffs who had been previously severed from the case be
rejoined with the other O'Quinn plaintiffs. 297 At around the same time, a matter in state
court that focused primarily on property value diminution was ordered into the same
298
mediation. Several small, independent groups of plaintiffs were also folded into the
talks. The court consolidated these actions in order to meet its objective of applying
whatever was to be worked out in mediation to all claimants. The mediator (later
appointed as special master) was asked to:
Make recommendations to the Court to define the final/complete plaintiff group in this case; and
Report to the Court and the parties his determination of an allocation of any of the settlement
funds among the final/complete plaintiffs in the Kennedy Heights litigation.299
Thus commenced the settlement negotiations that plaintiffs had long prepared for
(attorney notes suggest preparation of a settlement matrix linking plaintiffs to exposure
years and forecasting bellwether claims settled in a certain dollar value range). The
special master described "four phases" to settlement of the case on June 2, 1998, after
having met with most or all of O'Quinn's clients (roughly 1,700 people):
The first phase, which I have explained extensively to the various clients and to the plaintiff
attorneys, would be what I call a settlement model. The settlement model treats all of the parties
fairly, even though each of the parties may get a different amount of the settlement. I should have
the settlement model done within the next week, maybe as late as 10 days, to present to the
plaintiffs and their counsel. Once the settlement model has been agreed to by the plaintiff attorney,
because it's essentially for their allocation of whatever amount the case settles for, I would then be
involved in negotiating an actual settlement agreement. The settlement agreement will set out all
of the detailed terms of the settlement. For example, the amount of plaintiffs that have to agree to
the settlement and any other particular terms that may be unique to the settlement. Once the
settlement agreement has been negotiated, Your Honor, we would then negotiate the dollar
amount, the actual amount of settlement, and I will make clear to all of the parties and all of the
attorneys that my view of the settlement has no bearing on liability of any. It is a settlement; it is a
resolution of the dispute. Once we agree on the settlement amount, then the respective attorneys
would send letters out with their signature and my signature to their clients recommending the
settlement and the amount they would receive. As we did in the Fench Ltd. Case and the way I
settled the Colonial Pipeline case, any of the clients who are not happy with the settlement then
had a right to come and meet with me to review their settlement, and then I would make a
recommendation to the Court whether their settlement should be raised or lowered or remain the
same. The fourth phase would be for those clients who are just not happy with the settlement.
The way we have handled it in the past is, after reviewing their claim, I have made a
recommendation to the Court that their attorney, for example, O'Quinn should have the right to
withdraw, and they would have the right to seek other counsel; and as long as the requisite number
of plaintiffs agree to the settlement, then the settlement would go forward.m
All resident-plaintiffs met with the special master, for the most part on more than one
occasion and in groups of roughly 20-30. Some recalled that these groups were divided
according to geography. All sides agreed that the master discussed what he felt were the
facts of the case and the case's merits with the residents. While certain residents were
convinced by their meetings and by data made available to them that the neighborhood
was only contaminated at "a minimal amount or level,")301 others expressed concern over
the master's apparent use of the meetings as a means of cajoling settlement by focusing
on RRC/Chevron data in order to cast doubts over plaintiffs' chances at trial. Of equal
concern to residents, particularly some who lived in the vicinity of the NE pit, was the
manner in which their concerns were heard and then apparently discarded. For example,
it was suggested that the master shared with the small groups a number of issues that
would be considered during the process. One resident recounts these issues in a letter to
U.S. Representative Sheila Jackson Lee:
My concerns with the case vary from the frequent presiding judges removed from the case to the
apparent disregard of factors, such as the six elements. These elements were argued and discussed
in trial and reiterated with residents in a meeting with the mediator as the basis to reach decision
on during mediation, per Judge Hittner's orders. The six elements included: (1) the buyout of
homes over two of the three pits in the subdivision; (2) relocating residents; (3) transaction cost; (4)
clean-up of area for other residents outside the pits; (5) move and replace water lines; (6) personal
injury. The proposed settlement award for Kennedy Heights residents appears not to reflect thejudge's request.302
Another discusses what he perceived to be the master's discussion of weaknesses in
plaintiffs' case:
One of the things that came to my mind, the meeting that we did have with him. His thing was,
OK, how many of you all here have ever heard of tort reform? And we were like. And then he
said, now ya'll know that there has been tort reform that has taken place in Texas. So it's like, in
other words, at this point here, because of tort reform, these particular categories here, you can just
forget about these. And that's when one of us rose up a bit, and said "what are you talking
about?" And he said all of the things that have happened to everybody. So the mediator's thing
was, because of tort reform, you're not going to be able to get what you asked for. He had
mentioned that Texas legislature had gotten involved in the whole process of tort reform, and
everything, had turned everything around. So it was like he just found this out. He just found this
out. And he said, since I know what I'm talking about, these categories here, you know, there's
nothing that's going to really be done about all of these.303
Unfortunately, no records of the meetings were available for review, making it
difficult to reconcile the various accounts of meetings with the special master. However,
it is clear in court transcripts that by June, 1998, Mills claimed to have "explained to the
O'Quinn clients that part of the settlement would not include a sale of their house, unless
it was voluntarily by them to some third party."3 0 4 Even aspects of the "six elements"
that would have required little expense and could have been accomplished without an
admission of culpability (such as movement or replacement of water lines) were tabled
by this point. To appreciate why a corporation would spend millions before addressing
low-cost needs such as an elimination of resident uncertainty, monitoring, and relocation
of pipes requires an understanding of what phase one of the mediation (construction of a
settlement model) entailed.
The total dollar value determined and allocated as part of the final settlement of
Adams v. Chevron was arrived at through the use of computer-generated settlement
models developed by the special master and his associates. Complete records of the final
settlement or the development of the settlement model were either privileged or
unavailable for review. However, it is clear that the model involved, at a minimum, two
primary variables: "property" (a function of distance from the NE and SE pits) and
"personal" (which was determined as a composite of duration of time spent in the
subdivision, the monetary value of certain diseases suffered, and other considerations).305
Higher dollar values were computed for homes of varying distances from the NE pit, as it
had been used for crude oil storage while the SE pit had stored brine. Property awards
were determined for each address and divided among the number of plaintiffs who
claimed to have lived at the address. The master made an effort to ensure that those
living on top of the NE pit had sufficient resources to allow them to purchase a home
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elsewhere. Review of a map illustrating "Total Property Award" for plaintiffs in the
Adams case shows that homes above the NE pit were awarded $54,000.307 By
comparison, homes over the SE pit were allocated $15,000. The distribution of property
awards appears uniform across the subdivision within a distance of 500 feet from the NE
($25,000 when not directly over the pit) and SE pits ($10,000 when not directly over the
pit). At distances greater than 500 feet, the value appears as a continuous function of
distance. The NW pit was not factored into the property determinations. Nor was the
exposure pathway claimed by plaintiffs (ingestion, inhalation, or absorption of
contaminated water through daily activities such as cooking and bathing) factored into
the model.
The special master indicated that he reviewed hedonic pricing models, in addition
to the site characterization and risk assessment data gathered by Chevron/RRC.
Residents were not confident that the final system of allocation based on the property
variable yielded fair outcomes. For instance, there were reported disagreements over
whether "median" or "mean" home values in Houston should be used (residents said that
the master preferred to use median values, which they claimed resulted in lower housing
value estimates). A broader concern was expressed over the fact that the "stigma" of
living in a community that had been repeatedly labeled a "toxic waste dump" had reduced
the value of all homes in Kennedy Heights substantially. Under this logic, a person
living less than 1,000 feet from the center of a pit and receiving $5,000 for property
damages would not be able to afford equivalent housing elsewhere in the city.
Residents interviewed understood the "personal" variable even less. Review of a
map showing personal awards to Adams plaintiffs reveals that this variable was not a
function of distance. What is clear is that certain residents on Murr Way in the vicinity of
the NE pit were offered personal awards far above the average settlement value (some in
excess of $50,000 and less than a handful above $100,000).308 A source of much
uncertainty following the release of the settlement amounts, the "personal" variable
appears to have been built based on a system of "disease levels" developed by the special
master and his team. One sheet lists plaintiffs, their diseases, and a monetary value
attached to each disease (i.e., colon cancer victims appear to have been offered $5,000
while those suffering from lupus were offered $25,000). Multiple diseases received the
sum of the value attached to each condition. The fact that residents were offered amounts
that were not so evenly rounded (e.g., $5,300, $500, $10,700) suggests that other factors,
perhaps including time spent in the subdivision, were included in this variable. As one
can imagine, the personal variable resulted in a wide variance of settlement offers, even
for people living on top of the NE or SE pit (for instance, three adjacent homes on
Lockgate Lane received personal award offers of $3,300, $102,400, and $6,200). To the
present, residents who lack a clear understanding of the model or who feel that it was not
fairly constructed are embittered by rumors of settlement offers received by their
neighbors.
Plaintiffs' attorneys entered into a master settlement on July 28, 1999, which set a
number of conditions that had to be satisfied by plaintiffs' counsel. Depending on where
they resided and their representation, certain percentages of groups of plaintiffs had to
elect to participate for the settlement to move forward.309 The maximum amount of funds
to be paid by the Defendants was set at $12 million (later raised to an aggregate amount
of $12.9 million), including $4 million for plaintiffs' trial counsel for partial
reimbursement of expenses and $400,000 (later raised to $650,000) for the special
master.3 10 Residents were given the opportunity to meet with the master and discuss any
grievances that they had with the settlement. A total of 3,150 residents settled. An
additional 589 did not. The court granted Chevron's motions for summary judgment and
dismissed remaining plaintiffs' claims with prejudice on October 1, 2002.3" Log
Development was also granted summary judgment based on limited immunity under the
Texas Business Corporation Act, due to their bankruptcy and dissolution.3 12
The settlement model described above was accepted by a sufficient number of
residents because they lacked the ability to contest it, by performing jointly with the
special master the kind of extensive soil sampling that would be needed to investigate
resident narratives of contamination. Rather, the special master focused his attention on
Chevron/RRC collected data and its interpretation through risk assessment to inform
what variables could be considered in a settlement model (such as distance from the
center of certain pits instead of a more realistic measure of exposure). The mediator was
clear about the applicability of Chevron/RRC data and its implications for the meeting of
resident interests, relying on these data in order to determine that "there is no basis for
this lawsuit."
The sequencing of mediation phases locked in the translation of RRC/Chevron
data used by the special master, who constructed a settlement model, had it approved by
plaintiffs' attorneys, added other conditions such as the proportion of claimants who
would have to accept settlement for it to be agreed to by Chevron and the court, and then
presented recommendations for individual settlement amounts to residents via letter.
Residents sensed a disconnect between their involvement in 1-2 group meetings with the
special master, where a broad range of topics were discussed, and their options following
receipt of letters recommending settlement and disclosing their proposed awards. They
were unable to explain how their expressed concerns over buyout of certain homes,
relocation, clean-up efforts, replacement of water lines, and personal injury were either
discarded early on or not included in the model. The model itself was not included in the
mailing which recommended a settlement amount to each plaintiff. Those who wished to
express their discontent were offered "the right to review" the settlement and, if
necessary, the "right to seek other counsel," having been deemed pro se after their
attorneys withdrew from representation of their clients. Thus even if residents' proposals
factored into the final settlement model at all, they were unaware of how their ideas were
incorporated. Model specification was relegated to a team of consultants and experts
hired by the special master. The real negotiations, between government officials and
regulated entities through choice of sampling frames, model assumptions, and risk
assessment parameters, had long been concluded.
Chapter 4
The Narrow Scope of Post-Accident Negotiation:
The Unocal Catacarb Release
We woke up one morning, it was Labor Day weekend, 1994, and there was, we had a house that
was on a hill, it's like the poor man's San Francisco. It's kind of like a town on the Mediterranean
that comes up from the sea and all the houses are built terrace-like. And our house had a
commanding view of the valleys and we faced, with the back of the house with huge banks of
windows faced the refinery which was west. And we woke up and I looked at the windows and
they were covered with a sap-like substance like from a pinetree and I went, oh, God, what did
those kids do now? And then I thought well, what is this, is this from the trees? We had a lot of
acacia trees around us that exuded kind of a sticky thing after they flower but it was the wrong
time of year so I was really stumped. What was going on? And then I started getting a call from a
gal who I worked with on the powerplant committee. She lived farther up the hill from me, and
she was a real estate agent, and she had gotten a call from one of her clients saying, there's crap all
over the cars, there's stuff all over the garden, the house, everything, up and down the streets, they
were trying to sell their house at the time, and they were a little upset.3 13
When I came back there were these brown, goopy spots all over my house, and windows that
would not clean off. And so people started calling the health department for two days saying
we've got this stuff everywhere and they said it might be pine pollen. They'd never come across
anything like this before so they didn't know what it was. Finally, the company that was right
next door to Unocal, at the time it was Wickland Oil, the manager called over and said we've got
this crap just all over our units and people are getting sick, you've got this brown stain just
trickling down the sides of the tanks. They were a little storage facility just on the East side of the
refinery. If they hadn't spoken up I don't know what would have happened. 14
These are descriptions of the final two days of what was in fact a 16-day release
of Catacarb, a catalyst used to strip sulfur from refined gasoline in the unicracker unit315
of the Unocal Corporation's San Francisco Refinery. 316 A Unocal Material Safety Data
Sheet describes Catacarb as follows:
Health hazards: Harmful if swallowed. Causes severe eye and skin irritation. Overexposure may
cause damage to kidneys and liver. Avoid breathing vapor or mist. Liquid. Brown-black. Odor:
None. Exposure guideline only available for diethanolamine (3 ppm OSHA, CalOSHA; .46 ppm
ACGIH). Target organs include the central nervous system. Accidental release measures: Isolate
danger area, immediate cleanup of any spill recommended. In California this is a non-RCRA
hazardous waste due to the vanadium content. Diethanolamine is subject to SARA 313 and 40
CFR 372 reporting requirements.m
Unfortunately, the above information comes from a document finalized in 1995. This
information was not so neatly packaged in the late summer of 1994, when the refinery
(located in Rodeo with prevailing winds moving in the direction of the town of Crockett)
released over 100 tons of the solution.
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A number of organizational contributors to the accident can be discerned from
thousands of pages of witness depositions taken by one of several law offices to file a $1
billion toxic tort claim on behalf of over 1,000 residents injured by the release.318 They
point to roles and routines that shaped refinery workers' decisions made during the
accident, but were ultimately removed from consideration by the time the Contra Costa
County Planning Commission conditioned future permit approval on Unocal's
negotiating a "good neighbor agreement" with community representatives. What
remained was a narrative of corporate greed and inordinate post-accident attention
focused on community notification, both of which limited what was discussed, translated
into proposals, and agreed to in the most groundbreaking community-corporate compact
of its time. In addition to (a) the manner in which the accident unfolded, (b) parallel
administrative actions, (c) efforts by Unocal during negotiations to limit changes to the
status quo, and (d) technological limits during implementation further narrowed the set of
interests represented.
The Unocal Catacarb release presents us with an "ideal case" for considering the
limits to integrative bargaining following an industrial accident. Despite the
disappearance of most of the evidence gathered during an investigation by the County
District Attorney,319 it remains the most documented petrochemical accident to lead to a
written contract negotiated with an affected community. The negotiation process
included representatives from each of four proximately located neighborhoods, and was
carried out apartfrom existing legal proceedings, thus freeing it of procedural elements
that could constrain agenda-setting, acceptable evidence, and the manner of
communications among parties (a controlling factor discussed in Chapter 5). The
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potential for residents to set agendas and priorities, develop proposals, tend to matters of
cost and other barriers to proposal acceptance, and meet their primary interests through
value creation, logrolling, and other strategies could not have been higher in this case, for
several reasons.
The Catacarb release occurred while Unocal was seeking County approval for a
land use permit for its reformulated fuels project, a draft Environmental Impact Report
for which was issued in June, 1994.320 A series of public meetings following the accident,
which began on September 13 (three weeks prior to a scheduled hearing before the
County Planning Commission to certify the Final EIR), encouraged the County to
condition permit approval on a good faith attempt by Unocal to negotiate resident
concerns. On November 15, the Commission added the following condition of approval
to Unocal's land use permit:
78. Within three months of the effective data of the land use permit and every three months
thereafter, the applicant shall submit to the Zoning Administrator, for review and approval,
a written report outlining the progress of negotiations of a Good Neighbor Agreement.
Good faith negotiations toward a Good Neighbor Agreement, as determined by the Zoning
Administrator, shall be a condition of approval of the land use permit. If the Zoning
Administrator finds that the applicant has not facilitated good faith negotiations, the Zoning
administrator shall notify the applicant of noncompliance with the conditions of approval
and shall commence revocation proceedings for the land use permit.32
The affected community's leverage over the refinery was further heightened by
the growing tide of litigation, which encouraged Unocal to try to limit liability by
working directly with a comparably small number of residents through direct
negotiation. It would also prove cost-effective to address certain concerns through a
GNA, which included many long-range commitments that could be transferred along
with general liability to the Tosco Corporation upon its purchase of the refinery in
November 1996.m An early community demand to develop an alternative dispute
resolution process for claims related to the Catacarb release further enhanced the benefits
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of negotiation perceived by Unocal. Unocal's relatively late start in pursuing permits for
its reformulated fuels project also meant that it could not afford the kinds of delays that
protracted litigation or administrative processes would require.
In addition, representatives of the affected area were well-organized and shared
recent experience with community-corporate negotiation. Negotiations commenced after
a final town meeting on October 5 and the Planning Commission's refusal to grant the
land use permit on October 18. By then, Crockett leaders had organized the Crockett
Group, composed of Douglas Tubb, Howard Adams, Kent Peterson, Alica Anderson,
Kasha Kessler, and Dave Hicks. Some of these individuals had served on the Crockett
Power Plant Committee, which opposed C&H Sugar's bid to construct a cogeneration
unit for the world's second-largest sugar refinery.
So when we started hearing about how they were going to site this powerplant virtually across the
street from some of our neighbors, we were appalled. We couldn't believe that it could happen.
So I became involved that way more through, I was concerned with I had one child and I was
pregnant at the time, and we were concerned about the chemical fallout. We were also concerned
about the chemicals that they used in the process because they were using ammonia and it was
going to be in a tank that was gonna be situated right on the curve of the railroad track. There
were several items about the powerplant they were proposing that we thought were crazy to be
putting so close to a neighborhood of 3,200 people... And then as I got into the process I was even
more upset. Because it was even more reckless in the way that they were trying to put this thing
up and the return to the community was practically nil. It was for C&H Sugar, and also PG&E
liked it, because they were going to be sold the excess power. And the state of California liked it
because it would be what they considered a co-generation plant, and therefore generating cleaner
and less expensive energy. We didn't believe it and we proved it time and time again in front of
all kinds of people.3 2 4
After ten years of opposition by the town and a citizen group called the Crockett Power
Plant Committee, the applicants agreed to compensate Crockett residents for the effects
of the new facility. Compensation came in the form of development of a portion of the
Carquinez Strait for public access, various community improvements, and the
establishment of a foundation.325 While the plant was only sited near the town of
Crockett, the town received a share of the company's property tax payments. An
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agreement between the companies, Contra Costa County, and Crockett ensured a stream
of $25 million in corporate donations and property taxes would be available to pay for
community and public works projects.326 The Crockett Power Plant Committee secured
the agreement after C&H received approval from the state Energy Commission for its
building permit in April, 1993. Opposition was dropped as C&H went before the state
Lands Commission in July, 1993.m
Following the Unocal accident, representatives of Crockett and Rodeo (including
Lynn Cherry, Leonard Miglio, and Janet Callaghan) formed the Crockett-Rodeo
Coalition. At a November 9 meeting at the Crockett Community Center, Crockett, Rodeo,
and Bayo Vista residents developed committees and working groups and gave each
committee tasks designed to clarify an initial list of community concerns generated at a
strategy meeting held in late October. By November 13, the committees had formalized
issues for negotiation within each of a number of broad categories of resident demands.
They had access to a substantial degree of technical assistance from both across their
neighborhoods (an expert in optics, a chemist, an arborist, prior petrochemical plant
workers and union representatives) and from regional non-governmental organizations.
Communities for a Better Environment, a non-profit environmental advocacy group
composed of organizers, scientists, and attorneys, had become aware of the nexus
between race and environmental quality through its research of the North Richmond,
California community in the late 1980's. It offered significant experience in
investigating and commenting on project impacts stemming from the Clean Fuels
program at refineries throughout the region.328
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These conditions allow us to explore the limits to integrative bargaining that exist
even under conditions that are comparatively hospitable to such forms of engagement
between parties. Despite the fact that the Unocal accident was a well-documented release
affecting a highly organized and supported community operating under a County
mandate, strict limits to what could be accomplished through negotiation emerged. To
examine the forces that can narrow the expression of interests following an accident, I
will search for institutional factors (roles, responsibilities, routines, rules) that were (a)
paramount to preventing future accidents or refinery errors and not fully considered
during negotiation or (b) present in such a way as to narrow the set of interests
represented during negotiation or met during implementation, despite the use of
integrative strategies known to be effective.
Catacarb Accident
Here is how the Catacarb release was understood by those in the local media and
members of agencies charged with investigating the event: The accident began with a
slow release of a "chemical mist" from the top of a 140-foot processing tower at 6:55
a.m., August 6, 1994.329 Media investigations uncovered an "initial flurry of concern"
which led to the declaration of a refinery-wide emergency and notification of the County
Health Department.3 3 0 Unocal workers started to shut down the tower, but the order to
cease operations in the unit was countermanded by the refinery's second-in-command.
Hastily called meetings between supervisors and engineers (without the consultation of
environmental and health and safety workers) yielded the conclusion that there was a
"very slim" chance that the leaking tower would explode. Management decided to keep
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the unit running until its next scheduled maintenance on October 8. County health
officials were told that the emergency was under control. Meanwhile, refinery workers
were noticing sticky brown spots on their cars and on equipment near the unicracker.
Operator Diane Wang described the leak, which by early September was noticeable from
nearby roadways, as a "giant troll and it was becoming monstrous."33' The unicracker
chief repeatedly told his workers that "we can make it." General Manager Stephen Plesh
left for the Labor Day weekend with orders to keep the unit running. By September 4,
workers began to notice Catacarb residue on the storage tanks of neighboring Wickland
Oil. Residents started to complain to the company and to health officials. 3 2 Workers
noticed a massive loss of Catacarb as they began to run out of potassium hydroxide.
Then, Wickland Oil, located downwind of the refinery, notified Unocal that their
property was covered in Catacarb and that their employees had been ordered to take
shelter. The unit was shut down on September 6.
The media accounts in particular focus on a decision (that in fact was never
agreed to) made early in the two week cycle to run until a scheduled turnaround, a choice
that was overwhelmed by a sudden cascade of events over the following Labor Day
weekend. The "Catacarb incident," as described by Unocal, also narrowly constructed
the event to give the impression that the right parties were "contacted" and the proper
data (post-accident monitoring, modeling, and sampling) "collected," but offered few
details of what transpired over the course of the two week accident. Table 6 shows the
chronology of events according to refinery management:
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Table 6. Unocal's Chronology of Events for the Catacarb Incident.3 34
Date Tigie .Event
August 22 0650 Leak detected
0720 Notified CCCHSD
September 5 9250 Secon complaint from Crockett
September 5 0120 Second complaint from Crockett
September 7 -0815 Unocal medical personnel contact Rodeo Medical Clinic
1100 Environmental consultants arrive and begin sampling
1300 Unocal visits Wickland to survey tanks, etc. for cleanup
1345 CCCHSD request samples
1400 Unocal medical personel arrive at Wickland; interview
employees (medical history), take samples
1500 Wickland sampling
1615 Wickland recurring health complaints; certified industrial
hygienist sent to Wickland
A.11 day Additional fruitsamples taken
900 reckett,cramunity mieeting
Following the accident, investigations focused on one explanation for Unocal
officials' reluctance to tend to the leaking tower: the plant's safety record. In 1989, the
refinery posted the longest safety record in the country: 6 million hours without a serious




officials and residents whom I interviewed, operated under an incentive structure that
included performance bonuses, which discouraged such simple procedures as routine
equipment overhauls (the hydrogen processing tower's overhaul was delayed from
February to October 1994).336 And refinery maintenance staff acknowledged that an
early shutdown would cost nearly $1 million.3 3 7 There is no denying the problems
caused by a decision made at the refinery to extend its run cycle in order to maximize the
life of the unicracker's catalyst and avoid downtime during the summer, when gasoline
prices are rising. 38 Yet the belief that this decision (fueled by corporate greed and
condoned by monitoring agencies such as County Health Services, which either turned a
blind eye or failed to detect an off-site release) accounted for the duration and severity of
the release masks a complicated struggle that occurred throughout those two weeks in
late summer 1994.
Underneath a broad and far from determinate incentive to continue operating
existed a series of problematic practices that demanded attention should the company
avoid "future Catacarb's," a phrase used often by local residents. The belief that refinery
management decided to continue operation of unit D-409 until the next scheduled
turnaround, while useful in pursuing criminal indictments of a handful of facility
managers (which ultimately did not occur), severely limited agenda-setting for the
negotiations that followed. Here we consider the seven areas of plant management and
operations that were opened to brief scrutiny by the Catacarb release. An eighth area of
practice, agency reporting and community warning, became the focus of much of the
resources devoted to the Good Neighbor Agreement and its implementation.
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Confirmatory Decision-making. While an order given to continue operations until
the next scheduled turnaround was never given, there was an initial "flurry of activity" on
the first day of the leak as reported by the media. Table 7 (Appendix) shows the extent to
which the leak was discussed formally on August 22 at meetings and informally through
information sharing between two or more workers (of the reported 27 times workers in
the sample attended meetings where the leak was discussed, 13 occurred on the first day
of the release). The decision to continue operations despite the presence of a leak was
made over the course of a single meeting early in the morning which "took less than one
hour," held in the office of Morgan Clark (General Superintendent of Operations) in
order to determine whether "his hypothesis that we could run with a hole in the tower was
correct."340 The meeting, which brought together people that the Superintendent of
Hydrotreating (Russell Crawford) believed would have an understanding of the unit, its
history, and operations, relied on several bits of data to confirm Clark's hypothesis.
During this "review process," many of the people involved were either vacation reliefs or
stand-ins for permanently assigned employees, meaning the likelihood that they would
"ask the right questions or know who to get the right answers from" was diminished (for
example, the Chief of Metallurgical Engineering was out of town).3 4 1 Being that it was
not a regularly scheduled meeting, Clark and Crawford had the discretion to choose who
should attend. This resulted in some glaring omissions: despite the observation that
Catacarb, or a substance resembling this caustic material, had spread down the side of the
tower, no effort was made to include an industrial hygienist, who would have represented
the best storehouse of knowledge regarding air and human health monitoring options.
Maintenance and health and safety personnel were absent from the meeting. Even though
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an emergency had been called for the leak in the tower, an action which activates an
emergency response system, the individual granted decision-making authority under this
system (the Incident Commander, usually a fire chief), was not invited to the meeting.
Thus, Clark and Crawford met with Richard Ferneau (the unit's Process Foreman,
who answered to Clark), and several engineers (i.e., corrosion, hydrotreating) to confirm
Clark's hypothesis, offered to the group along with a set of options available to the unit:
temporary shutdown, repair, and startup; shutdown leading to an early turnaround; or
continued operations. Clarks' hypothesis led the group to seek to rule out immediate and
catastrophic threats, the main concern of which was the "integrity of the tower." The
stand-in for the Chief of Metallurgical Engineering, Vijay Malhotra, investigated the
tower's integrity by reviewing the history of the tower, particularly an inspection of the
D-409 during its last scheduled turnaround. His primary document of reference was the
Turnaround Summary from 1992, found within a file for the tower (the refinery maintains
a file for each vessel under pressure). The summary indicated that mechanical damage
had been experienced by the tower, and Malhotra thought it "logical that the mechanical
problem noticed during the last turnaround could extend, especially with the longer
run."34 2 A more important question for the immediate integrity of the tower was the
source of mechanical damage. To answer this question, Malhotra relied on indirect
evidence from the file (as a hole in a 140 foot tower leaking steam was difficult if not
impossible to inspect while operating). The D-409 tower included a number of trays at
various heights that held catalyst, separated by "vapor spaces." Although the workers
present at the meeting could not be sure, it was assumed that the leak occurred next to a
tray, which could have failed and rubbed against the side of the tower, causing or
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exacerbating the hole. This assumption, along with an estimate that less than half the
thickness of the tower's wall had been gouged in the previous 2.5 years, was used to
conclude that such gradual erosion could not affect the tower's integrity. Several workers
admitted post-accident that had they known that corrosion was the true cause of the leak,
or that the leak was not directly across from a tray (the vibration of which was thought to
have caused the hole in the tower), they would have recommended shutdown.343 Either
fact (along with the knowledge that Catacarb was corrosive and included a corrosion
inhibitor that could weaken as a run cycle was extended) would have pointed to an
uncertain situation that should not be resolved through conjecture based on past history.
"We wouldn't know what's going on inside" was the common description of the state of
knowledge should either of the above facts be arrived at.
The meeting was set up to confirm the suggestion that the tower could run without
risk of catastrophic failure, and so minimal evidence of mechanical integrity was
accepted as sufficient. It is informative to consider the questions that were never asked
during the meeting: How long could the hole (under steam pressure, which all
interviewees believed would grow based on decades' worth of experience at
petrochemical plants) increase in size before it became a threat to integrity? Could an
acidic environment caused by C02 condensation have led to corrosion (acid attack and
carbonate cracking were ruled out "because this vessel does not give us any history of
any of those problems")? 3"4 Could the solution in the tower be monitored for changes in
normality (solution strength), the presence of iron (indicating rust), or other signs of
corrosion or loss of Catacarb? Attention to avoiding "catastrophic" events led to a focus
on confirming the absence of symptoms of threats to integrity or unit stability - the "hole
I1
suddenly growing a lot bigger, something breaking away from the tower, or a big change
in the process." 345 Absent these signs, and without any proof that large amounts of
Catacarb were escaping the tower (based solely on visual inspections from various
distances by some who attended the meeting), 34 6 operations could continue. This
decision was made in the presence of great uncertainty: besides the location of the leak
relative to trays, there was disagreement over the Catacarb entry level in the tower and
whether Catacarb would be removed by "demisters" (which separate liquids and solids
from vapor) before exiting through the hole (it was later discovered that there was no
demister before the hole). The confirmatory mode of decision-making meant that
"common sense was ruled out," 347 meaning that a variety of counterfactuals were never
taken to their logical conclusion once sufficient evidence backing Clark's hypothesis was
shared with the group.
Calls for refinery workers to reconfirm the hypothesis that the unit could remain
operational despite a hole its tower (which was strictly forbidden by the refinery's
Petroleum Safety Ordinances and viewed as a first for the refinery by all interviewed)
persisted. On two occasions (September 2 and 4), small groups of refinery workers were
called together to discuss the possibility of "online" repairs to the tower. Benchmarks for
deciding when "off-line" (during temporary shutdown or shutdown leading to turnaround)
repairs would be necessary were not requested. The fact that the emergency was called
"under control" and subsequently "all clear" on the 23rd meant that there was no
organized effort or mandate to look into such a question. In response to complaints on
September 4 and 5 from Crockett residents, refinery management's ability to frame
questions so as to confirm the decision to operate was stretched to its limits. Crawford,
112
during a visit to the refinery on the 4* (he was on vacation but responded to word of a
complaint), was asked by Clark to "verify that conditions at the refinery had not changed,
to validate that there was no reason to change our course of action."141 Similarly,
Crawford (still on vacation) was asked on September 5 (after another complaint was
received) whether there were any "substantial changes" from the day before. Finding no
evidence that there had been drastic changes through calls with two workers (this masked
wild fluctuations across several days prior to the S*), he reported this information to the
bulk shift supervisor and Clark. Any evidence to the contrary invariably lead to rival
interpretations - brown staining on tanks at units downwind of the tower was explained
away as "condensate," "coke dust," or residue from some of the tanks' odor abatement
systems. Complaints of brown film on residents' cars were attributed to "pesticide
spray," "pollen," or fallout from another area facility.
The need to interpret events so that they fit within management's assertion that a
tower could indeed run with a hole in it without posing a risk of catastrophic failure was
used by a number of operators to cope with the diminishing possibility that their
experiences with the unit would lead to the only rational, commonsensical conclusion:
unit shutdown. It demonstrated that in the context of an accidental release, a small
number of managers and engineers could construct the lens through which future
observations, data gathering, and questioning would be filtered. And it pointed to a
broader problem concerning how decisions made during an accident grew out of
questions that limited the scope of data gathering or investigation. For instance, refinery
manager Steven Plesh's request that the emergency be declared "all clear" grew out of a
single question: should the fire brigade remain on standby now that the threat of a
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catastrophic occurrence has been ruled out?349 Answering this question allowed
management to justify their contravention of refinery guidelines, which declare that an
"all clear" should not be called until the potential hazards of a situation are "completely
over and no longer a possibility."350
Methods ofAccident Investigation. After a decision to reduce rates in preparation
for shutdown was reversed and the above meeting concluded, hydrotreating engineer
Ellen Barker initiated a formal investigation of the leak by drafting a Management of
Change (MOC) proposal. The need for an MOC was justified by the fact that the tower
leak was "not a typical situation and operational changes outside of design should be
reviewed." 3 5 The MOC Work Request describes Barker's justification for the
investigation: "compliance with Unocal procedures" - it would in fact be the only
opportunity to formally ensure that standard protocol for responding to an emergency,
monitoring, mitigating, or repairing a leak, and related activities was followed. 3 2 Under
an MOC, a review of available Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS's), a review by the
Health, Safety and Emergency Response Department (not represented at the August 22
meeting), a structural integrity review, environmental review, and a Process Hazard
Analysis (HAZOP), which considers a matrix of pressures, temperatures, flows, and
concentrations under a variety of scenarios (relating to increases, decreases, and
shutdown) would be carried out.3 5 3 The HAZOP team would have authority to
recommend shutdown or repair. Instead, management determined on August 23 that an
MOC was not necessary because "it was a change in operation, not something we
installed to change operations." 35 4 In its place, a Process Review was commissioned,
finding the operation stable and "everything in normal parameter ranges."3 5 1 This review
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was conducted from a strictly operational standpoint; no consideration of health or safety
risks unrelated to the general running of the unit was given. The document further upheld
management's confirmatory mode of decision-making, asking Ken Sadoian, a process
engineer, to "endorse continued operation." The document "concurred that the hydrogen
plant can be kept operating" as long as the operation of the unit "remains unaffected" and
"no significant safety risk" was involved.356 It recommended that should the leak grow,
these two criteria be used to determine if the unit could continue to operate.
Transfer of Organizational Memory. With the initial confirmation of plant
operations in place (and influencing future investigations) and the only formal means of
reviewing related procedures turned down, workers were left to share information on an
ad hoc basis. Much was left uncertain by the above decisions: there was, for example,
no Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) for Catacarb solution, only some of its
constituents. There was no agreement among operators whether certain operating
parameters signaled a loss of Catacarb along with the C02 and steam that formed a
plume 140 feet above the ground. And as mentioned, differences of opinion were at the
root of management's decision to operate (i.e., presence or absence of a demister, point of
Catacarb entry, source of the leak, relative location of trays and vapor spaces). Not all
operators, supervisors, and engineers were aware of the decision to monitor the leak
(discussed below) or the results of the Process Review. They relied on the experiences of
their coworkers with previous accidents and exposure to Catacarb, shared information
regarding memoranda and studies that offered partial answers to operators' questions
(such as the "Scherer memo," which suggested acceptable Catacarb parameters), made
choices as to which piece of data to assign greater weight in guiding their actions, and at
115
times relied on unspoken agreement based on shared experience or training. For example,
Steve Carroll (Superintendent of Maintenance) did not discuss concerns that the amount
of Catacarb might be sufficient to cause health effects if the hole grew "because I thought
it was well-understood by Morgan [Clark]," a judgment made based on Carroll's prior
work experience with him. Sometimes, the lack of communication grew out of a
common set of expectations. Don Young, a shift supervisor, did not review an operator's
log because "if it was getting worse, [the operator] would have told me."358 Intuition
proved a poor predictor of behavior throughout the course of the release.
Many of the documented exchanges centered on major points of decision such as
whether to continue operating on August 22 (49 exchanges), whether and why "all clear"
should be called on August 23 (25), or how to respond to off-site complaints and stabilize
the unit on September 4 and 5 (22 and 21, respectively). Two other clusters of exchanges
occurred on August 24 (13, regarding whether to monitor and the risks of Catacarb
overspray) and September 1-2 (18, regarding a failed transmitter on the side of the tower
and its repair, observations of Catacarb on the Coking unit, and signs of unit instability).
These exchanges occurred primarily among the individuals who had decided to continue
operating or among members of a certain unit (operations, health and safety, engineering),
with an occasional bridging of two units. The lack of purposive interaction across units
failed to move the most valuable information to those with the discretion to shut down
the unit, or reconcile conflicting understandings based on workers' experiences.
Operators, for instance, were assigned to different plant units to take readings and
samples, their primary regular form of observation.35 9 They knew of certain dangers
based on what they were required to wear when drawing samples, and the forms that they
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had to fill out (describing the effects of Catacarb components) when disposing of
Catacarb filters.360 Through these tasks, the knowledge that DEA, a Catacarb component,
can degrade into a carcinogen was made available to at least one operator.3 6' A bulk shift
supervisor possessed an understanding of Catacarb, based on a leak in November 1992,
which would have reconciled some of the inconsistent visual observations of the plume:
He knew that Catacarb could coke around a leak, temporarily stopping it until steam blew
off the crust that it formed around a hole in the tower. 362
Experience with previous accidents was more commonly used to answer
management's calls for evidence that operations could continue. Clark was present for an
accident in 1990 where a control valve failed and a refinery unit lost all of its Catacarb,
without any documented health consequences.363 He and others therefore discounted the
health effects listed on MSDS's for individual Catacarb components. 364 Knowledge of an
incident in Chicago in 1984, where the failure of a process vessel resulted in the death of
several operators, heightened attention given to structural integrity, while bits and pieces
of information about the health effects of Catacarb remained lodged in the memories of
plant workers who did not have an occasion to share what they knew.365
Visual Monitoring and Observation. The decision to operate the D-409 with a
hole in its tower was conditioned on a system of observation designed by the process
foreman, Richard Ferneau. Absent available channels through which organizational
memory could be shared, reconciled, and used to inform decision-making, the
observation log stood as the only means of communicating operator concerns with
management. Operators were asked to record several key operating parameters (i.e.,
steam to carbon ratio, hydrogen production) as well as what they saw (i.e., the plume, any
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other signs that the leak might be worsening). Table 8 shows the observations recorded
throughout the release.
Table 8. Visual Observations Recorded During Catacarb Release.
August 22 Blowing forcefully through insulation (3 pm); Some catacarb leaking to ground
level (3 pm); No change (7 pm); Blowing through insulation. Little or no
catacarb leakage. Refer to drips on ground from hole (II pm)
August 24 No change (3 am); ? Can't tell (8 am)
August 26 No change (12 am); No change (4iam); No change (8 am); No change (12 pm);
Same (but catacarb visible in plume intermittently (4 pm); Same (perhaps odor is
more detectable behind D409). More spots on ground (8 pm)
August 30




Three aspects of the observations recorded by operators warrant discussion:
descriptions of the plume, accounts of Catacarb deposition, and interpretation of either
kind of log entry. The first mention of Catacarb entrained in the plume was made on
August 26 ("Catacarb visible in plume intermittently"). As mentioned, a possible
explanation for its sporadic appearance in the plume could be found in the tendency of
Catacarb to coke around a leak until bits of solid Catacarb were blown free by the
pressure behind them. Or perhaps there was a process explanation for why Catacarb
might escape the tower irregularly. Absent either understanding, management and
operators developed their own explanations. A head operator offered that "you take ten
people outside and look at the same object and you're going to get ten different answers.
Someone wrote 'blowing Catacarb' and I asked him what he meant. We went outside
and looked and looked, and then finally saw just a little puff."366 Management tended to
cite "atmospheric conditions," "the angle that you look at it," or "a trick of the light that
made the plume look discolored at some points in time" as possible explanations for
entries. There was also a lack of consistency in how observations were made and who
recorded them. Some viewed the plume for length, some for velocity, and some for
color.367 Various distances and angles were used when making observations (50-100
yards was not atypical). An example of an observation that was never recorded came on
September 1, when Barker described the plume as "the worst I'd seen it" (the log does
not reflect such a qualitative difference in the plume on the 1 t). Barker intended to share
her observation before an unplanned shutdown of a second stage change pump demanded
her attention. Interestingly, such minor upsets could temporarily improve the appearance
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of the plume. The latter upset resulted in rate cuts, meaning steam and any substances
entrained in it would leave the tower in smaller amounts for a period of time.368
It would appear more difficult to form competing interpretations of observations
of Catacarb deposition, noted for the first time on August 22 ("some Catacarb leaking to
ground level") and moving away from the immediate vicinity of the unit starting August
27 ("Catacarb is starting to accumulate on lines and equipment"). When management
viewed Catacarb staining on tanks further up the hill from the unicracker, Crawford
described staining on tanks as "new information," with "nothing to compare to." 369 For
one, management normally did not walk near where the tanks were located. Thus, the
presence of brown liquid or droplets on equipment was interpreted as possibly dust, ash,
dirt, condensate, material vented to atmosphere from vapor recovery systems on top of
certain tanks, or general discoloration. There was no method in place to sample the
deposition or make observations in a systematic way beyond the immediate area of the
tower, making it difficult to record Catacarb's steady movement toward the refinery
fenceline. Efforts to "wash Catacarb off the ground" and aim a fire monitor at the plume
to knock down what had become "vaporized Catacarb" on September 5 further confused
observations and what they could be attributed to.
Management revealed after the accident that they intended the log to "make sure
people were watching," while they relied on their own observations. After awhile, copies
of the log were no longer kept at the unit; they were sent to Ferneau and then to Crawford,
meaning the full record of entries could not be reviewed for trends or sudden changes.
Operators were never asked if their observations indicated Catacarb loss. There was
great confusion over how an observation should be communicated or whether the log was
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"given scrutiny or used to determine whether the tower would run." 70 Such
circumstances were not conducive to building a case for shutdown, despite the consensus
among operators by August 26 that the leak was "not just steam and C02."37 1
Operating Parameters. The remainder of the observation log included entries for
operating parameters that Ferneau believed would allow workers to monitor the stability
of the unit (loss of Catacarb was at best a secondary consideration). The entries were to
be recorded "so that we'd notice a trend and try to deal with it before a critical stage."37 2
Some of the variables could be linked to possible Catacarb loss. For example, the unit
has a methanator, which converts leftover carbon and hydrogen in the stream into
methane. A loss of Catacarb through the leak would increase the remaining C02, which
would increase "methanator delta" temperatures and possibly damage the system. Figure
5 shows the methanator delta temperatures during the release.
Figure 5. Methanator Delta Temperature Changes Recorded in Observation Log, August












00 C 0 0000CC>00C>00C,0 00C>000
These data suggest that substantial fluctuations began on September 1 and peaked over
Labor Day weekend, when the temperature reading hit as high as 93.24. Upper
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management (Plesh, Clark) was unaware of the values reached during this time.
Engineers and the process foreman, on the other hand, were charged with telling
operators "exactly what to add to the solution" to keep the unit running." 3 The head
operator, Milford Hodges, explained that during a time of unit instability, "it's the wrong
time to be asking why. Things are moving too fast and you have to stay on top of things.
You run the unit; don't let the unit run you."37 4 This sentiment, shared by many of the
operators, focused workers on the task of avoiding unit shutdown (extreme levels of
instability can trigger automatic shutoff) and stabilizing parameters. For example, the
feed gas gravity, another parameter listed on the observation log, represents the amount
of hydrocarbon in gas that is reformed into hydrogen and carbon monoxide. The higher
the gravity, the more steam the operator has to use to carry out the conversion. The more
steam in the system, the higher the concentration of CO and therefore C02. If Catacarb
cannot absorb the amount of C02 present, the C02 slips over to the methanator, causing
a rise in that number. When operators found that they could not increase the feed gas
gravity without the methanator "taking off' (signaling a possible weakening of the
Catacarb solution because of its escape through the tower or degradation over time), they
added KOH to make up for the Catacarb's poor performance. 375 Operators used the
remaining eight feet of KOH stored on the unit on September 4-5, and put in an order for
a new batch at the start of the week.376 Others responded to an increase in methanator
delta by increasing the stripping steam in the D-409 (which helps with the C02 removal
process). Figure 6 shows changes to the "steam to D-409" parameter.
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Two changes of note occurred during September 1-2 (when an unplanned shutdown
elsewhere caused rates to go down) and September 5-6 (when attempts to regain control
over the unit led to substantial increases). From Table 3, we see that the former
coincided with a period when observations did not record the presence of Catacarb in the
plume. The decision to increase stripping steam, so that operators could keep the unit
from "running them," exacerbated the amount of Catacarb released near the end of the
accident (when residents awoke to "brown, goopy spots" covering their homes). None of
the interviewees were able to estimate the additional quantity of Catacarb release caused
by such an increase in stripping steam (and there was no way to measure at the time how
much Catacarb was coming out of the leak in the tower as industrial hygiene monitoring
had been ruled out).3 77 Nor was this their role during the release: as shown by other
parameters on the observation log, the operators succeeded (with the above exceptions) in
keeping unit indicators stable.
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Because certain readings on the log, when they were available for trend
analysis, 378 did not necessarily point to Catacarb loss, the clearer objective to avoid
catastrophic change prevailed. For example, a methanator rise could arguably suggest
problems with catalyst in several other places within the broader hydrogen plant. A more
certain indicator of Catacarb loss was the normality of Catacarb, or the concentration of
active chemicals responsible for C02 absorption. At the time it was believed that
normality should not fall below 4.5 due to the possibility of C02 breakthrough, or exceed
5.4 because of the corresponding increase in corrosivity.379 Normality readings were
taken by a laboratory after samples were collected every Monday, Wednesday, and
Friday (midnight shift).380 Again, not all unit workers (or members of management) were
aware of the min-max values for Catacarb, or even the significance of the normality
readings. When they did detect potentially troubling changes (e.g., normality readings of
4.32 on August 31 and 3.59 on September 2), engineers and management remained "of
the mind that this was one sample," leaving them to "question who took the sample and
whether we gave them a representative sample." 3 8 1 This, coupled with the time required
to receive sampling results, meant that a meaningful trend of normality readings could
not be established in time.
The increased visual and unit observations encouraged by the monitoring system
DID detect changes in the leak, at times toward the start of the accident. But there was
no mechanism for reconciling different interpretations, bringing together bits of
organizational memory not shared among plant workers, or relating normality readings
from samples, recorded operating parameters before they were sent to the process
foreman and engineers, or visual readings of the plume and refinery grounds before
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efforts to stabilize the unit led to temporary changes in unit conditions. A strong obstacle
to bringing together these different bits of information was the hierarchical structure of
Unocal and the limits that it placed on individuals' discretion.
Hierarchy and Emergency Response Authority. Figure 7 presents the San
Francisco Refinery organizational structure as it related to the unit in question.
Figure 7. Unocal San Francisco Refinery Organization.




The first noticeable problem is the separation of Operations from Maintenance
and Health and Safety. Concerns regarding a leak in the unicracking unit differed
accordingly: the Operations division followed operating parameters, Health and Safety
looked into safety concerns of the unit, and Maintenance focused on structural integrity
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as well as "housekeeping" issues (such as the appearance of the unit as Catacarb
deposition accumulated). By August 30, when Andrew Garcia, a member of the Health,
Safety, and Emergency Response Division, told his supervisor that the leak had gotten
worse, it had become acceptable to regard the situation as "Operations' decision."3 82
Members of other departments were unaware of any procedures available for overriding
decisions made either within the Operations Division or the facility as a whole (which
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would have proven useful to the external industrial hygienist). Nor were they given
information regarding recent decisions made by other divisions, as when operators
received no word of what was discussed or decided at a Health and Safety Committee
meeting on August 29.384
Those within the Operations Division, particularly in the Hydrotreating
Department, did not perceive an equal responsibility for decisions regarding the leak. A
strong vertical chain of command existed in the department, which was self-reinforced by
worker understandings of what would happen should, for instance, an operator "go
around" it. Crossing the line between management and labor (operators), for instance,
was referred to as "insubordination," and going around the chain of command was
viewed by operators as the first step toward being criminally prosecuted or even accused
of sabotage. 385 Workers with the most knowledge of the leak and its progression "kept
opinions to themselves," understanding that decisions were "not theirs to make" or that
"their words carry little weight." 386 Contacting the hydrotreating or operations
superintendent with a unit-specific concern was not common practice - only when clear
safety concerns or an extreme unit upset leading to shutdown was evident was this
viewed as acceptable practice.387 The usual chain of command was to report problems to
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the head operator, who took his immediate instructions from the process foreman
(Ferneau). The problem was, most of the refinery's management worked during one of
four shifts at the plant (day shift). On the off-hours, it was left to shift supervisors to
make decisions. With personnel and the precise delineation of authority constantly in
flux, workers used deference as a means of avoiding decisions for which they could be
held accountable: operators did not think their review of sample results was critical if a
head operator was available to do the same, shift supervisors waited for the process
supervisor or others with "more experience on the unit" to make decisions, the process
supervisor, having been overruled on the first day of the leak after calling for a rate
reduction, deferred to upper management, and the superintendents of the unit in turn
believed that it was "the process supervisor [who] made decisions about operations." The
act of reporting information became the only recourse viewed as appropriate by members
of the Hydrotreating Department, and as we have seen, available channels for reporting
changing conditions had their limits. Once information was reported, according to one of
the shift supervisors, "they're [process foreman and above] aware of it and I'm aware of
it, so there really isn't anything to talk about." 388
With worker discretion held in check by refinery organization and an unwritten
understanding of worker roles and their limits, the only aspect left to control was worker
perception, absent a clear sense of the health impacts of Catacarb. The original Incident
Commander for the leak had always worried about the "alarming factor" of the accident,
stemming from the visual plume and its effects on local residents. As it turned out, this
concern was first manifest among the operators. Workers experienced a "feeling of
abandonment" as the leak progressed, to which the process supervisor attributed some of
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the more alarming entries on the observation log. By August 25, requests for a
"management presence" on the unit were made, and by the end of the month, the need for
an official statement led the General Superintendent to begin drafting a memorandum for
plant workers. The decentralized nature of information regarding the leak was evident in
the memo's construction, as members of the refinery from other divisions and units were
asked to contribute bits and pieces to the document. Upon its issuance on September 2,
workers were even more confused: the Catacarb constituent percentages (given in the
memo by weight) appeared "off' to some, and the fact that "a comparable solution would
be liquid clothes washing detergent" did not coincide with safety precautions taken
during sampling and some operators' past experiences with the caustic solution. What
the memo did accomplish was to make the first official assertion that the leak "at its
current condition does not present a health or safety risk.. .possibly the leak will grow in
size, but mechanical integrity of the tower is not in question." 389 This declaration further
reinforced many of the self-imposed and traditional barriers to vertical communication
within the unit and the division. At times after September 2, the former Incident
Commander (IC) had occasion to discuss sounding a new emergency, a decision not
made because of the "Clark memo."
None of these organizational barriers would have occurred had the refinery's
Incident Command System been upheld. Unfortunately, while the authority to call for
unit shutdown could not be questioned once granted to the IC, how to tell if authority
rested with the IC was in fact open to interpretation. The severity of an accident,
information gathered upon the IC's arrival, and the opinions of the "support group"
(process foreman and above) could work alone or in tandem to determine the IC's
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decision-making authority.390 When workers referred to commonsense being "ruled out"
during the accident, they were often speaking of the work of the IC and his team:
In an emergency situation and you are responding to it, you go to the resources that are available.
You would first get the unit personnel to find out the conditions of what is occurring and the
conditions surrounding what is occurring to see what impact they might have. Based on that
information we would then use either common sense to set some sort of "hot" and "warm" zone,
quickly, then through monitoring and using the proper equipment based on the information that
you have gathered, you would determine the true safeness of the zones that you established with
immediate information, size of the leak, position of the leak, wind direction, and wind speed.
Once you have established the parameters as far as monitoring, you might change that area a little
bit.39'
When the IC and his team arrived on August 22, the "support group" had already decided
to continue operations. A member of the team recalls that "a process was already
beginning - there was nothing to be done, so we left." 392 Once the leak was declared
"under control," there was no incentive for the IC team to learn more about the nature of
the release, the "requirement for being there wasn't as strong anymore," and the process
chief's duty to provide the IC with technical information about the unit was reduced
according to the refinery's Emergency Response Manual.393 The following day, the
emergency was declared "all clear," effectively disbanding the IC team and reinstating
the unwritten barriers to communication and decision-making.
Response to Off-site Complaints. Review of the timeline of worker actions during
the release suggests a final area in need of refinement: response to outside complaints.
Two complaints were received before the decision to shut down was made (September 4
and 5), in addition to two received by the Air Quality Management District (AQMD) on
the 5*. Complaints were typically referred to the bulk shift supervisor because of his
location on the perimeter of the refinery near tankage, pipelines, and other potential
sources of offsite emissions.394 The protocol for receiving complaints was to "obtain as
much information as the caller will give" regarding the odor, noise, smoke, or other
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environmental concern, make an odor tour of the refinery (including fencelines) using a
checkoff sheet, eliminate any sources if they are identified, complete a Community
Hotline Call form, file the form in the Call Binder, and contact the Bulk Shift Supervisor
to pick up the form. 395 He in turn would determine the appropriate persons for handling
the form and necessary follow-up calls, sending the form to each person. The first tour
taken after a complaint was received on September 4 revealed stains further up the hill
from the D-409 than they had ever been seen, darker on the side of equipment facing the
leaking tower. The bulk shift supervisor was not confident in his authority to eliminate
sources of offsite emissions should they be identified. On that and the following day,
complaints were therefore referred to the general superintendent (Clark) and the
hydrotreating superintendent (Crawford), both of whom were on vacation. The general
manager and maintenance superintendent were indirectly notified, and an operator later
learned of the complaint. On September 5, only Clark and Crawford were aware of a
complaint following its receipt by the bulk shift supervisor (with the exception of the
process foreman, who learned about it in the context of approving access to the tower for
the placement of a jet stream from a fire monitor on the plume). On the first day, a visit
to the address of the complainant that resulted in no personal contact was made by
Crawford. The second day, no visit was made: Clark asked the bulk shift supervisor
whether there was "anything unusual" at the refinery and was told that nothing had
changed significantly from the 4th. Meanwhile, starting on the 41, Clark, Crawford, and
Ferneau worked on approving the use of a fire monitor to knock down as much of the
plume as possible with water, a move that covered parts of the unit in brown liquid and
affected the temperature of the boilers. This small group of managers had sole discretion
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over the interpretation of the complaints and what to do about them. As evidenced by
Crawford on his visit to the complainant's home, a member of management, untrained in
incident response or the characteristics of certain chemicals used at the refinery, was
unsuitable for the job of responding to resident concerns. There was no rule in place
which stated that the true source of a complaint (such as "deposition of brown droplets on
car") should be found before Unocal could deny responsibility. Nor was there any
cooperation with County or AQMD officials in getting to the root of the problem. A
single person visiting the refinery while on vacation, or another individual calling in from
vacation, was the last line of defense against offsite consequences of the release.
Administrative Limits
The primary investigators of the Catacarb release were the Bay Area Air Quality
Management District (AQMD) and the County District Attorney's office. While
violations assessments were not issued until January 1995 (several weeks after a Good
Neighbor Agreement in principle was signed with residents), a comparison of the manner
in which agencies responded to the accident and the substance of community-corporate
negotiation suggests an unwritten division of labor between citizen and agency enforcers
of environmental regulations. Table 9 shows draft and final AQMD recommendations
for corrective action at the refinery, as well as violations assessments for the Catacarb
release.
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Table 9. Summary of Violations and Suggested Corrective Actions Issued by AQMD.
Regulatiob 1 1W5%9 9/25/95 OnfM~
1-301 - Public nuisance Likely Violation Injury, nuisance, and annoyance were
violation created for a considerable number of
people as a result of emissions. Lab
analysis of samples taken from
Crockett property indicates vanadium
content matching theCatacarb
material. NOV issued for 9/5 and 9/6.
6-311 General Operations Likely Violation Emissions exceed maximum particulate
violation emission limit of 40 ibs/hr. (emissions
were 278 lbs/hr.)
Suggested Corrective Actionsl 1/18/95 Suggested, Corrective ActionsK 9/259
2. A plant error reduction programinu stbe Same. Adequate environmental an4lt$ ws
established to address human etroi in a systematic should be done to provide manamn ithaccurate
and scientific manner. information.
4. Create a cultureti which workers feel Same.
empowered to participate, communicate freely in
health and safety issues, provide feedack and
ensure policies have real impact.
6. Needs improved capability t.ssess halthand eciii onmaking process mtu i
safety problems. invld e o .caetent and safety p rsonnl.
Sh 6 use the [OC, or simila netu to
unusual situations
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In its Complaint for Civil Penalties, the AQMD focused exclusively on the above Rules
and Regulations of the District, and sought the appropriate civil penalties.396 A Consent
Decree arrived at between the parties included civil penalties at $1.75 million plus costs
of investigation, in addition to calls for (a) a trained industrial hygienist on staff at the
refinery, (b) eight hours of training for each employee in the Health, Safety, and
Emergency Response Department on responding to unpermitted hazardous materials
releases, and (c) eight hours of training for five years for each of two individuals in the
Environmental Affairs Department on compliance and reporting.397
Vague calls for changes to "safety culture" and the "blame mentality" were never
codified into more precise directives for the company. Instead, the Consent Decree
called for minor changes to existing training initiatives, plenty of which had been in
effect prior to the release and worked fairly well, as evidenced by employees' efforts to
work to the fullest extent possible to address the accident within written and informal
limits to their discretion. Indeed, suggested corrective actions sent mixed signals to the
refinery, noting that "it is likely that given the preexisting conditions this type of release
would have occurred no matter who the workers were" while at the same time calling for
"a plant error reduction program" to address human error.398 Two easily reportable and
verifiable actions, the placement of a hygienist and the completion of training hours,
marked the only efforts to address organizational precursors to the Catacarb incident. In
addition, several suggested corrective actions sought to ensure that the right information
(MOC's to evaluate unusual events, MSDS's for mixtures, adequate environmental
reviews, a system of corrosion monitoring) would be collected and that appropriately
trained people would have evaluation authority. These recommendations failed to
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acknowledge the extent to which needed information and a redundant system of control
over shutdown decisions (Incident Command system and upper management) had been
available during the two week release. They ignored the most troubling concern to
emerge during the release, namely the fact that a heavily regulated, complex facility
encourages employees at all levels to adopt routines (i.e., patterns of visual observation,
information or knowledge transfer), rules (i.e., only ask questions or share information
under certain circumstances), or means of framing questions (i.e., confirmatory decision-
making) to simplify what is expected of them and their coworkers during an unexpected
event. A hierarchical organizational structure helps to isolate these coping strategies
within facility units or even individuals, making them difficult to identify, question, and
correct. As refinery management conceded during the investigation, a system was put in
place, clear signs that Catacarb was escaping in sizable quantities from the D-409 tower
were captured and recorded, but appropriate response actions were not taken on many
levels. Administrative actions after the release did not address these tendencies to
simplify unusual circumstances and the ways in which they were magnified or hidden by
the facility's organizational structure.
Negotiation Limits
A final corrective action suggested by AQMD was at the center of community-
corporate negotiation: "Unocal must implement a policy that results in rapid notification
of the BAAQMD for any future incidents." 399 In a pre-negotiation strategy meeting held
on 27 October 1994 for Crockett, Rodeo, CBE, and union representatives, a series of
134
resident concerns were generated, the most prominent of which was emergency response
and notification
Table 10. Community Concerns Presented to Unocal.
Response and Notification Fenceline Monitoring; Community Advisory Panel; Independent
Audits; Fire Department Training; Fire/Emergency Radio Channels;
Data Base/Information Distribution Center; Community Warning
System; Warning Sirens; Crockett-Carquinez Fire Department;
Neighborhood Watch Network
Environment Chlorine; Hydrogen Sulfide; Hydrocarbons; Wastewater Discharge and
Disclosure; Emission Offsets; Worker Training; Flare/Noise Advance




Relocate Hillcrest School; School Protection; Bayo Vista Safety
Agreement to Negotiate; Conflict Resolution Process; Remedies for
Breachof Contract; Refinery Name change; Drop Appeals of
Reforrnulated Fuels Project Permit
At a November 9 meeting at the Crockett Community Center, Crockett, Rodeo, and Bayo
Vista residents developed committees and working groups and gave each tasks designed
to clarify the initial negotiating list. By November 13, the committees had made
considerable progress.400 The Emergency Response and Community Warning
Committee produced the following proposals in order to assist the refinery in avoiding
future Catacarb-type incidents:
" On-site, paid professional monitors of community choice at all times
e Funding for community odor and spill patrol teams under the control of community groups
e Surveillance cameras at major refinery units, flares, and fencelines operated and monitored at all
times by community and government representatives
* Citizen monitors inside the refinery that would participate in activation of public notification and
warning systems during spills and releases
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e Fenceline monitors directly wired to community fire departments and other agencies for
immediate alerting of releases, designed to ensure early detection and control of release source; all
data available to public
* Funding for fire departments to design and provide training for emergency response
* Workable evacuation plan practiced regularly
" Create and maintain compatible radio channels of fire/emergency units at Unocal with such units
from County, Crockett, and Rodeo
* Computerized database with information on effects of known hazardous materials and
recommended medical treatments
* Ensure rapid medical provision and agency employment of recommended procedures following
release detection
* Fund operation of a community access public health and safety information distribution center
serving communities
e Contribute remainder of $250,000 previously committed to Community Warning System by
Unocal
* Fund permanent installation and maintenance of warning systems
* Funding to enhance community-wide neighborhood watch programs "
As evidenced by each of nine committees and their proposals, residents, many who were
suffering from the effects of Catacarb exposure, spent much of their time crafting
proposals and investigating alternatives.
We met endlessly. And we designed things because of course they were clueless. We called
phone companies; we called places to find out what to do about some sort of calling system and
also to get information from the County. For instance, one of the things we proposed was that
they would mail to every person in Crockett every six months or a year or less, a postcard and ask
them if they were chemically sensitive or if they wanted notification of what would be considered
kind of a "level two" incident which is not the highest but kind of a middle incident. And we did
this because my wife is very chemically sensitive and she has allergies and when they have a
release, if affects her more than others and many other people felt the same way so we filled out
all these forms and we figured out a way that Unocal could actually call with an automated system
so that the County wouldn't have to wait until doomsday, because they, literally people could be
dying by the thousands and the County could say well, there doesn't seem to be scientific evidence,
and we're not sure there's any cause and we don't know where the source of this is, even though
of course there are now detectors all over the place, they still won't commit to all of that. So we
were going to have Unocal determine if it was their release, with these new infrared detectors to
notify us if it was this kind of middle-range release.
Such proposals, which sought to alter roles and responsibilities within the refinery,
transfer some of the existing monitoring discretion from Unocal and agencies to local
residents, and encourage the co-production of environmental safety by residents and the
state, were either discounted or "chipped away" by Unocal negotiators. 40 3 Tables 6 and 7
(Appendix B) show the initial GNA draft issued by Unocal on 9 December 1994 and all
changes made to the GNA during single-text negotiations. From the initial text grew a
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series of counterproposals, positional bargaining steps, and calls for further specification
of provisions (105 in all), of which 33.3% were new program suggestions (by comparison,
40% were additional language/clarification, 11.4% were requests for additional money
accepted by Unocal, 4.8% were requests for funding that were denied, 8.6% were
requests that dates certain be added to existing provisions, and 1.9% concerned the
addition of a party or working group to a provision). Less than half of the 35 new
program suggestions were accepted by the refinery, including 1 emergency response
(funding for a siren), 2 school safety (facilitate drills, add a bus turnaround), 3
environmental (send final fenceline monitoring design to the county, share monitoring
data with the CAP, seek no offsets for emissions reductions), 2 transportation (begin
transportation demand management program, reduce or reroute bulk deliveries), 2
vocational (hiring preferences, include maintenance work in the agreement), and I
financial (shared tax allotment) and several legal provisions. Two interesting findings
arise from inspection of the first draft and subsequent changes. First, the December 9
draft excludes the majority of issues for negotiation produced by the negotiating
committees for issues of health risk and medical monitoring, emergency response and
community warning, and environmental concerns. Many of the deleted items were
attached to low-cost proposals, particularly in comparison to those issues that were
included in the initial draft by Unocal (transportation infrastructure improvements,
fenceline monitoring technology). Second, changes to the draft show that after December
12, before which some of the committees' issues were reasserted by the community and
rejected a second time, negotiation focused on additional financial resources for the two
primary towns and provisions included in Unocal's first draft, further specification of
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procedures and standards of implementation, and the addition of dates certain and a
process for resolving disputes over interpretation of the accomplishment of said
procedures. The degree of inventiveness and willingness to experiment with new
solutions was greatly diminished by the time residents were called upon to respond to
Unocal's initial draft.
Importantly, there was more give and take away from the negotiating table.
Unocal's concessions in other venues dwarfed (and were often echoed in) the provisions
that were added to its single text GNA. Before issuance of the single text agreement,
Unocal made a series of proposals that were mostly offered directly to the County's
Community Development Department or its Board of Supervisors, or agreed to with the
Rodeo Municipal Advisory Council (RMAC), a quasi-governmental body whose
members were appointed by the Board of Supervisors:
September 21, 1994: Memorandum of Understanding with RMAC 404
e Locate Tank 109 further from Hillcrest School
* Improve emergency notification plan to Hillcrest and St. Patrick's Schools and Bayo
Vista
* Provide Rodeo with quarterly newsletters information community of project status
* Conduct two shelter in place workshops and distribute kits by June 1995
* Work with Rodeo licensed day care centers to request notification from Community
Warning System; provide for any required access material and installation
* Continue participation in the Refinery/Petrochemical mutual aid system
* Appear before the RMAC quarterly during project construction
* Contribute $50,000 in January 1995 and $50,000 in January 1996 for community
improvements in Rodeo, selected by RMAC
e Advise RMAC of future hiring plans
* Work with Contra Costa building trades to implement hiring outreach for apprentices
from Crockett, Rodeo
* Work with County to develop a community advisory program
" Work with East Bay Regional Park District and State Lands Commission to develop bike
and walking path along San Pablo Avenue
e Contribute $25,000 per year for three years to John Swett Unified School District for
specific student programs
e Contribute $378,000 for facilities improvement project at Hillcrest Elementary School
October 12, 1994: Activities Summarized to Community Development Department405
* Reviewing notification procedures with regulatory agencies
* Will continue to work in conjunction with County's expanded emergency notification
network
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e Forming a Community Advisory Panel with representatives from Crockett, Rodeo, and
Tormey
* About to begin educational program with schools, senior centers, day care facilities, and
community groups on how to respond to emergency releases
* Making a contribution to Hillcrest (agreed to with RMAC)
October 28, 1994: Activities Summarized to Community Development Department4 06
* Is investigating all property damage claims; efforts to clean cars, windows, and personal
property will be completed soon
* Contribution has been presented to Hillcrest (October 20)
* Will install temporary on-site monitor at Hillcrest this week to allow school to be aware
of airborne release
* Working with Community Awareness and Emergency Response (CAER) organization to
educate community on sheltering in place and other ways of protecting themselves in the
event of a release; developing videos to be mailed to each neighboring household
* Signed contract with CAER for installation of new community warning system,
scheduled for completion in December 1995; would be capable of linking directly to all
major local TV, radio, and cable stations, activating sirens audible to residents within one
mile of each major industrial facility in County, including Unocal, initiating the current
Community Alert Network, a computerized telephone system which delivers messages to
businesses and residents during an emergency, and connecting to digital highway signs
planned by State Department of Transportation.
November 8, 1994: Letter to Board of Supervisors4 07
* Opened a temporary medical clinic in Crockett staffed by independent medical expert
specializing in toxicology and environmental medicine
e Initiated a health risk assessment working group including representatives from the
community and risk assessment experts selected by the community and Unocal
November 8, 1994: Unocal presents its Response to Community Concerns 408
e Will work to form a CAP, the function and role of which will be defined in a separate
agreement
* Will provide status reports on the project to the CAP
* Will request that land use permit conditions apply to Crockett as well as Rodeo Fire
Department emergency response
* Will work with Community Awareness and Emergency Response organization to
implement a new Community Warning System; has committed $250,000 toward
implementation of the system
* Will implement shelter-in-place education plan including two workshops and distribution
of videos to 6,000 residents
* Will provide quarterly newsletters on project
* Will continue participation in Refinery/Petrochemical mutual aid system
* Will work with CAP to enhance emergency notification procedures
* Will continue to upgrade internal communications systems, including purchasing cellular
phones, pagers, and other equipment
* Will develop system to provide timely notification to emergency rooms, health care
providers, and pharmacies in the event of a release
* Will install experimental remote sensor fenceline monitor pilot program at refinery
e Will prepare report on pilot program and share with CAP and community groups
e Will install a set number of bellows valves on project facilities or by replacement of
existing valves prior to March 1, 1996. Will replace other existing valves by 1998
* Will preferentially purchase local emission offsets
* Will install a permanent air monitoring device at Hillcrest School by end of November
* Will phase out anhydrous ammonia at refinery (replaced with aqueous ammonia)
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e Will conduct human health risk assessment through a working group; will present results
to include monitoring data and conclusions
* Will continue to have medical expert specializing in toxicology and environmental
medicine available to residents to address health concerns related to recent releases
* Will agree to annual contributions to Rodeo and Crockett for general improvements
* Will work with Supervisors to develop a means of allowing Unocal to participate in
partial funding of Cummings Skyway extension
* Has donated $378,000 to Hillcrest School
e Will work with East Bay Regional Park District and State Lands Commission to develop
a bike and walking path along San Pablo Avenue through refinery
* Will advise CAP of future hiring programs
e Will work with building trades to implement a hiring outreach program for apprentices
* Will contribute $25,000 per year for three years to John Swett Unified School District
* Will develop an alternative dispute resolution process for claims related to Catacarb
release
These concessions indicate that the refinery was active shortly after the Catacarb release,
seeking to influence public and quasi-public bodies with changes affecting primarily the
elementary school system, resident notification, and emergency preparedness. By the
time the facility made its first official response to resident demands, new refinery
management had generated their own set of emergency response proposals, such as a
system to provide timely notification to emergency rooms and pharmacies. Yet it is
striking how the set of organizational practices and cultural conditions discussed in this
chapter, some of which were known to a broad cross-section of workers and AQMD and
County investigators (as evidenced in dozens of interviews conducted after the release),
remained "black boxed" during the negotiation phase. With the exception of AQMD's
calls for training, the presence of experts in certain parts of the facility, error reduction,
and broad attitudinal shifts, the only vehicle with the potential to introduce change within
the refinery after the Catacarb spill was technology. Resident proposals to deal with what
they believed had exacerbated the accident's effects were based heavily on technological
fixes.
Technology, in the form of a proposed fenceline monitoring system, held this
distinction because of the lack of time and proper representation of each level of refinery
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organization during GNA negotiations (part of this was due to the fact that upper
management was placed on paid leave following the accident and the internal
investigation was relegated to the Legal Department). Joint exploration of refinery
practices after reaching a GNA was also a distant possibility, as only 0.3% of Unocal's
financial commitments were allocated to a one-time independent safety audit. By
comparison, fenceline monitoring, which could alter relationships between refinery
personnel, residents, and county enforcement officials, correct information asymmetries
during unusual operating circumstances, and render Unocal's past reporting hesitancies a
moot point (emissions crossing the refinery fenceline would be known to a broader set of
publics in real time), assumed nearly 17% of the funding outlays. Residents, with the
help of CBE, worked to include this technology as a condition of approval (condition 76)
for Unocal's land use permit. A resident explains how such a condition was added to the
Planning Commission's permit approval:
We shared documents, draft documents for instance. We had a draft of the GNA that we gave to
the Commission and asked them to put specific language into the permit from our document, to
legalize under the permit things that we were getting Unocal to agree with. In some cases they did
that, took language even verbatim. In other cases, they did not. But there was a parallel process
and it worked to our advantage.409
Condition 76 was the closest that the resident committee charged with preventing "future
Catacarb's" could come to encouraging changes within the refinery. A different set of
priorities emerged from proposals from other committees, which at times were also tied
to permit approval:4 1 0
Transportation improvements: $4,530,000 (30.3%)*
Financial contributions to four nearby communities: 3,000,000 (20. 1%)++
Fenceline monitoring: 2,500,000 (16.7%)*
John Swett vocational training: 1,500,000 (10.0%)++
Anhydrous ammonia phase-out: 1,000,000 (6.7%)*
Tree planting: 670,000 (4.5%)+
Hillcrest school improvements: 590,000 (3.9%)+
Health risk/epidemiological study- 488,000 (3.3%)
Reduce emissions: 300,000 (2.0%)*
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Medical clinic (for Catacarb victims): 120,000 (0.8%)
Bike path: 100,000 (0.7%)*
Emergency preparedness/community warning: 90,000 (0.6%)+
Safety audit: 50,000 (0.3%)
Miscellaneous: 10,000 (0.1%)
* = condition of permit approval
++= substantial improvement over permit condition
+ = improvement over permit condition
Positional bargaining tactics, such as the anchoring of proposals on permit
conditions, early concessions made by Unocal which met the interests of external parties,
the tabling of certain proposals by the company, and the early introduction of a single text
GNA, limited the amount of integrative negotiation that took place, particularly after
December 9. But opportunities for exploiting common interests or differences between
the parties were clearly present. As mentioned, residents spent much of their time in
October and November 1994 crafting proposals that took advantage of the parties'
different capabilities. The primary difference to become the focus of many of the
proposals concerned Unocal's limits in detecting emissions beyond its fenceline and in
notifying sensitive populations. On-site community monitors, odor and spill patrol teams,
surveillance cameras linked to web pages, community monitors inside the refinery that
would participate in the activation of public notification and warning systems during
releases, wiring of fenceline monitors to agencies and residents' homes, and community-
wide neighborhood watch programs were each designed to augment exiting facility
systems of emergency response with broad-based community awareness and involvement,
so that "future Catacarbs," particularly their duration and escalation, could be avoided.4 "
There was also discussion of some of the materials used in refinery operations as well as
loss of valuable compounds through fugitive emissions. Finally, community funding was
broached by refinery management with an offer to take advantage of the parties' different
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views of future events. Unocal proposed that the "crack spread," which captures the
relationship between crude oil and gasoline prices (thus determining profit), be used to
determine financial contributions. They offered to agree to a minimum amount of money
and to agree to a base level crack spread. The amount of Unocal's financial contribution
would increase should the crack spread increase by a certain amount.4 1 2
Two other areas with the potential to yield integrative solutions were parties'
comparative values placed on various interests and their criteria for success.
Unfortunately, the manner of group problem solving removed much of the opportunity
for systematically comparing interests, determining priorities, and thinking about
workable tradeoffs. Review of the minutes to Unocal's meetings with the community's
Negotiating Committee show that between November 3 and 28, discussions were
dominated by refinery manager Allen Randle, who reiterated existing and planned facility
changes and programs. A second line of discussion during this time period focused on
efforts to commit Unocal to a binding legal agreement to negotiate residents' concerns to
conclusion. Residents suggested this agreement as a means of facilitating permit
approval while the community ironed out its disagreements with Unocal and produced a
final single text agreement. By the time such an agreement was finalized (November 28),
a schedule had been established to consider the issues of 2-3 committees per meeting.
The Negotiating Committee was not made aware of the nuances of each committee's
proposals until their representatives appeared at their scheduled meeting. Committees
also met independently with Unocal, where tradeoffs, deletions, and new ideas emerged
in a context removed from the broader agreement. Criteria for success were similarly
removed from discussions between the Negotiating Committee and Unocal. Parties
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agreed to consider such benchmarks after a good neighbor in principal was approved by
all and the reformulated fuels permit was issued.
Group decision-making effects stemmed for the most part from the committee
structure set up by the Crockett-Rodeo Coalition. The committee structure had a number
of effects on the GNA negotiations. First, it solidified a number of important issue areas
that had been initially presented to Unocal en masse. By allowing small groups of highly
dedicated and qualified people (for instance, the health committee included a chemistry
Ph.D.; the vegetation and parks committee included an arborist) to further explore these
issues, the committee structure made it more difficult for Unocal to ignore or postpone
consideration of certain proposals. Interviewees credit the committees for ensuring that a
number of their initial demands were accounted for in the final agreement, even though
residents, who in some cases had just completed ten years' worth of negotiations with
other companies, gradually dropped out of the process. Committees also met on separate
occasions with Unocal, allowing for more focused discussions, and reported back to the
broader negotiating committee, chaired jointly by Crockett and Rodeo residents. At the
same time, the committees did provide their own set of challenges. Representation on the
committees was inherently lopsided due to self-selection. This meant that after mid-
November 1994, access to decision-making and the ability of certain affected areas to
influence policy was limited. As shown below, the committees, by virtue of self-
selection, did not encourage equal consideration of the issues by representatives of each
community. Finally, the presence of committees, and their direct negotiations with
Unocal, constituted an implicit concession on the part of the community that there was a
limit to which any particular issue could be addressed without crowding out the interests
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of other committees. For example, certain committees were adamant that demands for
school relocation be dropped so as not to affect other concerns. Similarly, efforts to
commit Unocal to fund all or part of the Cummings Skyway road extension were viewed
by some as a misuse of money that should have been appropriated for school relocation
or other projects. 413
Another limit to integrative bargaining included a high degree of valence or
degree of acceptability of solutions revealed early in the series of GNA meetings, heavily
concentrated around Unocal initiatives, restatements of existing commitments, or (to a
lesser extent) Crockett-Rodeo Coalition demands. The smaller Bayo Vista housing
authority and the town of Tormey, as well as citizens that had not become involved in
committees by early November, were thus left with less available room for having their
proposals heard and included. The GNA signed on December 20 does not include any
improvements for Bayo Vista, the public housing development on the fenceline of the
refinery beyond those that were discussed in the initial set of meetings with Unocal.
Additional health care and particulate matter reductions, Bayo Vista residents' priority
considerations, were never addressed. In addition to excluding additional issues, initial
proposals for high-valence items were also kept incomplete at first, making it more
difficult for the parties to interpret parties' expressed demands or engage in a bridging
strategy.
A final barrier to integrative bargaining occurred when Unocal rebuffed many of
the committees' early items for negotiation. When this happened, community
representatives sought additional resources from Unocal in return for their reluctance to
address certain issues or proposals. A series of trades along these lines ensued. For
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example, Unocal was opposed to CBE's participation in annual audits that the company
traditionally conducted at the facility. CBE agreed to drop its demand for inclusion in
exchange for an increase in funding for the communities. Interviewees agree that there
was often pressure to "take some of the environmental and safety improvements away" in
exchange for more money. Unfortunately, they admit that they were not as capable of
estimating dollar values for their proposals as they were of envisioning them. Thus, it
proved difficult at times to gauge whether the trades were fair from the community's
standpoint. Without adequate understanding of what each proposal entailed financially,
residents were prone to anchoring, framing, and overconfidence effects introduced by the
company. Nearly all of the initial financial allotments that appeared in the December 9
version of the GNA were first offered by Unocal. The refinery was also responsible for
setting many of the perceived reservation levels that bounded counteroffers. For example,
when a Tree Maintenance Program was proposed at a cost of $50,000 per year for 20
years, it was tabled by Unocal. Similiarly, initial proposed additions to studies (i.e.,
$70,000 extra for health effects study) and community development contributions (i.e.,
$50,000 extra for two towns per year) were rejected at first, even while programs
projected to cost millions of dollars were accepted. Following these rejections, nearly all
proposed changes were valued in the tens of thousands (with the exception of conditional
promises valued in the hundreds of thousands such as school improvements linked to a
proposed study's results). Unocal's initial rejections coupled with the committee
structure also introduced framing effects, as the generation of proposals by committees
ceased and efforts shifted to adding substance to those that survived the issuance of the
first draft. Not one committee proposal excluded from Unocal's initial draft was
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reintroduced after December 12, with the exception of a siren in Crockett that had been
under development before the Catacarb release and a bus turnaround at Hillcrest. This
dynamic was also made possible by residents' overconfidence in their ability to specify
proposed studies and multi-year commitments so as to ensure adequate implementation.
A final bias was the sacredness of certain proposals, such as fenceline monitoring. This
program was viewed as mandatory by many on the Negotiating Committee, even though
the technology was uncertain and many lower-cost programs could have yielded more
substantial improvements to community preparedness and resident notification.
The inventiveness of committee proposals, urgency of local residents, and number
of meetings with Unocal management and experts were not sufficient to ensure adequate
representation of emergency response and notification in the final agreement. Because
there was no effort to understand the constraints (mostly Unocal's) defining the initial set
of feasible offers (the December 9 single-text draft), develop or add new offers to expand
the set following the initial draft, or identify new attributes related to the roles and
routines which governed refinery operations, citizen capabilities, or industry-resident or
industry-agency interaction that could be used to change the dimensionality of the offer
set, integrative bargaining did not occur in this case. The only potential source of
organizational change was a multi-million dollar investment in technology, which
presented its own limitations to avoiding future Catacarb's.
Technology in Practice Limits
The primary means of "avoiding future Catacarb's" was to win Planning
Commission support for a fenceline monitoring system that could keep track of toxic air
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pollutants as they crossed refinery property. Local proponents of this technology
included Andy Mechling, a camera specialist who developed unparalleled expertise in
available monitoring models and their capabilities. CBE provided a great deal of support
as well for inclusion of such a system in the GNA and permit, efforts that had been less
than successful in previous attempts with Shell Oil and Chevron. The original signatory
organizations entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) in November 1996
regarding installation of a fenceline monitoring system.4 1 4 This agreement followed
numerous meetings with Unocal during which such issues as detection time (short
detection time was called for so that the equipment could be sensitive to "hazardous
releases of emergency nature"), best available technology, and data sharing were
discussed. Community representatives claimed that Unocal was out of compliance with
each of these issues during the initial pilot testing period, called for in the company's land
use permit:
By January 31, 1995, the applicant shall submit to the Zoning Administrator for review and
approval a monitoring test program for a fenceline monitoring system as specified below. The
system, if approved by the Zoning Administrator, shall be in place and operating by November 1,
1996, and shall fully incorporate the best available technology. Unocal will test and install an
improved air pollution monitoring system that is mutually agreeable to the signatories of its Good
Neighbor Agreement and the County Zoning Administrator as outlined below: Unocal... will
design a monitoring test program that will include infrared or other state-of-the-art remote sensing
technology by January 31, 1995. The test program will be designed to determine the effective
range of the monitoring instrument, the compounds that the instrument is able to detect, the
accuracy of the instrument at different ranges for detectable compounds, the reliability of the
monitoring instrument at different ranges and for detectable compounds, the suitability of siting
options, including the effect of localized environmental conditions (i.e., highways, fog, rain, wind,
etc.), identification of specialized operation and maintenance requirements, and the best means of
recording the data collected. 15
The MOU resolved some of the above issues, while implementation of the pilot
program, system construction, and use of the monitors raised countless others. The most
important issues resolved in the MOU included the kind and location of monitors,
monitor spacing, compounds monitored by each kind of monitor, how data would be
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recorded, summarized, and made available to the public, system maintenance, and
whether the system would be able to trigger various elements of the County's
Community Warning System. While the monitoring system was still in the design stage,
members of SEA began to seek grants from the EPA and other sources for studies to
measure pollutant load in Crockett and to engage in epidemiologic studies using the
416data. Such a study would have been unprecedented. Equally innovative were
proposed efforts to incorporate the system into the County's existing emergency
notification network. In addition, the technologies employed were relatively untested in
the context of monitoring refinery emissions. They included "open path optical remote
sensors," which send beams of light through the open air toward reflectors and gather
"fingerprints" of the chemicals that pass by the light. Every time chemicals pass the light,
a portion of the beam is absorbed, leaving a distortion in the beam of various wavelengths.
These fingerprints are compared to fingerprints in the monitor's internal library to
determine the chemical makeup of what has passed the beam. Three types of open path
optical remote sensors were used as part of the refinery monitoring system:
Fourier Transform InfraRed (FTIR): uses an invisible beam of infra-red light reflected off of a
mirror and returned to a detector, which looks for changes in light intensity at various wavelengths;
chemicals monitored can be programmed into the system, which saves raw data for further
analysis; over 300 chemicals can be detected by an FTIR during post-analysis.
Tunable Diode Laser System (TDLS): uses infra-red reflected off a mirror; looks for light
intensity changes at specific wavelengths; can measure hydrogen sulfide and ammonia.
Ultra-violet (UV): uses UV light and scans various wavelengths; can measure benzene, toluene,
xylene, carbon disulfide, and sulfur dioxide. 7
Access to data from the above systems was limited in the MOU to video output
for one recipient from a camera trained on the fenceline monitoring computer screen in
real time.418 Residents were also allowed up to six requests for raw spectral data that
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were stored by the monitoring system.4 19 By February 1997, the company reviewed
means of accessing the data, including video transmission, internet, remote access and
control software, and view-only supervisory software. It concluded that the latter was the
only technology that could satisfy elements of the MOU pertaining to speed, image
transfer, and security.420 Thus it was determined that a single resident of Crockett would
receive software so that continuously updated levels of various chemicals could stream
across their computer screen in real time. The usefulness of these data has depended in
large part on the person receiving the data stream. Even in June 2002, Bill Concannon,
who presently receives the data stream, has no means of recording the data.42 Thus, he
can only check the computer screen, showing concentrations of 36 chemicals as they
cross beams of light beamed 1,000 meters across the north and south sides of the
refinery.42 Raw spectral data, received monthly by Andy Mechling, are converted by a
company in Houston, TX into what is visible on the screen. The company, Petris
Technology, uses an air dispersion modeling program that takes the monitoring data and
real-time meteorological data in order to generate plumes and estimate concentrations
downwind.42  Unfortunately, it is difficult to compare concentrations on the screen to
regulatory standards. It has also proven a challenge to link the system to existing
emergency response networks.
Normally I first call the refinery because I figure if there's a problem I want the refinery to be
alerted to it so that they can deal with it. Because the people in Houston, they're just basically
interested in making sure that they do their job right which is to run the equipment right. And I'm
mostly interested in impacts from the refinery. So that's my goal is to top that. And a couple of
times I found stuff and sure enough there's been an open tank or they've had some problems or
one thing or another. We had a hydrogen sulfide release that actually showed up on the refinery
monitor, which is, that would be something we'd want to see.. .We call AQMD and they'll send
somebody out, I mean you know it's not that bad, I don't expect them to just have somebody
sitting outside Crockett standing by waiting for our calls, we don't call that often. But one of the
reasons why we don't call more often is that by the time they show up, if there's no odor they're
kind of going, well, and we go, well, and you know.4 2 4
150
At the time, Concannon did not have the capability of recording what had passed across
his screen, meaning any proof of elevated levels of toxic chemicals would have to wait
until receipt of the raw data.
In April 1999, members of the fenceline committee entered their grievances with
the monitoring system into the public record through the Community Development
Department. Concerns expressed by the committee included:
FTIR equipment is operated so as to only detect higher levels of chemicals, without optimizing the
detection limits readily achievable by the technology (contrary to the Planning Commission's
suggestion that the system be designed to enable detection of ongoing, day-to-day, lower levels of
pollutants in addition to higher levels)
* Raw data is not saved for UV or TDLS equipment (meaning some of the chemicals of greatest
concern to the community, including BTEX (benzene, toluene, ethylene, and xylene) chemicals,
could not be subjected to post-incident analysis by the community
* FTIR will be prone to false negatives, false positives, and poor detection limits
* UV data are unreliable; there are repeated instances where the detector will swing from a large
negative number to a large positive number; monthly reports only include positive portion of the
swing, even though baseline levels of emissions are often recorded as far below zero
* TDLS data are problematic, and a quality assurance system needs to be in place for independent
measurement to determine if the equipment is operating properly42 5
In an effort to further evaluate and improve the system, SEA, CBE, and the County
Health Services Department formed a working group with Tosco (who by then owned the
refinery), AQMD, California EPA, California Department of Health Services, and the
EPA. Under an Environmental Monitoring for Public Access and Community Tracking
Program (EMPACT) grant, members of SEA (and later the working group) conducted
detailed analysis of the monthly raw data that had been collected.426 Many of the same
findings were noted in the working group's report, which recommended that data from
the FTIR be released on a website for one compound - total hydrocarbons, reported as
butane - as a pilot effort.42  Efforts to minimize false positives and negatives were also
proposed. To date, the data have not been posted in real time on a website.
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The report also found that system alarm levels that were set before the monitors
went online in 1997 had never been reached. It was noted that
The absence of an alarm level may not necessarily reflect the lack of potential threat to the public
during a particular incident - it may simply mean that a release has not crossed the beam path, or
not crossed it in a sufficient concentration to trigger an alarm. At times releases have come from
high stacks and/or at high temperatures and have gone up and over nearby areas, rather than
diffusing or blowing along the ground near the monitors. In some such cases, including some
refinery fires that have occurred in the County, County Health Services has called a shelter-in-
place since wind conditions are unpredictable and change rapidly. Levels reported by the
fenceline system are also related to and may be affected by the length of the monitor's beam
path.
The report concluded that "information from the open-path monitors at Tosco Rodeo
cannot at this time be relied on by itself for community emergency notification." Other
efforts to improve notification during industrial accidents, a primary concern expressed in
negotiations, were of similar consequence. As those interviewed agreed that the County
resisted efforts to monitor data from the fenceline monitors or make use of the data to
improve enforcement, there is also a sense that the County was reluctant to address its
community warning capabilities.
That's why I wanted a Level Two warning. I said that if we had another Catacarb incident
tomorrow, the County would not pull the plug because Catacarb was not listed as a hazardous
material, and Unocal would certainly never pull its plug by itself, push the button for the alarm.
Never, never, never, especially with the first bunch of administrators over there. And they had no
infrastructure working. The County system wasn't working. We would never be informed. And
one of the things that we designed were whistles over here for the County early warning system
and then of course there was this great debate, because the County said well, people don't like
whistles, they don't like sounds, and we said bologna, people want to be notified. And then the
question was when would they have the test and so it's tested once a month to make sure that it
works. And then all they needed to do of course was to get one individual saying well, I don't
want it over here, because it's next to my house. Then we have to go through all that. We had to
deal with all the details. We essentially had to engineer and plan everything for Unocal and the
County.429
We wanted the County to have [the fenceline monitoring data]. And the County said we really
don't want that, after all, we rely on Unocal. Yeah, they call you three hours after an incident,
that's terrific. You guys need us. Well, who's gonna watch it? Well, no one's watching. Well,
maybe you could have an alarm on it, you know, there's software to put an alarm on it, so it could
ring a bell, so someone over at public health, well, there's no one over there at night. Well, maybe
it could ring somewhere else, like 911. On and on and on. There's always a reason not to do it.
And my fear is that we are not prepared.4 3 0
Listen to this: When we were doing this EPA grant, we were sitting at the table. We're sitting at
one of these meetings, we've got people from hazardous materials at the County there. We're
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talking to them about, they have a monitor themselves, and when they got this money for this
grant, all of a sudden they hooked it up. They said but it doesn't work really well, it's really not
reliable, that was their constant theme why they didn't use it. The County. They were hooked up
to all of them, the FTIR, the UV, and the laser. Anyway, they could have been hooked up. At any
time, they had the ability to be hooked up. Unocal agreed that would be fine. So they had this
equipment. What did they do with it? They stuck it in a hallway being a door upstairs where
nobody goes. And we didn't know this until I started questioning them in one of these meetings
we were at with the EPA during this. Now this is years later. This thing's been up since 1997.
And this is like 3, 4 years later. And I said well, why don't we plug it in and bring it out? Well,
yeah, I guess we could do that. Then you need somebody to use it. Oh, my God, it was a
nightmare.
Of primary importance to residents was the fact that only "Level Three" incidents
result in public alerting of any kind. Catacarb-type incidents, should they occur in the
future, would be considered at most Level Two incidents, because of the lack of a major
fire or explosion or the presence of an off-site impact suspected of causing health
problems while the incident is ongoing.432 Level Three incidents by definition also have
to involve hazardous materials. For this reason, residents have tried to convince the
County to develop an alert system that would notify sensitive receptors, or those who are
most vulnerable to even low concentrations of certain chemicals, in the event of incidents
that did not qualify for Level Three notification. Residents contend that such a system
continues to fail to notify those in greatest need. Following a series of three incidents at
the Rodeo refinery in April 1997, residents testified to the County's Hazardous Materials
Commission that the existing Community Warning System in general could not work in
the ten minutes that it took for releases to reach Crockett.433 While the refinery had
provided sirens and some technical support, notification capabilities continued to fall
short of resident expectations. Community negotiators' hopes that millions of dollars
worth of monitoring equipment could be incorporated into an improved emergency
response network had not been met.
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The Limits Revisited
The Unocal Catacarb spill demonstrates how an industrial accident can unearth
strategies used to simplify response to a crisis by plant operators and managers, which
can have the effect of exacerbating a release and its effects on neighboring communities.
Examining the response, negotiation, and implementation phases that followed shows
how remarkably resilient these roles, routines, and structural aspects of refinery
management are to consideration and change by parties to a post-accident dispute.
Absent an effective means of considering such challenges as reconciling interpretations
of refinery condition changes, bringing bits of organizational memory across refinery
units, decoupling the effects of unit stabilization efforts from broader input-output trends
and the condition of refinery catalysts, enabling workers who would question the
decisions of upper management and how they frame problems, encouraging dialogue and
interaction across divisions, and allowing workers to take potential outcomes of their
decisions to their logical conclusions before they act, these problems can easily be "black
boxed" by the time residents sit down with refinery managers to negotiate a settlement to
their grievances. We have seen how administrative actions, based heavily on existing
regulations, will sidestep such issues, dealing instead with weight and concentration
limits for certain compounds, agency notification requirements, changes at the margins of
existing programs (i.e., training initiatives), and easily reportable and verifiable actions.
Efforts to achieve integrative bargaining during the negotiation phase are further limited
by a lack of appropriate representation of a cross-section of facility operators and
management, the absence of any real discovery process before deliberations begin, the
tendency of post-accident response to be administered by a facility's legal department,
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the span of available windows of opportunity for negotiation, the anchoring effects of a
draft settlement, challenges of collective bargaining for members of several distinct
communities, and incentives for industry to issue concessions to parties external to the
face-to-face discussions. In light of these limiting factors, technological fixes can appear
to hold the potential for altering roles and relationships that exist between refinery
personnel, residents, and officials and correcting informational asymmetries within and
across stakeholder groups. Yet as discovered by residents of Crockett, Rodeo, and Bayo
Vista, technology, here in the form of a fenceline monitoring system, introduces its own
set of expected behaviors and limitations of operation. A system that promised to
improve community notification instead yielded an endless stream of data that could only
be used for calibration, cross-referencing, and interpretation weeks after each spectral file
was collected. Residents discovered how a technological artifact cannot simply be
molded to suit the needs of diverse publics using available means of post-settlement
deliberation.
The bargaining power of residents, built upon the expertise of their organizations,
the specificity of their proposals, the sense of urgency brought about by the Catacarb spill
and post-accident revelations, legal action, and agency attention, and conditions imposed
by the Planning Commission, was not without its drawbacks. After mid-November 1994,
access to decision-making and the ability of certain affected areas to influence policy was
limited by the solidification of committee membership. Indeed, the solution space
available to residents who were given access to the negotiating committees had already
been limited by Unocal's prior dealings. But a number of issues remained open for
discussion, and a broad group of representatives of the four communities was involved in
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every step of the negotiations. How are we to interpret the resulting GNA in principle,
which represented a commitment to invest nearly $15 million in a broad range of
programs?
The answer to these questions can be found through the careful comparison of
GNA provisions with previously agreed-to permit conditions. Fully 57% of the financial
commitments in the GNA represented previously agreed-to conditions of permit approval.
The only items that represented substantial improvement over existing permit conditions
encompassed direct financial contributions to the towns and to vocational training, both
to be paid over a period of 15 years. Remaining items that represented somewhat of an
improvement over permit conditions included three issues linked to strong committees
with the expertise to craft detailed proposals regarding Hillcrest school improvements,
landscaping, and emergency preparedness. Yet these represented only 9% of the entire
package, with emergency preparedness/community warning, the most pressing issue to
emerge after the Catacarb release, receiving less than 1%. Entire sections of the GNA
represent compromises or "something close to the bottom line" for the committees. Most
readily excluded from negotiations were ideas relating to questioning "normal operating
procedures" of both the refineries and their monitoring agencies and establishing new
roles for local residents in plant inspection, pollution patrols and citizen monitoring, and
early warning and notification. Remaining items included promised studies with few
links to action, and a desperately needed medical clinic. This negotiation illustrates how
a company seeking permission for one of the most expensive capital improvement
projects in the history of California, facing strict deadlines and the likelihood of major
restructuring, remained as close to existing permit requirements as possible and focused
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most of its concessions on monetary commitments unrelated to the facility itself. What
concessions it did make beyond monetary contributions required significant post-
settlement deliberations, the use of novel technology, and intensive data-gathering
exercises leading to few actions conditioned on findings.
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Felderman (VP, Notified of leak from 2; aware of rate reduction; 2 said he would talk
Refining - in to appropriate personnel re: ability to run with hole in tower; 2
LA) decided to hold rates; called Felderman; SI w/ 2 (safe to operate w/
monitoring); called Felderman
3 Crawford Superintende Clark Notified of leak, RI from 5; SI w/ 2; M; M; RI from 6; SI w/ 2 (re:
nt of online repairs); WO to 19; M w/ 13 (no response)
Hydrotreatin
11 Alexander Bulk Shift
Supevisor











RI from 3; 0; M; assumed 2 or 3 would check with HSER, Env.; M
w/ 5 (re: solution strength - should work be done on tower),
Stephan (re: check the liquid seal on bottom of407); RI of 15;
brought MSDS's to 2; spoke with 22 about leak (didn't know he was
IC); MOC proposal; 3 signed it; M w/ Stevens (re: technical review
of proposal)
Wang Senior Ferneau Asked to check D-409 by 17; reported leak; staged near leak; SI w/
Operator Tony Day (said overhead vented same as leak - I disagreed); SI w/ 5
(shut down, watch stain to see if it grew); response team arrived -




RI of 16, 0
R Obs; SI w/ 5; Alfrom 16; RI from 2;
SI W/ 16; All CIcr; sign incident report;
Copy to.HSER






9 Willson Fire Protection
Shift
Supervisor
SI w/ Fred Welsh (he was told to call all SI w/20 (discussedtpossibility of
clear);, .u erstottthat fireprotection's overspray, quet'ioned qpertions' opnion
ppinspssed along tosenior thatIo:C ilthatparttftower);SL
Ort ifRs mangen
e grama
Cowision -0SglovSadoiat; SI w/16; RI of2of3








16 Partain Shift Call from 1; why no All Clear; SI w/
Supervisor Welsh (IC for the day); RI of 15; RI of
Matthews w/ Welsh; RI of operators, 3,
Komplin (filling in for 2) re: thoughts
about All Clear; instructed Welsh to
blow All Clear (Welsh disagreed)
-S1
Told of leak by heavy equip. operator
2 asked for info on IH monitoring, health
effects (because 16 filling in for
Renshaw); M w/ 2, Matthews (didn't
know what to monitor for)






















21 Wang Senior Operator Off of day shift CO{C visible in plume) Consensus among operators that it was notjust stea and C02; 0 (C in phases, odor
detectable, more spots on ground)
1 Plesh General Manager NA NA
Crawford Superintendettof Away Away
5, Ferneau Process Foreman NA Fettateeingof abadnment led to
wht~oe'opeators wrote in log
iv~~ L - 1E o a
Arbzadeh Maagr rA
Hygiene-in LA
9 Willson Fire Protection N
Shlift Supervisor
41 Alexander Bulk Shift NA NA
Sunevisor
V
OpraorN(p no new C on









M w/ 2,4 (summary of leak; did not
discuss monitoring data or repair);
requested M re: repairs without SD
S30
M (safety - regularly scheduled)
3 Crawford Superintendent of R Obs; 0; M R Obs; 0
Hydrotreating
Process Foreman NA 0 (saw discoloration from office); told 3
of brownish plume; checked
instrumentation, samples - no indication
of C loss
SI w/ Renshaw (heard about leak); asked if
ieede hygienist for monitoring - told no;
IN to rmake regularly scheduled visit to





Discussed MSDS's w/ Partain NA







Normality 432 (saw discoloration)









SOetor '(Qulb lioged; nning unit&n4H













# WORKER TITLE 2










11 Alexander -BullkShift (just steam); SI w/ Pericoli; viewed












# WORKER TITLE 4
I Plesh General V (call from 2 re: Complaint and 3's investigation; told about fire monitor idea)
Manager
3 Crawford Superintendent V- RI from 2; RI of 12; Complaint; 0 (staining; plume white); RI from 12; SI w/ 2;




17 Hodges Head operat- t
19 Barker










7 Arabzadeh UI Mnaiger NA
9 Willson Fir Pmtedtion Y
19 Barker -Hyot n V
21 Wang Seni etor. QPieacedin brown liquid dt. fire rnitor; b$h ethanator differential; thoukhtit









W. Smith said reports of illness at Wickland Oil; toured area near Wickland (brown on
tanks, deposits on windshield); told 2 to shut down; spoke w/ Wickland manager;
contacted Felderman; started TA; SI w/ 2, 4, Smith (reporting, what released, how
much)
Superintendent RI from Smith; Visit Wickland; SI w/ 2; Shutdown
of
Hydrotreating
Process Arrived; residue falling on car as approached; read operators' daily records; O (brown
Foreman stain on lines); toldjall to prepare to Shutdown.
7 Arabzadeh IH Manager









NA = no action; V = vacation; SI = shared information; RI = requested or received information; M = attended meeting; 0 = observed
leak;
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Appendix B: Good Neighbor Agreement Negotiation Process












3 Will contribute up to $100,O0 to study health impacts of Catacarb spill
Will develop a database of health effect information for chemicals used at refinery
1 Will plant vegetation on refinery edge and spend $30,000 per year for 9 years to further vegetate
areas (LUP Condition 63)
3 Will consider supporting efforts associated with the Lindsey Museum; will contribute $5,000 for
educational. programs at Rodeo, Crockett schops
I Will install permanent monitoring station at.Hil lrest School to detect sulfur and hydrocarbons
ofjobapplican1sfor, ject
nvironment
5 Proposes monthly monitoring oftave/putpn replacement of same to reduce fugtive
emissions by 787 lbs/day
V e cn 00 /vr. for 15 years for ocalatea
P els will develop procedules forgivitgnoice ofqvailable funds and for seliciting proposals
S No funds will be used by any-persn4t-amnne adersarial to the interests of Unoca l,
9 At conclusion of 15 years, Unocal agrees to negotiation regarding continuation of payments
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Financial
GNA Provision Piivs - rfiten
SeCtion Niiinber 4K
Legal I Parties will notify all other parties if they believe a party to be in breach of a a terial term of this
GNA
3 If agreement cannot be reached, parties will submit dispute to Zoning Administrator; decision shall
be appealable to Board of Supervisors
5 No legal action may be brought in any court of law to enforce the GNA
7 Will jointly investigate an arbitration procedure for resolving conflicts, conducted by recognized
neutral
9 SEA, CB,, and any other ofgapizatins Wiligofrain from appealiig the LUP ot anyother project-
related permit
169
Health Risk I NC NC NC NC
and Medical SEA
Monitoing
3 $70,000 (+) Change $100,000 $100k kept;
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Chapter 5
The Narrowing Influence of Parallel Processes:
Clean Air Act Litigation in Swansea-Elyria
This chapter documents actions taken by federal and state agencies to address a
series of incidents at a Conoco Petroleum Refinery, located less than two miles northeast
of a working-class Latino community known as Swansea. 4 These actions
preconditioned a mediation process between residents, a statewide public interest firm,
and Conoco that did not facilitate consideration of the full extent of community interests.
Litigation that encouraged these mediation talks was filed by the Colorado Public Interest
Research Group and local residents associated with a local organization, the Cross
Community Coalition. The suit accused Conoco of violating the Clean Air Act by
emitting sulfur dioxide and flaring certain gasses in excess of permit conditions, a
practice which led to numerous odor complaints received by the state in 1996. Residents
approached talks with Conoco with the a high level of commitment, organization, and
inventiveness, proposing a sulfur dioxide inventory, a review of technology options for
sulfur recovery, efforts to eliminate odor sources, and fenceline monitoring to protect
residents from accidental releases. Administrative actions covered other important
aspects of plant operations, including recently documented benzene releases that could
potentially contaminate groundwater. This chapter shows how an industry, targeted by
multiple regulators (federal, state, and citizen), can develop a proposal to simultaneously
satisfy their demands while anticipating and adapting to changing environmental
enforcement conditions. Here, Conoco's "Denver Refinery Sulfur Project Presentation"
called for all regulators to accept the refinery's goals for emissions reductions and
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technological improvements to its sulfur recovery operations, leaving only minimal funds
to address more specific concerns of Swansea and Commerce City, host to the facility.
The "predetermined" nature of the mediation process is explored by showing how
parallel agency, corporate, and community activities shaped the timing and substance of a
zone of possible agreement that was established prior to resident involvement and agreed
to despite the absence of certain important interests.
Background. Environmental justice disputes add distinct layers to existing
regulatory, corporate, and industry developments. Communities are increasingly able to
maneuver through these realms and understand the extent to which each can contribute to
or help resolve risks to resident health and well-being. Yet problems of judging whether
behavioral changes by any given firm will yield noticeable improvements to quality of
life at different geographic scales and dealing with this challenge within the context of
multiple, overlapping, existing processes can limit the effectiveness of mediation in
meeting a community's interests. As the communities of Swansea entered into a
mediation regarding air emissions, they were given little time to come to terms with these
challenges.
The Conoco Petroleum Refinery, 435 located 1.5 miles northeast of Swansea in
nearby Commerce City, was not technically a neighbor, although many of the odor
complaints received by the state were from the community. 436 These complaints peaked
in September, 1996 when a disruption in refinery operations resulted in flaring that
contained substantial amounts of sulfur dioxide (SO2).4" Conoco would later be accused
of violating the Federal Clean Air Act by emitting sulfur dioxide and other compounds
(potentially in excess of permit limits) and flaring certain gasses in violation of permit
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conditions.43 8 Litigation was initiated by the Colorado Public Interest Research Group
(COPIRG), who had been active in passing the Colorado Clean Air Act in 1992.439 The
CO CAA required industries to more fully disclose their annual emissions through use of
Air Pollution Emission Notices (APEN's) 440, which went above and beyond the EPA's
Toxics Release Inventory and gave COPIRG and public interest attorneys a clear
suspicion that Conoco was illegally venting sulfur dioxide. The Swansea community
became involved as joint plaintiffs with COPIRG on a citizen suit under the CAA.
Sulfur Emissions Concerns. COPIRG, an experienced public advocacy
organization, had begun to look at stationary sources of air pollution across the state in
1990.441 They conducted an early assessment of the CAA as it was federally reauthorized
in 1990, determining what percentage of emitting sources would be cut through federal
statutes. Conoco appeared in the early 1990's in their analyses of the Denver
metropolitan area as one of the major sources of air pollution, particularly criteria air
442pollutants. At the time, its emissions were dwarfed by those of power plants such as
Excel.443 COPIRG worked with Environmental Defense and the Land and Water Fund of
the Rockies to reach a voluntary agreement with Excel where the company would receive
tax credits for pollution control equipment. This left oil refineries as the largest source of
sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide emissions in the greater Denver area.
An attorney at the Land and Water Fund of the Rockies, based in Boulder, CO,
was also investigating the refinery's activities.444 His research, based in large part on a
review of public documents such as facility permits, focused on the refinery's sulfur
recovery operations.
Conoco had two different pollution control devices, #1 and #2. And the refinery according to
Conoco needs to operate 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, and yet those pollution control devices
need to be shut down for maintenance periodically and sometimes it's for a long period of time.
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So you would think that OK, it's a redundant system. If you shut down one, then you reroute all
the gasses through the second one and when you shut down two you reroute all the gasses through
one. For some reason, whether it was one of the devices took liquid as opposed to gas, when they
shut down one of these they could not reroute the gasses to the other one, so instead they routed
the gasses to a central flare. Now central flaring is something that all refineries have the ability to
do for emergency situations but it's a terrible form of releasing. Because flaring doesn't have any
pollution control capturing. So you're venting the worst of the worst. So there was significant
flaring going on at Conoco when they'd shut the facility.445
This problem substantially impacted the refinery's sulfur emissions. Specifically, the
Conoco refinery contained two units (sulfur recovery units, or SRU's) where a catalyst is
used to break hydrogen sulfide (which is formed when sulfur is removed from crude oil)
into elemental sulfur which then solidifies and can be sold. Not all hydrogen sulfide is
converted. Some is sent to a "tail gas incinerator" and either flared or burned. This
results in a release of sulfur dioxide into the atmosphere during normal operations.
Conoco was issued a permit in 1991 to construct and operate a second SRU in order to
handle acid gas from a new Gas Oil Hydrodesulfurizer (GOHDS) as well as sour water
stripping derivatives.446 This structural change was part of a larger project to produce
low sulfurAiesel fuel.447 The unit experienced operational difficulties, including a period
in April 1996 where it was shut down for 20 days. When the SRU shut down, a gas
stream was sent to a flare where it generated SO 2. Venting SO 2 into the atmosphere
posed a nuisance and potential health problems to neighboring communities.
Conoco's SRU #2 permit limited the emissions of S02 to 85 tons per year and
19.6 pounds per hour, and required "all gas from the sour water stripper shall be
processed through the Claus sulfur recovery unit."448 During maintenance, however,
Conoco would shut down its GOHDS while continuing to operate. This would continue
to generate a sour water stripper gas stream (containing an estimated 5 tons/day of S02)
that would be sent to a flare and vented into the atmosphere. 449 The attorney documented
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the following incidents of SRU#2 shutdowns and sour water stripper flarings between
July 1995 and July 1996 as part of his preliminary analysis:
























COPIRG joined with the Land and Water Fund attorney to investigate a possible suit
under the state and federal Clean Air Acts. They also sought out members of the affected
community:
We were aware of the concerns going on simultaneously about large numbers of companies
operating in that area so we made contact with the director of the CCC and spoke with her about
this issue and brought her in to the information that we had access to as well as the president of the
local neighborhood association. So we, they had expressed some concern, there was some
information in the file about concerns, basically neighbors smelling, I mean the oil refineries
aren't particularly sweet smelling to begin with, but the residents were reporting that there were
occasionally very nasty smells coming from the neighborhood, and we began to put two and two
together that these were probably the occurrences of when there was large-scale venting
occurring.451
By 1996, residents sensed that certain refinery emissions were increasing substantially
from the norm, although they were not aware of the underlying causes:
We didn't know what was going on over there, but we would readily complain because a lot of
times when we would see that big flame at night or during the day and at the same time you would
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start getting the smells from the refinery. And you would smell it heavily in the neighborhood.
And so we were complaining about a lot of that stuff at the time just like we had constantly been
complaining for years and years and years about the rendering plant. Some days you don't even
notice it, but then in the summer times or when the wind's just right it'll gank you, I mean it's a
foul, foul smell. It's not unheard of somebody getting a whiff of that and starting to vomit.4 5 2
As COPIRG, the attorney, and local residents developed an understanding of
Conoco's violations, broader regulatory developments began to shape how they would
eventually resolve a dispute over SO 2 emissions. Federal environmental statutes such as
the Clean Air Act contain provisions that allow the EPA to place parts of the programs
under state control.45  This allows the EPA to avoid running programs in all 50 states, a
task for which it lacks the necessary resources. 454 In the mid-90's, the Colorado
Department of Public Health and Environment worked on meeting EPA delegation
requirements, and the federal EPA began to promulgate monitoring, reporting, and
enforcement requirements for state implementation (which, in the opinion of COPIRG
yielded a more collaborative Notice of Violation policy given the CDPHE's agency
culture).4 ss By 1998, the state of Colorado was given interim approval for delegation of
the EPA's permitting authorities.4s The issue of delegated environmental enforcement is
closely linked to Colorado's comparatively strong self-audit policy enacted by the state
legislature in 1997.457 The self-audit policy in Colorado allows "a privilege for self-
critical analysis done in a voluntary self-evaluation of a [company's] environmental
compliance." 458 The Colorado state legislature, when enacting this legislation, stated:
The general assembly hereby finds and declares that protection of the environment is enhanced by
the public's voluntary compliance with environmental laws and that the public will benefit from
incentives to identify and remedy environmental compliance issues. It is further declared that
limited expansion of the protection against disclosure will encourage such voluntary compliance
and improve environmental quality and that the voluntary provisions of this act will not inhibit the
exercise of the regulatory authority of those entrusted with protecting our environment.459
178
Colorado's statutory privilege for environmental self-evaluation was passed in response
to a 1993 case involving Coors Brewing Company, which was fined over $1 million by
the Colorado Department of Health after disclosing volatile organic compound
emissions.460 The company was not required to disclose the information, and had learned
of the emissions through its own voluntary study. The state statute went beyond mere
privilege and relaxed requirements that reporting entities use prompt remediation of any
contamination that they discovered.
The EPA and the Department of Justice have actively opposed the self-audit
policy and expressed the opinion that Colorado can no longer meet delegation
requirements because of it. One of the mechanisms for the EPA to retain its authority
over delegated powers, overfiling, was carried out as part of the EPA's attempt to
compensate for the state's lack of sufficient use of its enforcement powers. Overfiling
occurs when the EPA begins an enforcement action regarding a program that has been
delegated to a state.461 Residents' concerns over Conoco's sulfur emissions would be
resolved in large part through the settlement of an EPA overfiling.
Contours of the Sulfur Emissions Dispute. The citizen suit against Conoco, and
the mediation process that followed, was shaped in large part by processes beyond
plaintiffs' control. Before COPIRG and Swansea residents filed a citizen suit, EPA
Region VIII and the CDPHE stepped in, initiating what the former President of COPIRG
would refer to as "four games of chess" that were played and solved nearly
simultaneously among federal, state, and local interests:
1. EPA Region VIII overfiled on previous CDPHE enforcement actions on March 18, 1997,
claiming that in a previous consent order between the state and Conoco the state did not
adequately interpret regulations concerning inspections, record-keeping, hazardous waste
discharges, notices to the state, and penalties associated with certain counts of RCRA
violations;462
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2. The state filed Compliance Advisories under RCRA and the Colorado Hazardous Waste Act,
regarding the presence of benzene in one of Conoco's wells and the contamination of
groundwater.6 3 It also continued to work with Conoco on adjustments to its construction
permits;
3. COPIRG and local residents filed a citizen's suit under Section 304 of the Clean Air Act,
focusing on the fact that Conoco had failed to detect violations for five years as it had not
properly monitored its SO2 emissions;4 and
4. Conoco continued to adapt to a series of regulatory and site-specific changes, while working
with the CDPHE to ensure that its operations were in line with permit specifications. The
company stopped producing leaded gas at its Commerce refinery in 1990, sought, announced,
and then scrapped a proposed joint venture with the Colorado Refinery Company to share the
costs of complying with more stringent environmental controls (requiring .05% sulfur diesel
fuel by October 1993), addressed the reengieering of a device (the grubbs manifold) that
caused the death of a worker who was cleaning a reactor in the hydrosulfurization unit, and
faced budgetary limits to expenditures for on-site continuous emissions monitoring and
sought to improve their control over fugitive emissions, two areas of concern that would be
addressed in subsequent consent orders with the Justice Department.
Table 12 (see appendix) illustrates the progression of each of the above legal and
organizational developments.
EPA's RCRA overfiling was both a part of its response to the state's audit privilege
law and a result of EPA Region VIII's longstanding attempt to work with the state to enforce
hazardous waste regulations. The EPA and the state engaged in joint inspections of the
refinery in March and April of 1992. The state cited violations found during the inspection
in a Compliance Order against Conoco. The Order required compliance within 45 days and
required actions similar to what the state had called for in 1985. In December 1995, another
inspection took place, unearthing violations that mirrored those found in 1985 and 1992. The
Complaint lodged in 1997 amounted to a sprawling list of violations, from faulty
recordkeeping to storage and disposal without a permit. The Complaint prompted Conoco to
file two motions for accelerated decision, claiming that in their rush to undermine the state's
statutory authority the EPA failed to take a proper inventory of Conoco's inspection
records.4 65
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While the CDPHE was arguably sub-par in its enforcement of certain RCRA
violations, it was actively involved in discussing whether the refinery was required to
include "routine maintenance" in its APEN emissions estimates. Conoco claimed that
process unit turnarounds, which resulted in substantial increases in SO 2 emissions, were
not distinct from start-ups, shutdowns, and malfunctions and should not be included.466
In August, 1996, CDPHE requested that Conoco provide the Air Pollution Control
Division a record of all incidents where acid gas or sour water stripper offgas was
combusted in the main flare since June, 1993. The information was requested in 12
month segments, suggesting the agency was investigating when permitted levels were
exceeded.467 The CDPHE was also actively engaged in a separate RCRA action
regarding hazardous substances and waste material found to be migrating from the
facility into groundwater and nearby creeks and wells. Compliance Advisories were
issued to Conoco in February and August, 1997.468 Both the EPA Region VIII and
CDPHE were in the process of resolving Compliance Advisories with Conoco when
citizens filed suit under the Clean Air Act.
The citizen suit was brought under the Federal Clean Air Act for Conoco's
alleged sulfur dioxide emissions. 469 The problem, according to the original complaint,
began when Conoco installed a second SRU. The unit malfunctioned on numerous
occasions, causing Conoco to perform maintenance while diverting gas to its main flare.
In addition to alleged violations of permit emissions requirements, plaintiffs alleged that
continuous monitoring and recording of concentrations of sulfur dioxide discharged into
the atmosphere was not taking place. Conoco's lack of a continuous monitoring
instrument was one of three causes of action for the citizen suit (the final being Conoco's
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failure to process all gas from the sour water stripper in the SRU). Relief sought included
declaratory judgment, a compliance order (that would include monitoring), penalties of
$27,500 per day for each violation under the CAA, and $100,000 for beneficial
mitigation projects. The community representatives involved in the case focused on
particularized impacts to local residents and the need for monitoring and resident
notification, while the state-wide organization sought precedent-setting results at the level
of construction permitting.
Conoco's Response. Conoco adapted to each of the above developments through
the efforts of managers, engineers, and environmental professionals. In general,
Conoco responds to new corporate objectives, pollution control challenges, or regulatory
or permit changes through adjustments in two directions. First, new objectives were tied
to specific roles and personnel from upper management through various incentives.
Second, middle management used data in what is called the "plant management system"
to track emissions points (85 in all), respond to "upticks" and regulatory exceedances,
carry out trend, incident, and root cause analyses, and propose changes that accounted for
budgetary constraints, systems effects, and broader plant optimization goals. The two
directions often intersect, particularly within a given refinery's various emissions
programs (i.e., Air Program) and broader Environment, Health, and Safety management.
These streams of adjustment, adaptation, and innovation were in motion long before the
filing of COPIRG v. Conoco.
Since 1990, environmental managers at the refinery had been working on nine
environmental initiatives instituted by Conoco upper management, including a pledge to
reduce toxic air emissions and hazardous solid waste significantly beyond existing legal
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requirements. Efforts to adapt to such objectives are limited by whatever information is
available and the ability to process and interpret the data. For example, sulfur, which is
allowed in finished products in varying (and over time decreasing) amounts, is not
uniformly monitored at the refinery, as a patchwork of regulations guide the facility's
tracking of various chemicals:
Environmental regulations apply to specific pieces of equipment, so if your piece of equipment is
covered by a specific regulation that requires a certain kind of monitoring that's what you do. So,
for example, I talked about the heaters and boilers we have, and there's a requirement that the fuel
that you burn, if you think of them as big gas stoves almost, not to be too simplified, but if you
think about it, we've got dozens of big gas stoves all over the place, we have one monitor that
measures the hydrogen sulfide in that gas that goes to every burner, and that's a continuous
emission monitor. And we have requirements on the limit of hydrogen sulfide we can have in that
monitor, or have in that gas in any period of time. So we get a continuous readout. If the monitor
fails for some reason, then we have to take other samples and get other readings so that even if the
monitor is not working we have to prove that we stayed in compliance. And then we have a
continuous emission monitor, when I mentioned earlier all of the changes we had to make in the
early 1990's to get the sulfur out, we put in a process that helps us process the sulfur, and it has a
continuous emission monitor for our sulfur dioxide concentration in that. The rest of our facility
now, because we haven't made the kind of changes that require the emissions monitors, we use
what are called AP-42 factors. The EPA has said if you process this much crude oil through a
certain kind of unit, this is the factor you use to estimate your emissions. 471
It depends on the units involved. There's multiple places where we have sulfur dioxide emissions.
There's one that has a continuous monitor on it. There's one that's not yet been required. We
have two sulfur recovery units. One of those is continuously monitored right now. The other one
which is an older one had not triggered the requirement to do so, but under the national consent
decrees [lodged after the settlement of COPIRG v. Conoco] will. And it will have a continuous
monitor on that. And there are other sulfur dioxide sources in the plant as well. And some are
monitored more frequently, some less, a lot of that dependent on regulatory requirements. 472
Monitoring other sources of environmental contamination, such as particulate matter and
fugitive emissions and flaring, poses completely different sets of challenges. For each of
these areas of emissions, environmental managers work in teams (such as the Reliability
Group and the Refinery Leadership Team) to (a) stay within permit requirements, (b)
avoid upsets and reduce the unplanned release of certain chemicals, and (c) increase plant
efficiency. Given the fact that the refinery process is continuous throughout the year,
crude oil and its various toxicants and impurities are flowing through the system every
hour of every day. Uncontrolled or unplanned releases, resulting because of electrical or
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system component failure, can account for a significant percentage of overall emissions.
An upset that lasts 10-20 minutes, where certain streams are sent to a flare to avoid
overpressuring vessels or spilling hazardous chemicals, can yield more emissions than
normal operations for 1-2 days. Routine maintenance factors strongly in attempts to
achieve reliability and emissions reductions. A weekly incident review process involves
a formal management review of incidents and in the case of large-scale incidents a root
cause failure analyses. Under the recent consent decree between Conoco and the
Department of Justice, the facility must comply with strict guidelines for when to trigger
a root cause failure analysis (for example, releases of more than 500 lbs/day of sulfur
dioxide).m
Communicating what is learned through failure analysis, and assigning new roles
or incentives to engineering groups, operators (who work on four separate shifts under
contract), mechanical personnel, and planners who determine how the facility should be
run is a challenging task. Equally daunting is the need to target cost-effectiveness across
the universe of a facility's boilers, valves, pumps, flanges, and other pieces of equipment,
estimate the effects of any changes on the system as a whole, and propose changes that
will remain within projected budget allocations or convince upper management of their
need.
The process engineers are kind of the ones sitting out there saying how can I run this unit better?
What can we do that can create an advantage for us someplace? And so they're by nature looking
out ahead and I think that's the guys who can do that. And the other one here probably who has a
really good long-term and kind of how does it all fit together is the optimization leader.. .The
barrier is getting projects to be viewed as cost-effective and that might not be at the site level, it
may be at a higher level than that. I mean there's people look at a project, and as a company
you've gotta make money. And so that ultimately sits out there behind things, and people have
always struggled with the concept of does an environmental project make money and I actually
think that there's more acceptance now that they do. But the payback's different than what the
people are normally used to looking for. It might be indirect. Traditionally, from an engineering
perspective, people would look at a project and they'd say if we do this then we can produce x
amount more gasoline and that means we make that much money, so you compare that to the
original cost of the project and you can say yeah, this is justified. And the environmental projects
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don't have the same direct payback to them. Sometimes they are cost-avoidance: if you do this
you won't get a penalty. Sometimes, and then there's the grey, it's really hard to quantify
community acceptance. 7
The challenges of cost-effectiveness, mining and interpreting thousands of data
points, coordinating among diverse work groups, operators, engineers, and upper
management, and communicating new goals and tasks to over 200 employees on-site are
indeed daunting. At the same time, they offer opportunities for those seeking to enforce
the permits and regulations that drive much of the refinery's environmental management
work. Indeed, the fact that citizen concerns over S02 emissions could be resolved by
finding a practical or engineering solution rather than a legal finding of fact encouraged
settlement discussions in the first place. But once discussions commenced around
Conoco's proposed solutions to S02 emissions, there is little evidence that the mediation
process offered a full appreciation of how plaintiffs could shape discussions around
Conoco's broader attempts to address sulfur emissions in order to address the company's
environmental management challenges.
Nor was it clear that EPA Region VIII, the Justice Department (involved in
settlement negotiations with a significant percentage of the nation's refinery operations at
the time), or plaintiffs had figured out an appropriate division of labor to maximize
Conoco's promised reductions in emissions more broadly. Lacking broader coordination
among these groups, Conoco developed a response to EPA's RCRA action that served as
the primary driver behind the mediated resolution of the citizen suit.
As indicated in Table 12, the citizen suit was filed after the RCRA actions were
commenced by EPA Region VIII and CDPHE. Plaintiffs gave notice of violations in the
citizen suit on November 3, 1997."'5 EPA Region VIII and Conoco had been engaged in
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an alternative dispute resolution process facilitated by an administrative law judge since
June 30' 1997.47 By September 2 "d, the parties to the EPA RCRA action reportedly had
"developed some reasonable possibilities for settlement that remain to be explored."4 77
The parties' tone changed a month later, when they recommended termination of the
ADR process.478 Two weeks after plaintiffs in COPIRG et al. v. Conoco gave notice of
their intent to sue, Region VIII and Conoco made a joint request for a stay of litigation.479
Parties believe that it is at this point that Conoco began to contemplate and design a
settlement that would satisfy the demands of Region VIII, COPIRG, residents, and the
CDPHE as expressed in the RCRA action, the citizen suit, and state activities such as
discussions over permitting of the #2 SRU (see Table 12). Court records confirm that
two months after a stay was granted for the RCRA matter, parties began to reach a
"settlement in principle" that included a supplemental environmental project (SEP), the
magnitude of which "may impact other issues currently being discussed by the parties
outside the context of this matter."480
Less than a month following the RCRA "settlement in principle," parties to
COPIRG v. Conoco began to meet under the direction of a mediator to consider the
"Conoco Denver Refinery Sulfur Project Presentation.""' Importantly, parties to the
EPA RCRA action had to request motions for extension of time, and were given several
deadlines for submitting an executed Consent Agreement to the court.482 Parties to the
citizen suit, particularly resident-plaintiffs, thus entered settlement negotiations after
Conoco had begun to try to link settlements in the two cases and the court had set tight
deadlines relevant to such linkage. Conoco would ultimately resolve the above two
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actions as well as CDPHE's RCRA action over groundwater contamination with
essentially the same Supplemental Environmental Project.
Pre-Mediation. The district court hearing COPIRG v. Conoco tried to order the
parties to attempt settlement negotiations in January, 1998 (the judge ordered the
scheduling of a settlement conference to be presided over by a magistrate judge in early
February). Parties did not seem particularly interested in following the judge's timeline
(they filed a joint motion to vacate the judge's scheduling orders), and instead continued
discussions with a mediator they had selected jointly.48 Conoco had already begun to
focus on an overarching settlement to cover the citizen suit and RCRA action. Plaintiffs
to the citizen suit, on the other hand, entered negotiations in order to gain assurances of
reduced flaring and emissions, understanding of the risks associated with sulfur dioxide
and other chemicals released, and the ability to educate other residents of impacted
communities of the risks posed by the facility:
We came in with an agenda that we had, that we are the victims of what's going on over here and
it needs to be fixed not because of your profits or not because of anything else but that we're
overburdened, and that's been our story over here is that we are the center of everything and we're
overburdened by everything from all across the city. People drive into the city to work, we get the
fumes from their cars. They need more highways, they come right through our neighborhood.
The trains, people want to move downtown, they need a place to switch the trains and store the
trains, we get them in our backyard. I think COPIRG stuck pretty much to their stuff and we
jumped on them for things that we needed. We needed the assurance that the flare-ups wouldn't
keep going up, we wanted an understanding of what was being released in all of those releases, we
wanted an understanding of what the health effects would be from the things that we were
breathing from that area, and that just the assurances that those would be reduced or stopped.484
One of the mediator's tasks was to justify representation of all interests that could either
influence or be affected by the outcome of any settlement of COPIRG v. Conoco.
Assuming the alleged violations true, the mediator assessed whether plaintiffs' interests,
if obtained, would benefit "others that were similarly situated" or part of the same
class.4 85 Because the mediator could not identify any proposed solutions to sulfur
187
emissions that could prove detrimental of the broader community if implemented, he
chose not to broaden the mediated discussions beyond the parties to the suit. The
mediator was responsible for trying to align the interests of the plaintiffs, whose interests
did not entirely overlap as they commenced discussions with a company that was already
in the process of justifying proposed process changes to the EPA Region VIII. Table 13
provides the premediation elements of COPIRG v. Conoco.
Table 13. COPIRG v. Conoco Mediation Elements: Pre-Mediation.
Initiation Informed of Agreed to attempt Agreed to attempt to Contacted by
discussions to reach reach settlement counsel for
between COPIRG settlement plaintiffs and
and Conoco that selior counsel for
















































Actions against Conoco were described as "lawyer-generated," fueled by attorneys with
conflicting objectives. Attorneys for the EPA monitored state implementation of its
delegation requirements under the Clean Air Act. Attorneys for CDPHE monitored
Permit 10AD998, issued to Conoco for its Claus Sulfur Recovery Unit. Both agencies
notified Conoco starting in 1991 that significant hydrocarbon seepage into Sand Creek
had been observed. Both conducted inspections of Conoco for RCRA compliance, noting
a series of violations. Then, EPA Region VIII overfiled on the state's enforcement
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Objectives
actions, stepping up the pressure on CDPHE to enforce its hazardous waste program.
Attorneys for COPIRG entered the fray with a citizen suit that focused on Conoco's
failure to detect Clean Air Act violations for five years due to inadequate sulfur dioxide
monitoring. Their goal was to set a precedent for regional industries and to build on
legislative victories that had enacted the CO CAA and APEN.
By this time, Conoco and the EPA had reached a settlement in principle to Region
VIII's overfile. Both parties filed a motion for an extension of time to consider a possible
settlement to include a sum of money in addition to a SEP. Only after these actions had
occurred did residents, who had filed numerous odor complaints during a two year period,
finally join a statewide public interest firm in lodging their complaint under Section 304
of the Clean Air Act. The resident-plaintiffs had access to legal counsel and technical
assistance, substantial prior experience with negotiation procedures, and a high level of
community organization. They were in favor of moving toward mediation as soon as
conditions surrounding the legal case warranted. In addition, residents shared objectives
that could not be obtained through litigation, including joint exploration of methods to
eliminate possible odor sources, on-site monitoring, and the hiring of a community
technical consultant to conduct a review of technology options for SRU upgrades and
evaluate engineering work performed by Conoco. Above all, residents wanted
assurances that heavy flaring would not continue, and a notification system in case it did.
Yet as we will see, parallel administrative actions encouraged a near exclusive focus on
the sulfur recovery problem. In addition, an engineer who offered technical assistance to
residents was contracted to review Conoco proposals rather than to explore broader
production process changes that may be of interest to residents. And time constraints
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imposed by parallel processes called for swift resolution of the citizen suit, so as not to
jeopardize settlement of the EPA overfile.
Mediation. The mediation commenced with a meeting at the refinery where
parties considered a presentation of Conoco's proposed sulfur project. In addition to
proposed structural changes, the presentation included a "Pollution Prevention Progress
Report" outlining the refinery's goals for emissions reductions: 5% per year for TRI,
criteria air (including sulfur), and hazardous waste emissions, using 1993 as a base year.
Also listed as facility-wide goals were the improvement of energy utilization and
reliability, documentation of operating standards, enhanced environmental training for all
employees, clear roles and accountability for employees, and improved emergency
preparedness.
Formally, the mediation began less than a month later (March 10, 1998), at a
preliminary meeting where parties discussed (a) an agenda, (b) the objectives of the
mediation, (c) groundrules for the process, (d) a timeframe for completion, and (e) the
factual background of the controversy.486 The scope of settlement discussions was
limited to the factual background and violations alleged, actions that Conoco could take
to resolve the alleged violations, and the drafting of a settlement that would codify
actions required of Conoco and the plaintiffs for resolving the issues at hand.48 1 The
timeframe, established during the next meeting, was surprisingly short (3-4 meetings over
a span of weeks) for discussion of refinery process changes and broad community- and
state-wide concerns. Within the context of the "four games of chess," it is possible to see
why the timeframe had to be condensed.
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Mediation progressed through a combination of shuttle diplomacy and face-to-
face meetings between the parties, including COPIRG, resident-plaintiffs, plaintiffs'
counsel, the refinery's plant and environmental managers, senior counsel, and other
attorneys (some outside counsel). An additional party, a scientist with experience in
refinery emissions who worked for an environmental organization in California, joined
via telephone for at least one meeting. Her role was to ensure that proposed alternatives
were feasible and would meet plaintiffs' objective of reducing sulfur emissions.
Plaintiffs' attorney admits that the case lacked the value necessary for bringing in more
experts to consider other options (value in terms of the potential for success at trial).
Nonetheless, their hired expert was adept at evaluating Conoco and offered a buffer for
the plaintiffs as they discussed refinery operations under conditions of uneven
information.
The first meeting after preliminary discussions took place in the mediator's
offices on March 31 s.488 The meeting's agenda, drafted by the mediator, included (a) a
presentation by Conoco, (b) a discussion of a proposed SEP, (c) summary of the
preliminary meeting, (d) possible approaches to the EPA, (e) steps to address the court's
(f) 489
schedule, and (f) scheduling issues. Conoco's environmental manager began the
session with a presentation of the refinery's efforts to reduce sulfur emissions, using an
aerial photograph of the refinery as a backdrop. Sources of sulfur dioxide and sour water,
fate and transport, historic emissions, odor dynamics, and other aspects of the broader
problem were presented. The mediator, an experienced environmental attorney, modeled
the discussions after the National Environmental Policy Act's scoping process, where
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project alternatives are scoped and then compared in terms of their environmental and
economic impact.
Plaintiffs relied almost entirely on Conoco's information, much of which had
been promised at the preliminary meeting and shared at the first session, in order to
evaluate Conoco's proposals. Information sharing was followed by a discussion of
whether the settlement discussions could result in a SEP that would resolve EPA Region
VIII's RCRA action. There were concerns that such an arrangement wouldn't work, that
plaintiffs would still require a consent order for any settlement with them, that an EPA
global settlement with Conoco refineries could negate elements of the SEP that parties
were working toward, and that EPA would require a permit modification that could delay
resolution of the citizen suit because it would require extensive emissions modeling and
public comment. Parties agreed to work toward an interim agreement during the next
meeting and to put aside these broader issues. Conoco's involvement with EPA in active
litigation restricted their ability to collect additional information requested by plaintiffs
for the next meeting (such as an inventory of sulfur and other compounds emitted by the
facility).
Between the first and second meetings, plaintiffs met with the mediator to discuss
desired components of an interim agreement.49' Here, the community's sense of what an
agreement should include was made clear. It is instructive to compare these elements
with an interim agreement that was developed at the next mediation session, held on
April 2 0':
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Table 14. Comparison of Plaintiffs' Desired and Actual Components of Interim
Agreement.




Any press releases or public information related to
this action shall be jointly issued
Plaintiff agrees not to review automatic disclosure
materials until May 4, 1998
Conoco to pay plaintiff's costs and attorney's SAME, with amount stipulated
fees
The above interim agreement accomplished several things: it maintained a certain level
of ambiguity around the process and extent of sulfur dioxide emissions reductions, it
transferred some of the monitoring, modeling, and emissions investigatory work from the
company to the plaintiffs, and it included stipulations that served to shield the company
from further liability. It also de-linked the establishment of a performance measure (S02
emissions reductions) from any community-driven evaluation process, for which
plaintiffs had advocated. Thus, the interim agreement gave Conoco a level of flexibility
that was necessary to pursue negotiations with EPA Region VIII, which by this time
began to focus on an S02 emissions reduction SEP.
It was challenging for the parties to reach a point where they could engage in
creative problem solving. As the interim agreement suggests, progress in this regard was
slow at first. Yet at some point, either at the second meeting or at future sessions
designed to finalize settlement documents, the parties began to focus on some of the
specific elements of the production process. Plaintiffs credit the plant manager for
showing a level of patience in explaining how production was related to sulfur emissions.
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While Conoco's attorneys sought to limit his sharing of information, plaintiffs were given
an opportunity to evaluate what they were being shown:
Then we were really clear that they needed to replace sour water stripper number one. It was
ancient, it was frequently down, it wasn't able to process as much as the second one. And so what
had happened is since this area was declared an economic enterprise zone, then well you know all
the tax breaks and stuff, so Conoco had literally quadrupled in size. But it had not necessarily
kept up making the changes to deal with the additional production. And so the sour water stripper
was older than heck. They had to put in one new sour water stripper that was unit number two but
unit number one had never been replace so how they were dealing with that was just flaring, just
burning it off. So we were really clear that the response had to be that they had to replace this. 49'
They were so busy selling us on their preferred solution that it seemed that we were getting really
good answers to our questions. And ultimately I think Conoco did a very good job of killing three
birds with one stone. And I think we went along with it in part because I recommended that we
not continue with strong litigation with the judge that we got and because they did provide us with
some things. And we did get a green light from the San Francisco folks that ultimately this is
what a refinery ought to do in a situation like this. So, that's when you settle.492
Plaintiffs characterize the mediation as driven by Conoco as well as forces beyond the
scope of the mediation. Information flowed primarily in one direction: from Conoco to
plaintiffs, who felt as though Conoco was "selling" a preferred option from the outset.
Even the first official proposal for a community-driven SEP was made by Conoco. The
effect of this arrangement was to give residents a sense that "there wasn't much to
discuss," which discouraged attempts to reconfigure the process around their objectives
(i.e., monitoring, modeling, community awareness, informed, community-driven process
of selecting engineering alternatives):
I think we let them off the hook too easily. And I think the things that they planned on doing were
OK, but we really didn't get anything that we were looking for as far as the community goes. We
did want some type of air monitoring, we did want some type of notification system in case there
was a bad flare-up so that people with allergies could stay in the house or lock themselves off. We
wanted some of those kinds of things that we probably could have forced on them. Small things,
but things that would really make the community feel a little bit more protective of their health.
[We didn't pursue these because] I think that there were so many different people involved in the
process, they were so willing to give up what they were giving up, and they were really pushing
on a timeline and trying, there was already a suit filed I think and they had so much time to come
up with a solution.493
As parties moved toward detailing the final settlement documents, the two most
important questions for the residents remained: How did Conoco's sulfur emissions
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problems affect the surrounding area and What level of emissions reductions would
amount to a noticeable improvement in odor abatement and human health more generally?
Residents' notions of how these could be answered were de-linked from Conoco's
decision-making processes (both internal and with regard to the RCRA actions), meaning
residents had to rely in large part on the expertise and leverage of the environmental
agencies to ensure that these were properly addressed.
Agreement is Reached. The final agreement between plaintiffs and Conoco was
signed on April 2 9 h, 1999, nearly a year after plaintiffs filed a Notice of Dismissal
dismissing the citizen suit without prejudice.4 94 Parties reached an Agreement Regarding
Notice of Dismissal on May 4th, 1998, which would guide development of the final
Agreement. Table 15 details elements of each document:
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Table 15. COPIRG v. Conoco Settlement Elements.
Notice of Dismissal-Agrdeinlept ' SettlementAgreemnent-
Plaintiff agrees to file notice of dismissal Plaintiffs will designate a payee and account to
receive funds, to which Conoco will pay a lump sum
of $72,000
Conoco to use its best efforts to secure Conoco to withdraw its December 30, 1997 request to
participation of a representative of the the state that the state modify Conoco's Permit
Globeville, Swansea, or Elyria communities in #91AD180-3 to include turnaround emissions
the Industrial Council (best efforts commitment
not subject to breach claim)
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If any provision is held to be invalid or
unenforceable, such holding will render this
Agreement invalid unless provisions are
severable and if severance is equitable to the
parties
Sulfur dioxide emissions had already been addressed through a Consent Agreement
approved under EPA Region VIII's RCRA action as well as a Compliance Order issued
by the EPA and CDPHE regarding separate RCRA and Colorado Hazardous Waste Act
violations.495 Terms of settlement for the RCRA actions included a SEP in the amount of
$337,500 plus $627,500 in addition to mitigated civil penalties. 496 A SEP, the purpose of
which was to reduce sulfur emissions by 200 tons per year, was designed to proceed
according to an engineering assessment of three options, detailed by the EPA, for
structural changes at the facility to address sour water stripper gas emissions. Plaintiffs
in COPIRG v. Conoco were kept abreast of developments through periodic reports that
included activities accomplished, problems and solutions, any sampling activities,
personnel or schedule changes, activities planned, and estimated costs for activities
planned. A deadline of October 1, 2000 was set for completion of construction, testing,
and implementation of the engineering alternative selected.
A representative of the Cross Community Coalition attended further meetings
with refinery staff and three community involvement groups in order to help the residents
oversee the implementation of sulfur dioxide emissions reductions while planning an
appropriate Community Right-to-Know project. The SEP proceeding on-schedule,
leading to improvements to the #1 SRU and its associated tail gas incinerator and
allowing sour water stripper overhead gas to be proceeded in the #1 SRU.497 Conoco's
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completion of the SEP was conditioned in part on its agreement to modify its air
emissions permits for its #1 and #2 SRU's to indicate that (a) all sour water stripper
overhead gas would be processed in the two units, (b) no sour water stripper gas would
be flared unless both SRU's were incapacitated unless there is an emergency situation,
and (c) SRU emissions would be monitored and records maintained. 498 The refinery's
startup, shut down, and malfunction emissions fell from an average of 322 tons per year
(1994-1998) to 18.4 tons in 2000.499 Conoco's overall expenditures for the construction
phase of the project totaled over $2 million.500
Implementation. Residents, having achieved their objectives of ensuring
substantial reductions in sulfur emissions as well as permit modification that restricted
the kind of flaring operations that led to citizen complaints, were left to decide how best
to apply their settlement dollars under the Right-to-Know Project. 50' The settlement
dollars were spent through the Colorado People's Environmental and Economic Network
(COPEEN), an organizing and environmental advocacy group operating under the CCC
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organization. A substantial portion of the settlement was used to research the Toxics
Release Inventory and Environmental Defense's "Scorecard" website. The goal of this
project was to "develop accurate and thorough information around who the major
polluters are in the area, what sort of toxics they emit and the possible detrimental health
effects of those pollutants."50 3 COPEEN developed a better understanding of the
cumulative impacts of pollution to Northeast Denver, and worked with the 80216
Regional Geographic Initiative (the zip code has the highest emissions levels in the state
of Colorado) to disseminate educational materials regarding how to prevent everyday
exposures to toxic pollutants. 5 4 COPEEN discovered through its research, which was
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assisted in part by a public relations representative of Conoco, that much of the emissions
in the 80216 zip code did not come from large point sources:
We learned from TRI data that there 2 million pounds a year of legal hazardous emissions into the
air, water, and soil. However, we found out that it's really the smaller emitters that emit more than
that. Because the three major emitters are classes of businesses. It's autobody paint shops,
printers, and wood treatment plants. You know we have so many of those that put together, those
plus other small businesses actually emit more than the 2 million pounds but they're not required
to report to TRI. So we did that and [the Conoco representative] was very instrumental. In fact,
he used our money to have Tetra Tech do some GIS mapping for us.505
COPEEN began planning a regional initiative to help small businesses improve their
pollution prevention practices in 2000.
The Limits Revisited. The sequencing of events prior to resident involvement in
settlement talks strongly influenced their bargaining power. Settlement negotiations had
commenced months prior between EPA and Conoco. CDPHA had been involved in
detailed discussions over permitting for the #2 SRU with the refinery, encouraging
Conoco to modify its permit to include a condition addressing emissions that occurred
during planned process unit turnarounds. And since 1990, refinery and environmental
managers at Conoco had been working on a series of environmental initiatives including
attempts to address sulfur dioxide emissions through trend and incident analysis. These
heavily institutionalized efforts created a certain momentum that superceded resident
attempts to pursue monitoring technologies for advanced warning and to set precedents
for other community-corporate relations. That momentum was strengthened two weeks
after plaintiffs filed their notice of intent to sue. Region VIII and Conoco requested a
stay of litigation and Conoco began to design a settlement that would satisfy the demands
of Region VIII, CDPHE, and COPIRG through a single SEP. While residents had the
option to reject the proposed mediator and were given a chance to discuss desired
components to an interim agreement, the interim agreement, lodged roughly two months
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after a notice of settings was filed for the citizen suit, remained sufficiently ambiguous to
permit the conclusion of negotiations between Conoco and Region VIII.
The short timetable, parallel processes, and institutionalized methods for
addressing certain elements of underlying problems made it difficult for residents to
engage in creative problem-solving, although the refinery manager was amenable to
technical discussions and to helping residents understand how production related to sulfur
emissions. What limited time that was available for problem-solving during the handful
of meetings with the mediator was also limited by the scope of residents' technical
assistance, consisting of an engineer who assessed Conoco proposals. Under these
circumstances, it is not surprising that residents sensed a company-driven process
designed to "sell" a preferred option to a variety of parties. There was little use for
residents' comparative advantages in this context. Residents' primary questions of (a)
how emissions problems affected the surrounding area and (b) to what extent emissions
reductions would amount to a noticeable improvement in odor abatement and human
health were relegated to a small "Community Right to Know" project that was not
allowed to target the refinery itself.
Discussion. Much of the residents' concerns regarding air emissions were indeed
resolved by the convergence of the citizen suit and EPA and CDPHE RCRA actions.
Sulfur dioxide emissions originating from malfunctions and maintenance were reduced
dramatically, while permit modifications called for an end to the flaring practices that led
to citizen complaints. At the same time, the division of labor with regards to generating
and exploring options for improving refinery operations and meeting residents' interests
beyond sulfur emissions left considerable room for improvement. To understand why, we
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have to return to the mediation space itself. The meetings between parties to the citizen
suit were limited by the agenda to an exploration of solutions to a highly specified and
technical problem and bound by time limits imposed by external processes. And while
the parties' alternative to negotiated settlement was important, the mediated settlement
was shaped to a greater extent by the manner in which the parties' BATNA's changed, at
times without even their awareness, as Conoco adapted and linked the citizen suit to other
actions.
It would be unfair to claim that the residents in the Conoco civil suit lacked a
vision for achieving their communities' objectives. To the contrary, the residents'
proposals that were communicated to the mediator show a level of subtlety and
sophistication that one would expect from a group that had built a community visioning
process into an EPCRA settlement months earlier. In the end, residents' desires to
involve the community in generating engineering options and encouraging Conoco to
carry out modeling and an exploration of fenceline and other monitoring technologies
were ignored. Conoco had already determined, through work predominantly with EPA
Region VIII, an acceptable range of engineering options to consider through
implementation of a SEP. The alignment of two RCRA actions allowed Conoco to
suggest that adjudication of COPIRG v. Conoco would recommence should plaintiffs in
the citizen suit fail to take advantage a common, environmentally beneficial project.
Thus, rather than utilize the resources, attention, and authority of state and federal actors,
residents found themselves in a narrow, diminishing window of opportunity, and they
acted as one might expect: they settled.
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Residents would have had a different bargaining position given (a) the lack of any
RCRA action, (b) the initiation of only a CDPHE or EPA action, (c) a reversal in the
order in which the actions were filed, or (d) a difference in Conoco's ability to anticipate
regulatory change and build it into its goals and staff roles. As the RCRA actions moved
toward resolution, residents unwittingly engaged in mediation and considered a zone of
agreement that had already been shaped beyond their ability to push back, through the
assistance of the mediator, agenda, party representation, or other means. The importance
of the mediator's style and approach is clear here: A mediator who operates by modeling
the NEPA alternatives analysis approach will encourage biases that are similar to what
NEPA engenders: technical and engineering forms of knowledge predominate, and
social and experiential knowledge is subsumed. The mediator also failed to assist the
parties in building a shared understanding of anticipated regulatory developments.
Indeed, the Department of Justice's recent settlement with Conoco greatly overshadows
any progress made in sulfur dioxide reductions through the citizen suit. Residents had a
chance to achieve meaningful, cheaper, and more cost-effective improvements to
monitoring and community relations within the context of larger sulfur emissions




Table 12. Important Events in Addressing Conoco S02 Emissions.
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Bringing Structure Back In: Lessons from the Cases
Structural Influence over Negotiations: The Narrowing Dynamics Revisited
The cases provide a rich context in which to consider how various factors shape
individual perceptions of self-interest and encourage disputants to reach agreements that
deviated substantially from the objectives that brought them to the negotiating table at the
outset. These same factors displace residents' initial preferences, narrow their interests,
and foreclose certain topics from deliberation. These narrowing dynamics are caused by:
1. The manner in which accidents unfolded, were reported, and were responded
to prior to negotiation;
2. Efforts, if any, taken by plant-level workers and environmental managers to
limit changes to the status quo, including existing role structures, standard
operating procedures, production rates, and production processes;
3. The effects of parallel adjudicative or administrative actions (taken on behalf
of the affected community) on resident objectives, agenda-setting, data
collection, and the timing and scope of available agreements; and
4. Limits imposed by the nature of the facilities involved and the technologies
employed (for source reduction, pollution monitoring, and risk regulation,
including ways in which these technologies alter resident goals and available
paths for meeting them).
I consider each in the following sections.
1. How the Accidents Unfolded
The case studies represent a striking range of contexts from which environmental
injustice claims have emerged. From small, isolated neighborhoods faced with
encroaching land uses to diverse seaside, unincorporated communities, subsidized
housing, wood frame settlements near refinery operations, and a suburban subdivision,
the communities appear at first to have little in common. Consider the historical origins
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of the environmental burdens involved. Residents of Swansea described how industry
was concentrated in North Denver as a result of the construction of 1-70 and the
placement of railroad switching and holding stations further from downtown.
Manchester residents recalled how refinery and ship workers built homes on small lots
near their places of employment. Richmond's diverse population was attracted by the
acceleration of shipbuilding and other opportunities that emerged during the Second
World War. Bayo Vista residents speculated that their housing units were made available
after military housing was abandoned and signs of soil contamination were discovered.
Those in Kennedy Heights considered attempts to secure government assistance for a
land exchange, shoddy construction, and city neglect for repair of waterlines as
contributing to their exposure to hydrocarbons. The diversity of accounts, ranging from
the isolation and targeting of certain neighborhoods by the forces of industrial location to
efforts to live in close proximity to jobs offered by petrochemical plants, is evident in
these narratives.
Regardless of the specifics of a community's narrative, they share a sense of
ongoing exposure to multiple, severe environmental burdens that are both unpredictable
and constantly changing. Rather than a sense that the exposure itself is disproportionate
or inherently unfair, it is this complexity, brought about by the clustering of industry near
low-income minority residents (or vice versa), that shapes how residents characterize and
approach environmental negotiations. Of particular importance is how members of these
communities make sense of the uncertainty caused by pollution, nuisances, and multiple
sources of stress. Residents, unable to capture the true extent of risks borne as a result of
where they live, nevertheless work to generate a general baseline of environmental
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quality, against which they can assess any gains or setbacks caused by facility changes or
land use decisions. Those living in Smith Addition, a neighborhood near Manchester in
Texas, considered Rhone Poulenc a relatively stable facility - hardly a pressing concern
when contrasted with the former Hill Chemical Company site or even the practice of
illegal dumping on vacant lots. Residents of communities in North Richmond, faced with
a diversity of point sources, sought to establish greater predictability of anticipated
accidental emissions, through efforts to achieve "no net emissions increases" and real-
time fenceline monitoring and notification. Accidents, flaring, shut-downs, shipping
patterns, production cycles, disease clusters, and public nuisances caused by various land
uses rarely generated patterns that were clear, even to the most observant members of the
community.
As a result, resident evaluations of a given facility, accident, or proposed
mitigation were prone to bias in that the amount of weight residents gave to specific
proposals did not reflect their true impact on the environmental quality of a neighborhood.
For example, an accidental release and minor permit modification at Rhone Poulenc
heightened attention given by Manchester residents to a facility that represented less than
1% of the toxic emissions from all area facilities (see Table 16). A variety of approaches
to emission reduction were considered and rejected by plant management. Then,
residents of two neighboring communities, Harrisburg and Smith Addition, were included
on the post-settlement Community Advisory Committee (CAC). Harrison and Smith
Addition residents evaluated the agreement in the context of generally decreasing
accidental releases, fires, and explosions in their areas. Even though the agreement
reached by the CAC focused on facility changes already mandated by state-issued
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permits and regulations, the new CAC members reacted positively to it, because it gave
them access to information and lessened their sense of uncertainty regarding facility
accidents. Residents involved in the mediated settlement, however, assigned far greater
weight to proposals to deal with sulfur emissions, even though such proposals simply
reflected what the Department of Justice would require of the refinery shortly after
agreement was reached. Residents' positive evaluation of the sulfur reduction proposals
made by several agencies reflects the desire to reduce uncertainty, which led residents to
assign too much weight to proposals that were less effective in addressing broader
neighborhood concerns.
In Richmond, a trend of rapidly increasing toxic releases to waterways swamped
small gains in air emission reductions. But residents concerned with the health of those
who relied on the Richmond Marina (a Superfund site) for food and other constituencies
received little attention during negotiations with Chevron, who was responsible for
roughly 99% of the toxic water emissions in the area. A construction permit representing
potential increases in toxic emissions and a recent accident at General Chemical led to
proposals for low-emission valves and fenceline monitoring, but there was scant
consideration given to criteria air pollutants and particulate matter releases that were
more reasonably associated with high asthma rates (up to 90%) and absenteeism in
nearby schools.
A second commonality across the case study communities concerned the uneven
nature of contamination. Whether the community included many point sources of air and
water pollution or residual soil and groundwater contamination, the experience of
contamination and associated health concerns and diseases varied throughout each
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community. While certain diseases in Kennedy Heights occurred with prevalence rates
that were well above state or national averages, the majority of the subdivision's residents
did not suffer from lupus or certain forms of cancer. Chronic contamination, no matter
how widespread, will invariably affect a community in discontinuous, unpredictable ways.
So while some residents of Murr Way, living near a lupus cluster and above a crude oil
storage pit, were reluctant to accept anything short of relocation, many in Kennedy
Heights evaluated the results of soil sampling from the standpoint of healthy individuals.
In unincorporated areas of Contra Costa County, Unocal's Catacarb release occurred in
Rodeo, at a facility bordering Bayo Vista housing units, with prevailing winds carrying
much of the substance to Crockett and Tormey. Each community developed a different
interpretation of the significance of the release from the standpoint of their unique
community health concerns. The unevenness of contamination served to break
environmental justice communities into distinct, but not always identifiable factions.
Sometimes, these groups surfaced and influenced the negotiation process as
representatives of the broader community. Other times, they remained in the background
until final settlement offers were made. Their presence was influential in both instances.
The uncertainty and unevenness of environmental burdens in each community
shaped resident interests and objectives as conflict erupted. When residents were given
an opportunity to develop a shared narrative and understanding of the environmental
burdens they faced, they were more successful in avoiding the two common challenges
described above that make it difficult to evaluate settlement proposals and to make
informed trades between available options. Yet when resident judgment was not
influenced by the uncertainty and unevenness of environmental burdens, an equally
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challenging dynamic was evident. Residents, while adept at developing proposals
regarding emergency preparedness and response, community involvement in plant
inspections, and citizen monitoring, were less able to consider how their initiatives should
be weighed against proposals by facility managers that focused on financial contributions
to the community or health studies and other information gathering exercises.
Community representatives were rarely given an opportunity to accept or implement
proposals leading to real changes in the organizational routines or agency oversight.
Table 16. Characteristics of Case Study Environmental Justice Communities.
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In addition to how accidents or contamination unfolded and were reported to or
discovered by residents, the nature of the responses to ach crisis set the stage for the
community-corporate negotiations that followed. The accidents that galvanized residents
in the six communities were often made worse by organizational decision-making as
opposed to simple human error or chance events. While in some of the cases, this
worsening of the accident was encouraged by a breakdown in one or more discrete sets of
procedures, other accidents were shaped by more systemic organizational problems. The
Vulcan Chemicals release, for example, was exacerbated by a lack of safeguards on-site
to prevent and respond to accidental releases and little to no emergency response
coordination among city agencies. Similarly, Rhodia (chemical transport and offloading
procedures and release containment) and Chevron (lack of accident prevention and
disaster plans; inadequate regional early warning systems) were unprepared for accidents.
In contrast, systemic breakdowns in organizational routines worsened already
serious conditions in three cases. For instance, the Unocal catacarb release continued for
two weeks because of a series of internal dynamics and decision-making errors. Residual
contamination in Kennedy Heights was ignored and ultimately left in place because of a
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breakdown in agency site characterization and risk assessment approaches, tasks that
were shared by Chevron and the Railroad Commission. These precursors to the
difficulties faced by organized citizens could not have been discovered through a cursory
inspection of public documents - they were only reconstructed through extensive review
of thousands of pages of internal correspondence and depositions (in preparation for
lawsuits). Yet they had a profound effect on the conditions that set the stage for the
negotiations that followed.
2. Plant and Environmental Managers: Challenging Changes to the Status Quo
Environmental regulations, which enable agencies to monitor industry practices
and pursue a desired level of public health, place numerous demands on the owners of
industrial facilities. Companies such as Conoco and Rhodia are required to comply with
rules regarding emissions points, input-output factors, fugitive emissions, storage and
shipment of waste products, monitoring, and the analysis and prevention of accidents.
These requirements are superimposed on existing efforts to maintain continuity of
production and profitability. Similarly, agencies, lacking the ability to continuously
monitor or inspect even a small subset of existing point sources or contaminated sites,
must make tough decisions regarding how best to enforce the same regulations and
ensure compliance. Both sides, faced with pressing demands and limited resources,
adopt a series of rule-like means (routines) of upholding the appearance that regulations
are producing desired effects (i.e., quality of environment, minimal risks to human
health). Such routines include the manner in which regulators rely on industry emissions
estimates, scatter a limited number of fixed monitors which track a small number of
pollutants across their jurisdictions, and make use of standard protocols for responding to
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accidental releases. On the industry side, they include commonly-used, non-threatening
interpretations of accidental releases, calls for residents to "shelter-in-place," internal
processes for classifying and assessing accidents, and incentives for avoiding facility
shutdowns. Often, these patterns of behavior become "second-nature" to those involved,
and are no longer open to reconsideration or criticism. They are upheld in order to save
time and energy, minimize disagreement, and provide a shared plan for how workers
should proceed under different circumstances. It takes an event that can call attention to
the assumptions underlying these routines to reopen them to consideration.
Table 17 includes the routines implicated by recent industrial accidents in each of
the cases, such as inadequate monitoring and early warning systems, disaster plans that
met EPCRA requirements but could not be adequately implemented, safeguards and
shutdown procedures that did not prevent the release of substantial amounts of toxic
emissions, state-industry coordination of the interpretation of accidents, and industry
incentives. The disputes between residents and facility owners grew out of incidents that
could have led to a questioning of industry and agency routines. Yet to varying degrees,
the relevant role assignments, standard operating procedures, and production processes
and incentives remained hidden from the investigatory efforts of the communities
involved.
Again, we can distinguish the Vulcan, Chevron, and Rhodia accidents from the
Conoco, Unocal, and Kennedy Heights events. At first, the routines evident in corporate
and agency responses appear remarkably similar, particularly the facility owners'
interpretations of accidental releases as non-threatening and agency reliance on industry
data for their assessments of risk. But the six cases differ in the degree of resistance of
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more systemic organizational routines (particularly standard protocols for responding to
accidental releases and internal processes for assessing accidental releases and changes to
production cycles) to change. Accidents at the Vulcan, Rhodia, and Chevron facilities
concerned routines that were addressed shortly after the events which led to community-
corporate negotiations. Government officials drafted an overview of agency duties
(Vulcan), issued fines relating to chemical transport and offloading procedures and
release containment (Rhodia), and addressed early warning systems and air quality
(Chevron). In each of the three cases, industry representatives were amenable to
discussions concerning these isolated emergency planning and response routines.
By comparison, dispute resolution in the Conoco, Unocal, and Kennedy Heights
cases did not address existing role assignments, standard operating procedures, or
production processes at the respective facilities. Adjustments in response to accidental
releases at the Conoco refinery involved a two-step process. First, new objectives were
agreed upon, and specific roles and personnel from upper management were tasked with
meeting those objectives using various incentives. Second, middle management at the
refinery tracked emission points and proposed changes within budgetary and plant
optimization constraints. Conoco used this system to craft a response to sulfur emissions
years before residents called for changes at the refinery. The nine environmental
initiatives instituted by upper management, and the means through which each was
implemented (through new roles or incentives to engineering groups and operators),
remained undisturbed throughout the mediated process, which culminated in an
agreement that mirrored the facility's existing response to the problem of sulfur
emissions.
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At the Unocal facility, only one of seven kinds of organizational routines was
considered by refinery managers or regulators in the aftermath of the Catacarb release.
Confirmatory decision-making, methods of accident investigation within the refinery,
organizational memory transfer problems, reliance on visual monitoring, a focus on
discrete changes in operating parameters, and the assignment of emergency response
authority within the existing hierarchy were ignored. At the same time, ways of
responding to off-site complaints were addressed through technological solutions.
Specifically, fenceline monitoring was used to gather continuous data of the release of
certain toxic chemicals into neighboring communities. This technological solution
accounted for a percentage of the resources expended by the parties that did not reflect
the importance of off-site complaint response to accidents like the Catacarb release.
In Kennedy Heights, the Railroad Commission and Chevron followed standard
protocols for joint site and risk assessment. The state agency and responsible party
ignored more obvious exposure pathways and resident narratives of contamination and
left the contamination in place after years of investigatory work and the expenditure of
millions of dollars. As the sub-optimal results of five of the six negotiations demonstrate,
even addressing some organizational routines prior to negotiation does not guarantee a
negotiation that will lead to a mutually beneficial agreement. Other routines that are not
accessible for reconsideration during a negotiation, such as those described above, will
swamp any integrative potential that exists in the bargaining space after an industrial
accident.
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3. Parallel Administrative and Adjudicative Processes
In an environmental justice community, multiple administrative and adjudicative
processes are in progress prior to any one accident. These processes shape the extent to
which residents are able to address organizational routines at the heart of accidental
releases. First, an accident calls attention to existing legislation and standards. The
agencies that monitor and enforce existing standards frame residents' sense of harm. For
example, in Swansea, regulatory intervention after an HCL release showed residents that
companies such as Vulcan Materials can fail to disclose and communicate risks posed by
the hazardous materials that they handle (as required by EPCRA and CERCLA).
Sometimes, the search for relevant standards proves less than rewarding, as when residents
of Kennedy Heights learned that there were no statewide rules governing the cleanup of
petroleum spills in "sensitive areas" or when a paucity of data on Catacarb or acceptable
levels of exposure were uncovered after a release at Unocal.
Second, existing administrative processes can result in a defacto "division of labor"
among government agencies. After Conoco was targeted for SO 2 releases and benzene
contamination, the EPA and CDPHE initiated various independent and overlapping efforts.
These actions allowed Conoco to fashion a proposed SEP before citizen complaints led a
statewide public interest firm to add them as parties to in its litigation. In Richmond,
residents sought to make sense of a series of accidents as a permitting dispute progressed
through planning department, city council, and AQMD hearing processes. Each forum
involved different rules for the standing of residents as well as the issues that could be
discussed. It can take a good deal of time to identify and maneuver through available
administrative forums and remedies, as when residents of Kennedy Heights sought
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assistance from the City, TWC, RRC, EPA, and state health officials. Often the ordering
and combination of available administrative remedies, decided on an ad hoc basis, can
itself limit the extent to which residents' sense of harm and the true complexity of
environmental burdens are addressed. For example, Manchester residents, having
identified a wide range of concerns stemming from facility operations, were at first only
allowed to consider those linked to the TWC's contested hearing process. More
importantly, administrative actions and legal remedies can open only narrow windows on
the routines identified by residents. For example, oversights leading to and magnifying the
effects of Vulcan's HCL release were not relevant to an EPCRA suit (which could only
encourage fines and record submittal after the fact), while proposals such as community-led
inspections were deemed beyond the scope of Chevron's reformulated fuels project by the
city council and AQMD.
The complexity of environmental burdens and administrative actions in
environmental justice communities can severely limit the potential joint gains available to
all parties, despite their efforts to adhere to the procedural elements stressed in the
negotiation literature. Yet the uncertainty of environmental conditions perceived by a
community will heighten residents' openness to accept a suboptimal agreement. One
possible exception was the Vulcan Materials mediation in North Denver. In this case,
questions concerning organizational routines were addressed in part on an ad hoc basis by
local agencies, an administrative complaint by EPA Region VIII settled matters of
Vulcan's responsibility to the government, and a mediation process encouraged
consideration of additional routines, relationships, and the neighborhood's experiences with
broader environmental burdens. Otherwise, externally imposed (and at times immovable)
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deadlines, legally mandated agency actions and responsibilities, and parallel enforcement
actions narrowed the integrative potential of the negotiations which followed industrial
accidents.
The Facilities and Technologies Involved
Any increase in facility or technological complexity, while theoretically offering
additional options for integrative bargaining, simply made it more difficult, if not
impossible, for community-based organizations to identify the routines and more
systemic organizational concerns that if addressed would lead to an expansion of the
initial offer space. The facilities represented in the case studies span a continuum of
facility complexity, from simple crude oil storage pits to an area of rail devoted to HCL
storage and transport, to individual processing units in the Rhodia and Chevron facilities,
to multiple units in the Unocal and Conoco refineries. Technological complexity ranged
from discrete to systemic within the case studies. The greater the complexity, the more
technology-based routines were increasingly hidden from investigatory efforts. This is
because the technologies involved guided and constrained what actions the users of each
artifact could carry out and therefore, what could be proposed and agreed to during
negotiations.
Technology has an influence over dispute resolution because of the human
organizations that it encapsulates and locks into place, that are to varying degrees
immune to disruption or change. Organizational theorists have long posited that
organizations are related to the technologies that they employ, which affect the tasks,
techniques, knowledges, and tools that are set in motion and over time influence the
social order in which they are introduced. Structuring influences of a technology include
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(a) the practices that it reflects or that are demanded by its use, which stabilize through
increased usage, (b) the adaptations made to technical conditions (which can be
determined by, for example, comparing organizational charts with the social networks
that emerge after a technology's introduction), and (c) the distance between the intentions
of a technology's designers and the practices of its users. The latter occurs as social
networks that prove incompatible with the new technology are not disestablished by those
who introduce the new artifact. Technologies that proved most immune to criticism
during negotiations included pollution monitoring, risk regulation, and source reduction
methods and devices. Their narrowing influence over a dispute resolution process can
occur before an accident, through stabilized practices and adaptations that escape
detection. Narrowing can also occur during negotiation or agreement implementation,
through new roles and responsibilities necessitated by the technology and the disconnect
between the intentions of designers and users of the technology.
For example, the fenceline monitoring system set up near the Unocal refinery did
not lead to improved post-incident analysis, emergency notification, source reduction, or
even information dissemination. This was due in large part to the failure of negotiating
parties to disentangle incompatible social networks (existing monitoring officials at the
county and within the refinery) or build new networks of interests that were supposed to
be met by the technology (such as sensitive populations that required improved detection
time, the monitoring of certain compounds, linkages to the county's emergency
notification network, and a means of comparing concentrations to regulatory standards).
The technology in practice disempowered intended beneficiaries. Raw spectral data was
off limits to residents, converted by a consulting firm once a month using an
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impenetrable air dispersion modeling program, and sent to a community representative
who could not easily compare concentrations to acceptable levels. Indeed, the
technology, unbeknownst to negotiating parties, made it impossible to explore the kinds
of new monitoring efforts and relationships necessary to address future incidents similar
to the Catacarb spill: "level 2" incidents, where a dangerous substance is released over
time without the presence of a major fire or explosion. At the same time, the kind,
location, and spacing of monitors, data recording methods, compounds monitored, and
other decisions inherent in the technology closed off other emissions monitoring
solutions from deliberation.
Similarly, the site and risk assessment methods in place long before crude oil
residue was discovered at Kennedy Heights dramatically restricted the kinds of data that
could be collected, exposure pathways considered, and unique sets of questions answered
about the risks inherent in living in the subdivision. In addition, the procedures
implemented by Chevron in cooperation with the Railroad Commission did not allow
residents, regulators, and industry to more efficiently test the exposure pathways to
hydrocarbons that residents were concerned about.
Source reduction technologies, such as the plant optimization models and new
processing units at the Conoco refinery, also construct and set in motion new social
networks that have a stake in the actions that they as users of the new technologies can
carry out. These structural elements are not immediately identifiable by other
stakeholder groups. Yet they resist efforts to forge new approaches and practices that are
incompatible with the technology-based routines that are already in place.
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In the next section, we consider aspects of the dispute resolution process that were
affected by the above "structuring" variables. The following negotiation mechanics further
narrowed the range of issues and options addressed in the case studies.
























































































The Effects of Structuring Elements on Negotiation Mechanics
So far, I have discussed the following challenges that arise when environmental
justice community representatives must decide whether or not to enter a negotiation:
1. In order to manage the complexity of environmental burdens that they face,
residents develop a baseline against which they can evaluate gains or setbacks
caused by facility changes or land use decisions. Events at one or more facilities
can call attention to an unrepresentative set of changes to the baseline. The
amount of weight residents assigned to specific proposals did not reflect their true
impact on the environmental quality of a neighborhood. Therefore, baselines of
environmental quality can lead community representatives to interpretations of
proposals or the success of agreement implementation that encourage suboptimal
negotiated agreements. Environmental burdens are at times worsened by a
breakdown in either one or more discrete sets of organizational procedures, or
more systemic organizational problems that are difficult to detect, even further
restricting integrative potential.
2. The sources of disputes in environmental justice communities often include
industrial accidents or new information regarding the extent of contamination.
These events raise questions about a variety of organizational routines that allow
facility management and environmental regulators to meet environmental




standards themselves are counterintuitive, particularly when they apply to single
facilities or compounds in landscapes comprised of hundreds of emitting facilities.
Much of the initial community organizing that follows an industrial accident
involves attempts to learn the scope of human health impacts and raise questions
about the practices which exacerbated the intensity of the accident and its effects.
The extent to which routines are considered by environmental and plant managers
will help to shape the integrative potential of the negotiations that follow. The
presence of more resistant and systemic routines can dramatically limit integrative
potential.
3. The scope of environmental burdens in an overburdened community means that
multiple administrative actions are in progress before or during resident attempts
to question industry and agency routines and oversights. Existing processes
impose deadlines, legally restricting and narrowing the potential remedies. The
integrative potential of negotiations that follow is in turn constrained. Narrowing
occurs because of the order and combination of administrative activities and the
extent to which they open only a small window on the routines responsible for the
accident in question.
4. Routines inherent in a highly regulated industry such as petrochemical production
can dominate the practices, such as source reduction, pollution monitoring, and
risk regulation, that if addressed would lead to the most substantial expansion of
the negotiating space. The structures set in motion by these methods, devices, and
practices guide and constrain what users can do to promote change. The more
systemic or complex the technologies, the more hidden they may remain from the
investigatory efforts of the negotiating parties.
As residents intervened in administrative processes, filed lawsuits, or otherwise sought to
influence decision-making, these structuring elements influenced the mechanics of the
negotiations that followed.
Framing the dialogue
Two of the three assisted negotiations (Kennedy Heights and Conoco mediation)
constrained resident control over agendas to a greater extent than the negotiations with
Unocal and Rhone Poulenc. In the latter cases, and during the Vulcan mediation,
residents showed significant, though varying, degrees of control over what was discussed,
when, and in what order. But influence over agendas (through discussions with
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mediators or participation in hearing processes) was not always used to the advantage of
community representatives, for the following reasons. Each negotiation occurred in the
context of recent events, of which residents tried to make sense for purposes of
encouraging change. In order to meet broad resident objectives, dialogue had to shift
between retrospective (specifics regarding an accident and its root causes, history of
residents' sense of harm, how a given facility contributes to residents' perceived
environmental baselines) and prospective (problem-solving and relationship-building)
concerns. Community concerns often necessitated numerous shifts between the two
forms of dialogue, and means of incorporating new knowledge from one into new
considerations of the other. Three important dialogic transitions necessitated by the
unique concerns of environmental justice communities are:
* From understanding the root causes of a recent incident and the relatively
immediate problems that it raises to understanding community-wide concerns that
may or may not be related to the incident (with efforts to demonstrate a nexus
between the two);
e From presentations of community narratives regarding environmental burdens and
claims of industry responsibility to problem-solving on the two levels described
above; and
* From problem-solving informed by sufficient technical assistance, information
sharing, and joint specification of research questions and assumptions to
relationship-building that anticipates the changing representational needs of the
community.
Negotiations that allow for such transitions can protect the comparative advantages of
community representatives, including their knowledge of resident needs and the ability to
mobilize consent around new ideas and proposals, an understanding of the
interconnectedness of environmental hazards and ways in which they can be mitigated or
reduced, and an intimate understanding of how common mistakes and accidents that are
taken for granted by industry and regulators can affect people's daily lives. The
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structuring elements present in the cases, as well as an incomplete use of proper
mediation tools, did not facilitate these transitions
Negotiations focused on appropriate mitigations to a project or a small number of
agency-proposed projects or remedies. Negotiations were most productive when facility
management and residents jointly identified isolated engineering (sour water strippers,
fenceline monitor placement) or community-based (buffer zone, resident notification)
problems to solve. When such problem-solving proceeding from an understanding of
community-wide concerns and served as a means of building relationships, the results
were positively evaluated (this only occurred in Swansea-Elyria). When problem-solving
ignored broader concerns (Conoco mediation, Chevron MOU) or was not linked to
proper oversight or relationship building (Manchester, Unocal GNA), outcomes were not
favorably interpreted by some of the factions that emerged prior to negotiations.
Unstable zones ofpossible agreement
A second powerful negotiation mechanic that shaped outcomes was the "zone of
possible agreement" (ZOPA) in each case. As discussed earlier, negotiation theorists
identify several elements of a negotiation that influence whether a settlement will be
reached. First, each party enters the negotiation with a sense of other situations where
alternative negotiated agreements could be pursued in the event of an impasse. To
identify their "best alternative to a negotiated agreement" (BATNA), negotiators will ask
themselves what is the best outcome that I can hope for if the current negotiation fails to
yield an agreement? A second boundary to a negotiation is set by what is called the
reservation level, or the minimum acceptable settlement within the current negotiation.
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Negotiators often know their own reservation price (e.g., a contribution of $100,000 or
assurances that flaring will be cut in half) but have scant information about other parties'
reservation values. It is important to recognize that BATNA's and reservation levels are
usually not equal: in cases where what is offered does not meet a party's reservation
level, that party may still elect to settle, given the uncertainty of alternative situations.
The area between parties' reservation levels represents the ZOPA. Agreements that fall
within the ZOPA are better than each party's reservation level. The upper bounds of a
negotiation are set by parties' "target levels," or the best outcome that they expect from
all possible negotiations, discounted back to the present. Of course, there is a wide range
of ways in which parties can make use of their subjective knowledge of BATNA's,
reservation levels, and targets to guide them through a negotiation.
The structuring elements present in the case study disputes make it difficult for
community representatives to identify appropriate ZOPA's for the negotiations in which
they are involved. At the same time, they limit the ZOPA by closing off routines and
practices that only briefly came to light following an industrial accident. First,
representatives set reservation levels for a negotiation, but their perceived environmental
baselines make it difficult to set the most appropriate number. Residents who described
the environmental quality of their neighborhood as improving were also more willing to
accept minimal advances in environmental quality through settlement. When they
perceived worsening conditions, regardless of whether they were related to the facility
involved in a negotiation, residents were more likely set a reservation level for
improvements beyond the scope of what facility management views as acceptable.
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Second, procedural and time pressures from external processes and the
complexity of environmental burdens can increase the need for closure for residents that
are party to a negotiation. Thus, in all but one of the cases, representatives of
environmental justice communities settled below their reservation level. Indeed, a
surprising result was the fact that settlement was reached in each of the cases, despite the
tendency described in the literature about settlements for them to fall through when it is
perceived that opponents benefit more than community representatives (as could clearly
be argued in each case). One would expect that fairness norms would factor heavily in
the results of negotiations with environmental justice communities. The literature on
negotiation analysis discussed in Chapter 2 would also predict that environmental justice
communities focus more on what they would like to get (targets, such as relocation,
major production process changes) than what they would be willing to accept or could
expect from alternative venues, as occurs when parties adhere to strong norms of fairness.
The cases suggest that fairness norms and high reservation prices in the face of perceived
declines in environmental baselines, though important, did not greatly influence
negotiation outcomes. These were usually swamped by pressures external to the
negotiations, caused by parallel processes or additional threats to environmental quality.
Small, certain advances in the face of such pressures were assigned greater value than if
they had been subjected to dispassionate analysis and comparison, as has been suggested
in the behavioral decision-making literature by Kahneman and Tversky.
The strong focus on reservation prices was due in part to either the uncertainty or
undesirability of community representatives' BATNA's. One potential BATNA in the
case studies was the penalty a company was expected to pay as a result of a lawsuit.
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Even when the likelihood of success on the merits in a lawsuit was high, the proceeds
could not be used to improve affected communities. Another potential BATNA was the
result of a permitting process. Residents in each of the cases shared the sense that
permits were going to be issued eventually, even though residents could encourage delays
that posed some risk to the project applicants. Thus, resident negotiators focused on
reservation levels, which led to a certain amount of dissatisfaction in the broader
community. A reservation level is the minimum level for an issue that a negotiator is
willing to accept. It is not the same as a broader community's resistance point, which is
the least favorable outcome that is needed to encourage all of a party's constituencies to
accept an agreement. As could be surmised from the characteristics of an environmental
justice community, resistance points are the most difficult of all to estimate and satisfy.
Not all constituencies are identified until post-settlement, if ever. Their needs will rarely
overlap with the potential changes and solutions offered by the most current negotiation.
Thus, it becomes extremely important for community representatives to transition
dialogue to these broader concerns and to use them to set appropriate reservation levels.
Again, external factors make it nearly impossible to even begin to identify resistance
points. The only successful example in the present case studies occurred during the
Vulcan mediation, but only as a result of years' worth of interaction and planning with
the broader community prior to an HCL release.
Reservation prices, which set bounds on minimal acceptable settlement results,
were the focus of environmental justice representatives. BATNA's were less important.
However, the sources of residents' BATNA's (the parallel processes that were already in
progress) did help to shape the negotiators' perceived zone of possible agreement. For
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example, the EPA maintains guidelines for the out-of-court settlement of EPCRA and
other causes of action. So while potential fines in the Vulcan case totaled $9.9 million,
the guidelines encouraged settlement that represented a small fraction of court-imposed
penalties. A different set of expectations governs consideration of the Supplemental
Environmental Projects that are often used to resolve administrative complaints. And as
the number of regulators acting on a facility increases, the ZOPA for resident-negotiators
can be altered in unpredictable or counterintuitive ways, as illustrated by the Conoco
mediation. Permitting processes also help to shape what parties will consider to be
appropriate ZOPA's, by defining the scope of the "project" under consideration and how
its connection to proposed mitigation is determined. Thus, the availability of these
alternatives shaped how residents approached settlement, rather than the likelihood that
they would reach agreement.
Making and judging proposals, tradeoffs
The broader boundaries of a negotiation's ZOPA are set in large part by
representatives' reservation prices, a community's BATNA, and structuring elements that
close off essential considerations. The limits on negotiation constrained the framing of
proposals. Despite the limits on the technical assistance available, community
representatives invariably fashioned inventive proposals for improving emergency
preparedness, community-corporate relations, facility operations, pollution monitoring,
citizen involvement, and aesthetic improvements. Proposals such as the Swansea
Community Park plan and the Community Warning Committee's efforts to improve
Unocal's classification and response to certain incidents required substantial amounts of
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community resources, particularly time. Residents proved particularly innovative in
identifying how accidents would affect a community at-large as well as its most sensitive
members, and how they could work with facility management to decrease notification
times and increase the speed of information sharing in the event of an emergency.
Unfortunately, it was often these comparatively low-cost suggestions (e.g., community
odor and spill patrol teams, citizen monitors to participate in activation of public
notification systems, and other attempts to fundamentally change community-corporate
relationships) that were rejected by industry. Many of these proposals were low-cost
solutions to some of the root causes of resident concerns, particularly problematic
organizational routines. While it is difficult to know for sure why companies rejected
these ideas (while at the same time making substantially more expensive investments in
financial contributions and community development projects), their hesitancy can be
linked in part to uncertainty. Particularly when one is negotiating with the owners of a
complex facility such as a refinery, with an established hierarchy, working groups, and
procedures for handling emissions and accidents, costs to the firm have to be measured in
ways other than the sheer monetary value of the proposed change. A firm will attach a
high value to proposed changes in organizational culture. I also found that regulators
were unwilling to encourage fundamental changes in how they interact with industry or
the public. For example, the experience of Crockett and Rodeo residents with fenceline
monitoring suggests that agencies are hesitant to give up their monopoly over air quality
monitoring.
What kinds of proposals were appealing to industry representatives? As hinted,
promises of financial contributions were made early and continuously. Often, proposals
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that involved one-time or predictable financial contributions to put toward landscaping,
buffers, or even isolated changes to facility components were readily accepted. More
importantly, facility managers were able to anticipate changes in regulations, what other
firms in their industry were planning, and what agencies would require them to carry out
later in a permitting process. These anticipated changes led to many of the proposals
made by industry. In Manchester, facility audits, sulfur dioxide monitoring, emissions
summaries, and other elements of the agreement with Rhone Poulenc were already called
for by the state. Improvements to the community warning system were not required but
were already under development through a region-wide effort. The use of bellows valves
by Chevron and Unocal was required to some degree by the Air Quality Management
District. Sulfur dioxide emissions reductions made by Conoco were going to be required
by the Justice Department, as were improvements to fugitive emissions monitoring at
several facilities.
Thus, it was often the case that residents were left in a position to accept tradeoffs
between (a) their own proposals for citizen involvement and changes to organizational
practices and (b) financial contributions, isolated landscaping and equipment changes,
and slight improvements over existing practices based on anticipated regulatory or
industry shifts. As noted by residents in each case, it was nearly impossible to place a
dollar value on the true worth of their proposals, particularly when their implementation
could be accomplished at minimal expense. By the time it became clear that these kinds
of trades would have to be made, external time pressures and the actions of regulators
encouraged residents to accept concessions that clustered at the lower end of the
bargaining spectrum.
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Bringing Structure and Process Together: Structuration as the Narrowing of Integrative
Potential
The unique structural dynamics that influenced the framing of the dialogue, the
shape of zones of possible agreement, and tradeoffs in the negotiations discouraged
parties from reaching fully integrative agreements. In theory, the potential for an
integrative negotiation increases as the number of parties and issues for discussion
increase, and the manner in which aspects of the negotiation are valued becomes more
diverse. Under these circumstances, parties can search for ways to set up a deal that will
benefit each party more than the simple division of one or more assets. Even if parties all
want the same things, it is still possible to reach an integrative solution, as long as each
side places different values on different elements. In environmental justice negotiations,
parties most certainly have different interests (e.g., security, certainty, recognition,
economic gain), as well as interests that they value differently. As an example of the
latter, residents want steps taken that will increase their security from accidental releases
while facility managers desire security in the form of continuous production. Residents
want stability in the form of steadily reduced emissions, fewer episodes, and more
predictable facility operations. Managers value stable relations with agency monitors and
rule enforcers and a stable internal culture and division of responsibilities across various
employee roles. They may place different values on time, influenced by the urgency of
needed environmental improvements, deadlines, or levels of risk aversion. Residents
may give greater weight to costs imposed on future generations than their private
counterparts. Each side may assign different odds to anticipated outcomes. For example,
if a facility believes that certain raw material costs will increase while a community
group anticipates lower costs, they might both agree to tie financial contributions to the
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plant's future profit margins, with each side able to live with the anticipated outcome. In
addition, parties may have access to different kinds of information, skills, or capabilities
that can be combined to form the basis of an agreement. The possibilities for reaching an
integrative settlement among multiple parties are fairly unbounded in theory.
In practice, five of the six negotiated agreements analyzed did not achieve the
integrative potential that the range of issues and interests involved suggest. There
appeared to be barriers to reaching integrative solutions in this context, represented by
external structuring elements that shaped the negotiation space:
1. Dialogue did not transition from a limited range of concerns brought about by
an incident to broader interests stemming from the true extent of
environmental burdens. This limit on the negotiation space was the result of
the severity and complexity of environmental burdens, the uneven nature of
contamination, structuring elements (hidden systemic practices and
technological solutions) that closed off essential lessons learned following
industrial accidents, and pressures exerted by parallel administrative
processes and external norms ofsettlement.
2. When problem-solving did occur, it was linked to institutionalized
expectations for settlement, such as appropriate SEP's or settlement ranges.
When relationship-building was considered, it was linked (with the exception
of the Vulcan mediation) to relatively unimaginative advisory committees or
means of sharing information gathered by the company. This limit within the
negotiation space differed by case according to the unique ordering and
combination of administrative norms and solution mechanisms.
3. Reservation prices, which have to shift in directions that expand the ZOPA
and make reaching agreement more likely, were not properly used by
residents who relied on perceived environmental baselines for their
delineation. Residents at times both over- and underestimated the minimum
level of environmental quality changes expected from a negotiation, and
sometimes based these estimates on an environmental medium or proposed
mitigation that offered less-than-optimal improvements over the status quo.
This limit within the negotiation space was encouraged by the uncertainty of
threats to environmental quality and the uneven nature of contamination
across constituencies, parallel processes, and a lack ofperfect knowledge
regarding more systemic facility- and industry-wide solutions (engineering
and managerial) that would address resistance points (least favorable
outcomes needed to satisfy one's constituencies) rather than reservation levels.
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4. Proposals that made the most effective use of resident skills and comparative
advantages were often the first to be rejected by facility management. The
kinds of tradeoffs that followed involved the substitution of financial
considerations, uncertain data gathering efforts, or industry-anticipated
changes for more cost-effective measures of achieving citizen involvement in
monitoring, oversight, and emergency response. Industry-initiated proposals
were more prone to distributive bargaining than integration of a diversity of
resident and facility interests. Residents accepted proposals toward the lower
end of these bargaining continua. This limit within the negotiation space was
due to structuring elements that closed off essential lessons learned following
industrial accidents from deliberation (systemic managerial and engineering
routines) and internal environmental and facility management's valuation of
changes to organizational culture, lack of control over information, and the
costs of legitimizing resident's ability to gather such data.
What do the structuring variables that we have considered, and their influences
over negotiation mechanics in community-corporate negotiations, tell us about the limits
to integrative bargaining theory in environmentally overburdened communities? More
importantly, where can process managers (such as mediators) intervene to more
productively encourage an expansion of the solution space given the structural constraints
at work? The literature on integrative bargaining remains focused on a series of tactics
(such as nonspecific compensation and bridging) that have been popularized and applied
to a growing number of real-world contexts, through training courses, negotiation
simulations used in university coursework, and the expressed values of professional
mediators. Yet as we have seen, structural variables, such as administrative procedures
set in motion by an accident and organizational routines at work within petrochemical
facilities, can limit or even overwhelm efforts to reach integrative solutions. In part, such
narrowing is accomplished through an interaction between structural variables and group
biases, such as improperly defined ZOPA's, institutionalized notions of how settlements
should be defined, and the rejection of low-cost proposals that speak to relationship- and
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trust-building among residents, facility managers, and regulators. The extent to which
structural forces can constrain integrative potential, regardless of the presence or absence
of what the literature would tout as acceptable procedural tactics, may at first glance
suggest a marginal role for the process manager, at least in the context of
environmentally overburdened communities. On the contrary, I argue that a clearer
understanding of the interaction between structural realities and the reactions of
negotiation parties, or structure and agency as they are labeled in social theory, points to
even more valuable roles for mediators.
Fortunately, there is a rich literature on how human actors and the structural
features of the contexts in which they find themselves interact, beginning with Giddens'
notion of structuration.506 This seemingly impenetrable literature actually offers some
practical lessons for those concerned with meeting integrative potential in a negotiation.
The process of structuration occurs through the regular actions of individuals, which
leads to the formation of patterns of interaction and standardized practices (e.g., defined
roles and responsibilities, modes of decision-making, and approaches to learning). 50 7 It is
the habitual use of these emergent practices that leads to their institutionalization. The
process is reciprocal, because actors then draw upon certain institutional properties in
their ongoing interactions, which in turn strengthen and reinforce the structural properties
of existing institutions. In this formulation, actors' knowledge and ability to react to
various situations is limited by "the situated nature of action, the difficulty of articulating
tacit knowledge, unconscious sources of motivation, and unintended consequences of
action."508 In short, structure, defined as the institutions in which we operate, is "both a
product and a constraint on human action."5 09 From this high level of abstraction, we can
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quickly return to our practical negotiation setting by describing Giddens' model for how
the two domains of individual action and institutional structure interact.
The model begins with what Giddens refers to as "structure" and others have
labeled the "institutional realm," 510 representing a framework of rules that have
accumulated through previous actions and interactions. The institutional realm consists
of systems of domination, signification, and legitimation. There is also a realm of
action, defined as the actual arrangements of people, objects, and events that emerge as
a social setting unfolds. How do the two realms interact? Giddens argues that
institutions are encoded in actors' existing knowledge base as interpretive schemes,
resources, or norms.5 12 Individuals make use of these scripts, or behavioral regularities,
and in so doing the scripts allow for the institutional realm to shape how people
communicate, enact power, and sanction certain behaviors while rewarding others.51 3
Figure 8 illustrates this process of structuration.
Figure 8. Structuration Model.
Structure signification domination * legitimation
(modality) interpretative facility norm
scheme I I
Interaction communication power sanction
When discussing a day-to-day interaction such as a negotiation process, the notion of
scripts is empirically helpful. Defined as "observable, recurrent activities and patterns of
interaction characteristic of a particular setting," scripts are the means through which
individual and group practices and understandings accumulate and set conditions for
future action. They have been defined elsewhere in the literature as "routines" or
"schemata," but in each case these concepts represent similar phenomena. Schemata
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"both constitute and structure knowledge by identifying those elements of a situation that
are salient and by describing the causal relations between them," providing templates for
action, goals that direct attention to certain elements of a situation, and identities that link
individuals to preestablished roles. 5 Routines are "repetitive, recognizable pattern[s] of
interdependent actions," and tend to refer to behavioral regularities involving multiple
actors.516 A small literature on each has emerged, but in noticing the similarities across
them, we can make use of the prescriptive advice each provides for how such regularities
can be identified and changed.
Barley and Tolbert have isolated four means through which Giddens' two realms
of institution and action interact. In this model, vertical motion represents institutional
constraints (structure) while diagonal motion represents maintenance or change of an
institution through action (agency). The four means of interaction, or "moments," are as
follows:
a. Encoding (a in Figure 9): Institutional principles are encoded in scripts, as
organizational rules and procedures are internalized, appropriate behaviors are
interpreted, and technical designs force actors to engage in certain patterns of
activity.
b. Enactment (b in Figure 9): Actors then follow scripts that have been encoded,
using standardized rationales when they are aware that they are doing so, but
often following them without being aware of their origin.
c. Revision or Replication (c in Figure 9): Events such as technological shifts,
market adjustments, and contacts across different organizational cultures can
lead to modifications of scripts. However, since each preexisting arrangement
of scripts represents the outcome of a previous negotiation, there will
inevitably be actors who will resist reopening those deliberations to collective
questioning.
d. Externalization (d in Figure 9): Following replication or revision, patterned
behaviors or scripts are externalized, or separated from specific actors or
circumstances. From this point, scripts become more difficult to identify,
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isolate, and criticize, as their relationship to the interests of individual actors
becomes less clear. 518
The interactions between each of these moments are illustrated in Figure 9:
Figure 9. Sequential Model of Institutionalization.
Institutional Realm
a d
Scripts at T1 scri ts at ScritsatT3
b/ c
Realm of Action
The task for negotiation theorists, particularly those who advance integrative
bargaining as a superior approach to collective decision-making, is to "identify the forces
in the interactional setting and beyond that produce the observed outcomes and to link the
findings to other indicators of institutional change."'519 Meaning, if a given setting, such
as community-corporate negotiations following an industrial accident, consistently yields
suboptimal results despite its integrative potential, the forces both within and without the
setting that lead to the results must be identified. This dissertation has set out the key
forces, both in terms of negotiation mechanics (in the interactional setting) and structure
(beyond), that led to agreements that did not represent a positive shift in the initial offer
space, despite the efforts of parties, particularly community-based organizations, to
engage in integrative tactics such as cost-cutting, logrolling, and nonspecific
compensation.
A theory of narrowing of integrative potential posits that negotiation can be
viewed as occurring within a structuration process, where parties try to find common
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ground amidst the encoding, enactment, and revision or replication of scripts. It is this
cycling of scripts that inevitably will lead to a narrowing of integrative potential. I have
identified the scripts and shown how each of them plays a part in restricting what can
happen in a community-corporate negotiation. When parties draw upon them in their
interactions with other stakeholders, the result is a restraint on human action, or what is
possible in this unique context. This theory suggests that some of the recurrent activities
and patterns of interaction in the negotiation setting will be practically immune to
revision, influencing the structuration process while remaining hidden from the view of
negotiating parties. The task of the mediator is to work within such as process, adjusting
what elements of the structuration process are accessible to the parties while mitigating
the effects of those that will go undetected throughout the negotiation. In practice, this
means that in a negotiation setting that includes a collection of rules, norms, and roles
that are resilient to the idiosyncratic preferences of individuals, the mediator needs to
focus not only on procedural, strategic, and power imbalance concerns, as would be
suggested by rational choice and agency perspectives. To assist with integrative
bargaining in a highly regulated, institutionalized context, the mediator must recognize
that stakeholder preferences are endogenous, and that they are altered and restricted by
structural forces, operating through the scripts that they generate, that change how
negotiating groups define their self-interest. In a highly institutionalized context,
mediators must therefore play an integral role in helping to shape stakeholder
preferences, or risk ceding much of the integrative potential of dispute resolution
processes in highly institutionalized contexts. Traditionally known as a process advocate,
a mediator must also consider how to
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(a) alter or disrupt what is in practice a narrow range of identifiable scripts that
threaten the integrative potential of a negotiation;
(b) make negotiators aware of how existing preferences are prone to the kinds of
biases that scripts encourage; and
(c) help parties, particularly stakeholder groups that are newly or informally
organized, formulate new preferences that are less prone to the influence of existing
scripts, both identifiable and hidden.
In order to successfully carry out these new roles, mediators need to become adept
at recognizing how institutionalized, or structural forces intersect with a negotiation space,
which occurs within a small window that is opened on the broader cycling of scripts.
Most structural variables that we considered in the case studies operate at each stage of
the structuration process. They generate scripts that are followed and, if they avoid
scrutiny or detection, become increasingly separated from the actors or specific context
of any given negotiation. Some of them are, at least in part, invisible in terms of their
influence over the scripts that are then used to identify salient elements of the negotiation
process, describe causal relations between them, prescribe templates for action, and
influence the goals and identities of the actors. I enclose such variables in parentheses in
the figure below. Once these variables appear in the form of scripts followed or
standardized rationales expressed, very few of them remain available for use in order to
revise the scripts that were followed before, during, and immediately after the industrial
accident that led to the negotiation. We have witnessed how difficult it is to essentially
disrupt an existing pattern of script replication, and how the predominant structure in
which human actors attempt to operate severely narrows any opportunity for expansion of
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the zone of possible agreement. How the narrowing of integrative potential occurs has
been demonstrated through several major structural conditions, each of which represents
recurrent activities, behaviors, or patterns of interaction that were either in place prior to
an industrial accident or waiting to be set in motion.





I. Scripts Responsible for Multiple, Severe Environmental Burdens; Uneven Nature of Contamination
2. Agency/Facility Immediate Responses to Crisis (interpretations of accidents, limits to data-gathering, mitigations to projects, fines)
3. Identifiable Environmental and Plant Management Routines and Isolated Engineering Solutions
4. Ordering and Combination of Administrative Remedies for a Unique Industrial Accident
5. Systemic Facility-Wide or Technology-Based Routines Hidden from Investigatory Efforts
6. Finn Internal Decision-Making Stnucture and Valuation Methods for Proposed Changes to Existing Practices
* the two arrows leading from the realm of action back to scripts represent replication and revision, respectively
The structural variables that played such an important role in shaping the case study
outcomes, when mapped within a process of script formation and replication,
demonstrate the essential role of the mediator in managing a negotiated process. In fact,
it is structure in a highly institutionalized context and the limits that it places (narrowing
effects) on what is possible in a negotiation that renders the mediator most relevant, as I
will demonstrate below.
Some of the structural variables in Figure 10, existing as scripts prior to industrial
accidents, do not lend themselves to consideration by the parties within a limited window
of opportunity following an industrial accident. I identified systemic, facility-wide as
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well as technology-based routines that only a sustained data gathering effort, involving
sources of information unavailable in the immediate aftermath of an accident, could
unearth (denoted by the number five in Figure 10). Similarly, a facility owner's parent
corporation follows an internal decision-making structure and values options within the
context of such facility-wide optimization initiatives, which are also difficult to link to an
isolated set of problems exposed by an accident (number six, above). These two
variables materialize as scripts that cycle through and sometimes even past a negotiation,
in the form of recurrent activities and patterns of interaction, rules and the arrangements
of people they encourage, and institutional properties that leave their mark on all of the
above.
Similarly, an accumulation of rules in the institutional realm produces the unique
mix of environmental burdens experienced by a community. This accumulation
materializes prior to an accident or negotiation (number I in Figure 10). Environmental
management procedures are internalized within facilities and regulatory bodies, actors
within these organizations engage in certain patterns of interaction, and these groupings
of procedures, behaviors viewed as appropriate, and patterns of interaction leave facilities
more prone to pollution episodes or make it more difficult to identify and clean up
contaminated sites. The severity and uneven nature of the environmental burdens that
result are at least in part understood by stakeholders prior to a negotiation. As we have
seen, however, it takes a sustained effort months or even years prior to a negotiation to
prepare community representatives to appreciate and accurately gauge the environmental
burdens that they face. This structural variable can only be detected within a negotiation
in the form of the immediate response scripts of agency and facility officials to a crisis
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(number 2), and a severely limited set of identifiable routines and engineering solutions
that lend themselves to identification and consideration (number 3). The combination of
scripts generated by structural variables 2 and 3 constitutes the integrative potential
available after the remainder of the structural variables acted upon the negotiation space,
in large part because, as shown in Figure 10, they were the only scripts that lent
themselves to revision by the negotiating parties (denoted by the arrow on the far right in
Figure 10).
A final set of scripts, relating to the ordering of administrative remedies due to the
division of labor among regulatory agencies (number 4 in Figure 10), emerged in unique
combination after each accident. The sheer clustering of environmental burdens and the
fact that each accident occurred at a different point along agencies' regulatory timelines
means that the precise set of administrative processes, standards, and other scripts
directed at an isolated accident is never replicated. Thus, these scripts influence the
structure of a negotiation after an accident occurs, but are not available in the same
combination for future accidents. They, too, are replicated and cycle back into the
institutional realm following the completion of a negotiated process.
Structure Matters: Negotiation Process Innovations and Inaccessible Scripts
Negotiation theorists may object to a structural account of the limits to integrative
bargaining, and argue that it ignores new process techniques in the mediation literature.
Innovations such as joint fact-finding or post-settlement adaptations could be used in a
highly institutionalized context where existing scripts (patterns of interaction in an
organization) need to be broken down over time as parties solve problems or implement
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agreements. It could also be argued that failure to reach integrative potential has more to
do with a lack of effective mediation, both pre- and post-agreement, than structural
concerns. True joint fact-finding, for example, was not carried out in the cases.520 Joint
fact-finding occurs when stakeholders identify issues that need to be analyzed and related
technical information that is unavailable. A mediator then suggests engineers and others
with technical expertise who can answer such questions, and guides the parties to an
agreement over the choice of experts, assumptions underlying their proposed analyses,
and even methods for interpreting findings before they are issued, preferably in a way
that non-technical stakeholders can understand. Similarly, a mediator can work with the
parties to develop monitoring arrangements to keep track of implementation, administer
funds necessary to compensate for unexpected outcomes, and coordinate further data
gathering.521 An agreement that helps parties adapt to unexpected events increases the
integrative potential of a negotiation, because different stakeholder estimates of likely
outcomes can be used to make tradeoffs while ensuring that no party is overwhelmed
when their estimates prove inaccurate.
To some extent, the call for better use of process innovations for dispute
resolution applies to the case studies. Indeed, the only negotiation to reach its integrative
potential (following an HCL release in Swansea-Elyria) did so because a mediation team
carefully guided the parties through problem-solving and relationship-building (including
the use of contingencies) once community-wide concerns were gathered and translated
into working proposals. However, the negotiation also took place in the least
institutionalized setting of the six that were considered, where hydrochloric acid storage
at a railroad transfer station was the most complex task involved. In the other cases,
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merely crafting data gathering exercises to proceed from shared assumptions among the
parties (or agreements that can be revisited and adjusted at a later date) would not be
sufficient to unearth scripts already separated from the actors or the specific context of a
conflict, and not discoverable by the mediator. Such "invisible" scripts (numbered 5 and
6 in Figure 10) could not be used to revise organizational routines as part of a negotiation.
These particular patterns of interaction within the organizations were not recognizable, if
at all, until negotiating parties experimented with new technologies, monitoring
approaches, and other environmental management techniques after agreements were
reached. Invisible scripts can not be fully anticipated through contingencies prior to the
start of this experimental, post-agreement phase. Invisible scripts also demand something
more than mere adaptation, which effective mediation offers to parties post-settlement.
The most embedded scripts can only be disrupted or altered by organizational change,
which occurs when people and organizations abandon familiar routines and learn new
ways of doing things. By comparison, adaptation, even when more effectively used by
mediators to encourage parties to alter scripts that can be identified during a mediation
process (categories I through 4 in Figure 10), helps to maintain the broader status quo in
terms of more hidden organizational practices. Let us consider the three in-depth case
studies for evidence of the limited effectiveness of even advanced mediation techniques
such as joint fact-finding and adaptation through contingent agreements.
The Kennedy Heights mediation was court-ordered after joint completion of site
and risk assessment activities by a state agency (RRC) and regulated entity (Chevron).
The mediation context benefited from a lack of ongoing, complex petrochemical
operations following contamination of the soil at Kennedy Heights. Because of this,
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there were not as many of the more identifiable scripts in play, such as isolated
engineering solutions, for use during mediation. Instead, the interaction between
Chevron and RRC reflected longstanding internal decision-making, technology-based,
and valuation routines within both organizations that I was only partially able to unearth
by collecting years' worth of internal correspondence from the organizations. A skilled
mediator certainly could use joint fact-finding techniques to avoid the replication of some
of the data gathering limits and environmental management routines within the RRC, but
the sheer volume of assumptions employed by private contractors hired by Chevron and
relied upon by RRC, as well as scripts that governed the close coordination of their
operations, could not be addressed during site characterization. These assumptions,
which accumulated over several years of data gathering when incentives to reach a
negotiated settlement did not exist, severed data gathering from resident narratives of
exposure to hydrocarbons before a mediator even theoretically could become involved in
the dispute. Efforts to include resident narratives of exposure in any joint fact-finding
would lead to additional costs that RRC was in no position to absorb, and would not
account for the lack of balance in the RRC/Chevron relationship and the kinds of ad hoc
choices that RRC made because of severe resource constraints. In short, the information
that primary stakeholders needed to negotiate a joint fact-finding process was locked
within private contractors, particularly those employed by Chevron. I was only able to
extract this information after-the-fact through extensive document review; the data could
not be generated though a standard conflict assessment by a professional mediator. If a
joint fact-finding process was in place, it would lead to minor adaptations by the
RRC/Chevron but leave their fundamental relationship, the true root cause of continued
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resident exposure to toxic chemicals, intact. The limits to integrative bargaining, even
with perfect information and use of every process innovation at the mediator's disposal,
would persist, as they are linked to organizational change requirements that go beyond
any single dispute.
The same inability to discover the true root causes of an industrial accident was
found in the negotiations that followed the Unocal Catacarb spill. Effective mediation
can address such shortcomings as the anchoring effects of a draft settlement,
representational challenges within the several distinct communities, and even perhaps the
span of available windows of opportunity for negotiation. A skilled mediator can identify
the parties' interests and ensure that some of the more pressing concerns among the
parties, such as technological fixes, are implemented through use of contingent
agreements. Contingent agreements can anticipate how technologies such as a fenceline
monitoring system might introduce their own sets of expected behaviors and limitations
of operation. Coping with an endless stream of data, calibration, cross-referencing, and
interpretation problems, and links to community notification can be better managed post-
settlement. Conflict assessments ensure that proposals such as new roles for residents in
plant inspection, pollution patrols and citizen monitoring, and early warning are not so
readily removed from the agenda. And residents can be better prepared to insist on more
than the mere replication of previously agreed-to permit conditions by the refinery, if the
mediation process has access to and considers all publicly-available information at the
time of the dispute. Yet conflict assessment, contingencies, and other process
innovations would not have unearthed the organizational changes needed to avoid "future
catacarbs," the stated goal of all parties. Scripts governing how refinery workers at all
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levels of the organization reconcile interpretations of refinery condition changes, bring
bits of organizational memory across refinery units at times of crisis, attempt to decouple
the effects of unit stabilization efforts from broader input-output trends, ineffectively
promote dialogue and interaction across divisions, and discourage workers from taking
potential outcomes of their decisions to their logical conclusions before they acted, were
entirely "black boxed" before negotiations began. These scripts were not even identified
by the parties during extensive interviews regarding the accident and negotiation process,
which I conducted when the stakeholders had the benefit of hindsight as they shared with
me their interests and bargaining positions. A review of every single proposal and good
neighbor agreement element across multiple drafts and working group reports (Chapter 4,
Appendix B) reveals that these organizational change variables did not once appear on
the proposed agenda of even one stakeholder. Encouraging organizational change in a
way that will avoid future escalation of routine accidents can not be implemented by even
including a representative sample of top-level and lower-ranking refinery officers in a
mediated process, as is noted in the literature5 22 - the necessary changes in this case were
only discovered through review of thousands of pages of interview transcripts with every
single employee at the facility across a two-week period. The data gathering and process
adaptations available to a mediator would have been linked to script types 1-4, producing
real joint gains for the parties but leaving the most important organizational changes on
the table.
Effective mediation at first glance holds more promise for a process such as the
Conoco negotiation. Settlement talks directed by a professional mediator began months
after EPA and Conoco sought resolution of demands made by Region VIII and CDPHE.
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In fact, the issue of sulfur dioxide emissions was on refinery management's agenda since
1990 through ongoing efforts such as trend and incident analysis. A mediator could
sense the momentum that led the above parties to seek a supplemental environmental
project that met their demands while also including residents, represented by COPIRG.
The SEP addressed some of the more readily identifiable scripts at work within the
refinery, and called for isolated engineering solutions. More effective mediation could
also address the ordering and combination of administrative remedies, creating a space
for resident demands for continuous monitoring and other improvements to be more
carefully considered. But the internal decision-making structure within Conoco for
adjusting emissions over time (including nine environmental initiatives and a division of
roles and responsibilities designed to stay within permit requirements) and the state
agency's relationship with Conoco (which is what led to a lack of enforcement of
inspection results, particularly for hazardous waste as opposed to sulfur dioxide) were not
addressed by the mediator or the parties. More systemic change within either the
Conoco-CDPHE monitoring and enforcement relationship or how refinery workers
responded to broader regulatory shifts by assigning new roles and incentives to
engineering groups, operators, mechanical personnel, and planners was never requested
by the parties. Nor would they have been accessible to the parties within the timeframe
offered by the court or Conoco's broader attempts to address sulfur emissions.
Considering the use of advanced mediation techniques reveals the true limits to
integrative bargaining in a highly institutionalized setting. Negotiations occur within a
structuration process, amidst the encoding, enactment, and replication of scripts. Some
scripts avoid detection even when a crisis such as an industrial accident opens a brief
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window on how an organization makes decisions and meets its objectives. Facing new
scrutiny, a petrochemical operation or regulatory agency will adapt itself to anticipate the
changing institutions that regulate its environment, in order to protect its legitimacy. 523
The accidents that I considered cost refinery owners millions of dollars and were easily
preventable at a fraction of their ultimate cost. They attest to how inefficient methods of
production persist in the petrochemical industry, where organizations incorporate
externally legitimated formal structures, despite their inefficiency, to satisfy the need for
legitimacy in the eyes of regulators and shareholders alike. 524 After an industrial accident,
firms adapt so they comply with new expectations, such as the kinds of federal
regulations that drove most of the negotiations I considered. But it is the desire for
legitimacy that drives those adaptations. True organizational change, leading to real
efficiencies of production, monitoring, communications, and organizational learning, is
hindered by the efforts of petrochemical facilities to conform to new legitimizing
requirements (including those that are the subject of a post-accident negotiation).
Leading organizations away from the goal of legitimacy and closer to real efficiencies
will require more than process innovations such as post-settlement adaptations and the
joint exploration of interests and data gathering. It will require negotiation theorists,
professional mediators, and agencies that promote the use of alternative dispute
resolution to suggest new roles for neutral third parties. These roles should be discussed,
debated, and adopted while understanding that what mediators can accomplish is limited
by the level of organizational change (abandoning routines that people at all levels of an
organization are familiar with and learning new ways to approach longstanding
challenges) that can occur within the kinds of organizations they bring to the table.
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New Roles for Mediators
How would a mediator, or the parties themselves for that matter, be able to make
sense of structural forces, particularly before a negotiation process commences? Giddens'
theory, extended by Barley and Tolbert, suggests that structure and agency will interact in
the scripts or routines enacted by each of the stakeholders. It would be far too great a
task to ask a mediator, or a party to a proposed negotiation, to identify the (even partial)
extent to which scripts are replicated or revised before they subsequently become
externalized, or removed from specific circumstances. Rather, a mediator can play a role
within the identifiable scripts that influence a negotiation and are subject to either
replication or revision as the parties reach agreement (numbers 2 and 3 in Figure 10).
She can also play a vital role in shoring up and even influencing preferences so that they
are not altered or restricted by structural forces in ways that reduce the integrative
potential of a negotiation space (particularly by the scripts that operate undetected), or the
potential for broader organizational change.
Altering or disrupting identifiable scripts that threaten integrative potential. First,
the mediator can consider the degree to which identifiable scripts (numbers 2 and 3 in
Figure 10) are embedded, defined as "the overlap between artifacts and expectations
generated from routine performances and those generated from the enactment of other
structures."5 25 For example, the more existing scripts for settling a particular
environmental case, monitoring fugitive releases at an oil refinery, or handling citizen
complaints within an agency, among others, are strongly embedded in other structures,
such as guidance documents, a hierarchical organizational structure, or standard operating
procedures that suggest certain information is useful while other data are not, the more
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difficult it will be to open them up for deliberation. Scripts, or routines, may be bound up
with one of three kinds of structures: technological, coordination, and cultural.5 26 The
kinds of structures in which scripts are embedded matters a great deal for the integrative
potential of a negotiation. Let us consider the above structures in order to provide
examples of how a mediator could identify certain scripts and the structures in which they
are embedded, determine the kinds of resources needed to open these structures for
deliberation, and in so doing expand the initial offer space in a community-corporate
negotiation. These structures also can tell us about how a mediator should approach her
new role as a crucial actor in how negotiating groups define their self-interest.
A script might be imbedded in a technological structure, that will to some degree
guide and constrain what actions a user of the artifact can carry out.52 7 For instance, a
mediator who in a conflict assessment identifies that pollution monitoring is a high
priority among one or more stakeholder groups should develop some appreciation for
how available approaches to monitoring (continuous, parameter, hand-held) demand
widely varying organizational structures, collect different kinds of data that can be used
to address unique sets of questions, and allow for or discount a range of interactions
between regulators, industry, and residents. Altering existing monitoring scripts,
embedded primarily in technological structures, will require actions by those who have
control over traditional allocative resources, such as funding, knowledge, and technical
expertise. 528 Certain relational resources may also be important, as technologies that are
already in use would have generated networks of actors that operate through mutual
respect for certain kinds of skills or expertise.529 A mediator, in consultation with the
parties, would be able to explore whether such resources are available and whether they
256
could be marshaled in the context of a negotiation. It is true that simply encouraging
parties to agree to or ignore a proposed monitoring approach may lead to an agreement,
as occurred in a number of the case studies considered here. However, such an approach
will leave a far more wide-ranging set ofjoint gains, which could be created through
examining underlying scripts and their embeddedness in technological structures, on the
table.
A script could also be embedded in one or more coordination structures.
Coordination structures represent the "interdependence of action between multiple actors
when accomplishing a complex task."5 30 Within environmentally overburdened
communities, multiple administrative actions are in progress before and during resident
attempts to question industry and agency routines. Each is run according to its own
expectations and artifacts, which influence who performs various tasks and how they are
carried out. In several of the case studies, coordination structures influenced problem-
solving by providing institutionalized expectations for settlement and which issues could
be considered by the parties. For example, four parallel processes at work in the Conoco
mediation in Commerce City removed resident proposals for joint exploration of odor
sources, community technical consultation on equipment upgrades, reduction of benzene
emissions to groundwater, and early warning technologies from consideration. In their
place was a settlement designed to anticipate future sulfur dioxide emissions reduction
requirements and address the concerns of several agencies on the issue. A mediator
should be able to identify a range of such coordination structures that exist when her
attention is drawn to a particular dispute. Changing scripts embedded in these structures
will require the exercise of formal and informal authority to reorganize how multiple
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actors interact, as well as relational resources such as trust across actors generating each
of the parallel administrative actions.3
Of greater complexity for the mediator will be characterizing the cultural
structures that interact with the scripts used by parties to environmental justice disputes.
Cultural structures include "norms of appropriate behavior that enable and constrain
particular types and sequences of actions."5 32 In every case considered for this
dissertation, an industrial accident or the discovery of new information about
contamination exposed the norms at work within petrochemical facilities and agencies
that limited how facility upsets and accidental releases, sampling and risk assessment,
and emergency response were addressed. For example, a 14-day release of a refinery
catalyst by a Unocal facility in northern California revealed eight areas of plant
management and operations that contributed to the extended accident. Each was open to
brief scrutiny because of the publicity and attention surrounding the accident. They
included (a) refinery management's use of confirmatory decision-making, (b) outmoded
methods of accident investigation (Process Hazard Analysis), (c) limited transfers of
organizational memory, (d) biased results generated by a reliance on visual monitoring
and observation of the stacks, (e) reliance on a limited set of operating parameters to
gauge facility performance, (f) an inflexible management hierarchy and use of emergency
response authority, (g) a response to off-site complaints that did not ensure that essential
information would be gathered, and (h) limits to agency reporting and community
warning. These scripts are in part the product of cultural structures, which over time
framed and negotiated the shared meanings, norms, and identities (i.e., roles and
responsibilities) of refinery management and the operators who had access to ongoing
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information regarding the release. Many community-generated proposals for anticipating
and reporting accidental releases were rejected in favor of a massive expenditure on a
technological fix that has yet to be used to improve emergency response. A mediator
could have identified both authoritative and relational resources needed to reopen some
of the scripts embedded in these cultural structures, in part through collaboration with
regulators familiar with the practices common to facility management in the context of an
accidental release. If certain scripts are embedded in overlapping cultural and
coordination structures that cannot be addressed within a negotiation window,
stakeholders to the dispute should be made aware of these limits to integrative porential
as well.
We have learned how a few scripts in a highly institutionalized context, which in
the case studies included identifiable environmental and plant management routines,
isolated engineering solutions offered in the aftermath of an accident, and immediate
responses to crisis such as interpretations of accidents, limits to data-gathering, and
mitigations to projects, will inevitably percolate to the surface and present opportunities
for integrative bargaining. Traditional process techniques could be used to alter or
disrupt this narrow range of identifiable scripts, and mediators should work to investigate
their embeddedness in technological, coordination, and cultural structures and marshal
the kinds of allocative, relational, and authoritative resources necessary to address them.
The case studies suggest that even in the absence of a neutral process advocate, a narrow
range of scripts such as those listed above will emerge and prove central to any
negotiation and agreement reached. But given the vast range of scripts that are either
undetectable within a negotiation space or arise in unique combination within a
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negotiation, a more central role for the mediator presents itself. The mediator must work
individually with the parties to make existing preferences resilient to the biases that
scripts encourage, and help them form new preferences that are less prone to the
influence of existing, less identifiable scripts.
Making negotiators aware of how existing preferences are prone to the kinds of
biases that scripts encourage. As discussed, the scripts outlined in Figure 10 had
noticeable effects on community-corporate negotiations in three ways: they made it
difficult to transition from isolated engineering or environmental management problems
that needed to be solved to community-wide concerns and relationship-building
objectives; encouraged an inappropriate focus on reservation levels as opposed to
resistance points, or the least favorable outcomes needed to satisfy a locale's
constituencies; and led to the rejection of low-cost solutions to root causes of resident
concerns, forcing parties to make tradeoffs between such proposals and more certain but
inefficient infusions of resources into a community. These three visible effects of the
structural variables within the negotiation space, namely dialogue framing, ZOPA
construction, and tradeoff formation, can to some degree be influenced by mediators
through the traditional use of integrative bargaining strategies. Three tasks for the
mediator present themselves in a highly institutionalized context: (a) redirecting the
scope of dialogue from root causes of an incident to problem-solving informed by
community-wide concerns and relationship-building that anticipates changing
representational needs, (b) reducing the emphasis on reservation levels in the presence of
unstable baselines and procedural and time pressures, and (c) working to attach a true
value to time-intensive but low-cost proposals that represent solutions to identifiable root
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causes of resident concerns. By focusing on these tasks, mediators will help to protect
preferences from decision-making biases that would otherwise be created by scripts.
Every successful effort in this direction will protect some of the integrative potential of a
negotiation from further erosion, by recognizing that stakeholder preferences are in fact
subject to manipulation in ways that can threaten integrative potential.
Helping parties formulate new preferences that are less prone to the influence of
existing scripts, (particularly those that are not readily identifiable). The first two tasks
for mediators begin to sketch the contours of a new kind of process manager in highly
institutionalized settings, where scripts cycle through the negotiation spaces that occur for
brief moments of time within them. To some degree, a mediator who shapes dialogue
beyond the circumstances of a given dispute, moves parties toward a better
approximation of their resistance points, prepares stakeholders for unique kinds of
tradeoffs, and helps them identify the allocative, authoritative, and relational resources
necessary to change the comparably few scripts that emerge following a crisis will
succeed in protecting the initial solution space from erosion by structural forces. But.the
presence of scripts that influence the negotiation space while remaining partially or even
completely hidden from scrutiny points to the need for entirely new roles for mediators if
an expansion of the initial solution space can ever be achieved in institutionalized settings.
These scripts, particularly those listed as numbers 5 and 6 in Figure 10, represent
preferences that have solidified over many years and are therefore the most difficult to
identify by negotiating parties. Such scripts do not just cycle through a negotiation space
and change procedural dynamics such as the three discussed above. They remove vast
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bits of integrative potential from the negotiation space before it is even opened following
a crisis.
The fact that these scripts are so deeply embedded in technological, coordination,
and cultural structures that they remain hidden from the discrete scrutiny of mediators
during a conflict management process suggests the need to rethink the kind of neutral
third party assistance that would be necessary to truly expand the initial zone of possible
agreement for negotiations that occur within institutionalized settings. Simply
intervening after a crisis, documenting the preferences of relevant stakeholders (and even
shoring up existing preferences from the influence of structural forces), and pursuing the
procedural elements called for by the integrative bargaining literature will prove
insufficient. Mediators must assume new roles and relationships with parties in a highly
regulated context that begin months or even years before any given dispute emerges after
a crisis. They must understand that most integrative potential in these settings can only
be captured when parties are not in a state of crisis or its aftermath. Prior to crisis and
conflict, mediators, through their involvement with groupings of potential stakeholders,
must become familiar with the daily routines of environmental and facility managers, so
that they can understand the resources at play within regulatory and regulated entities
(allocative, authoritative, and relational) and learn where scripts are most likely to be
generated. Ideally, mediators, through their association with coalitions of potential
stakeholders, will advocate for the co-production of desired outcomes such as
environmental protection, by developing ways to move toward organizational
decentralization, better communication, new kinds of information exchange, increased
responsiveness to concerns, increased trust and coordinated actions, joint efforts to
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understand the causes of problems, means of analyzing patterns of problems, and ways of
responding creatively to problems through multiple means and coordination with parties
not initially involved. Barriers to co-production among stakeholders should constitute the
next frontier in the work of negotiation theorists to achieve better resolutions to conflict
in highly regulated settings and limit their narrowing effects on integrative potential.
Mediators, who have always been tasked with encouraging both institutional formation
and change through the very groupings of parties that they bring together and facilitate
and the arrangements for cooperative problem-solving that negotiated agreements leave
behind, should therefore become involved in (a) creating new forms of participation and
information gathering for all stakeholders, (b) motivating changes in state and facility
actions and responses to crisis, (c) increasing transparency and accountability of state and
industrial actors, and (d) contributing to joint initiatives to regulate difficult problems.
Conclusion
Negotiations with environmental justice communities reflect in large part resident
concerns with existing institutions and how they should be changed. It should come as
no surprise that once organized communities take part in negotiations with industry and
agency representatives, they will fall victim to some of the biases while ignoring some of
the scripts that allow for complex petrochemical operations and their regulation to
proceed under conditions of uncertainty. We've seen evidence of this in the negotiation
mechanics that were influenced by dynamic baselines of environmental quality, uneven
emissions, organizational routines, the roles embedded within technological fixes, and
multiple administrative actions. But institutions are not static entities; rather, they are
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"ongoing and historically embedded processes" that both enable and constrain behavior.
As such, the scripts that translate individual actions into these embedded processes,
which in turn limit what can be accomplished by human actors, are not set in stone. They
are to varying degrees embedded within technological, coordination, and cultural
structures, some of which will indeed be off-limits to stakeholders and mediators alike.
But mediators must become more adept at identifying these structural elements, and
positing linkages between them and the kinds of scripts, goals, pre-established roles, and
other factors that lie at the intersection of agency and structure, and hold promise for
limiting or expanding the initial offer space to a negotiation. The historical
accumulations of past practices and understandings that set the conditions for problem-
solving and negotiation after a petrochemical accident are arguably far more important
than the procedural tactics addressed in the literature on integrative bargaining in framing
what can and cannot be accomplished. And we have seen that mediators will often be
called upon to assess conflicts at moments where exogenous changes, such as industrial
accidents, can increase the odds that scripts will be revised, or at least questioned before
they are again subject to replication. If we do not encourage negotiation parties to
address the scripts, goals, and identities which under normal conditions are hidden within
industrial and regulatory organizations, we will forego much of the integrative potential
of a community-corporate negotiation. Mediators can assist by identifying and helping
parties to question and change scripts, recognizing "the applicability of previously
irrelevant actions," and suggesting new roles for important actors within relevant
organizations. Most of the work that will be needed to free integrative potential that is
locked within stakeholder organizations will in the end be the responsibility of the parties.
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But through conflict assessment, joint fact-finding, and more careful preference analysis,
mediators can protect a negotiation's integrative potential by identifying some of the
narrowing influences at work behind the scenes, and opening them up to review.
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